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SYNOPSIS
V(/ords like ’rules*, * principles* and ’laws* show in ordinary usage 
a considerable degree of fluidity which makes it impossible to draw 
more than certain broad distinctions between them,and moral 
philosophers have generally shown a tendneoy to use these words in 
rather blanket ways which ignore even these broad distinctions. It is 
necessary therefore to explain at the outset the sense in which 
’principles’ is used in this enquiry. As used here, this term means 
certain requirements of a general nature belonging to a given 
subject-matter which conflict with one another in a systematic way and 
without indicating a defect in tiieir formulation. This definition is 
not arbitrarily chosen but is claimed to apply to the main kind of 
general utterance in the field of morals.
At a further stage *a moral principle’ is defined stipulâtively 
as a principle which contains a distinctive moral concept in its 
statement as constitutive of its scope, and it is maintained that all 
moral principles in this sense adduce considerations.
The chief antithesis of ray position in this enquiry is constituted 
by what I call formalism, namely the view that moral principles are 
principles of a universal nature which are treated as the overriding 
principles of our lives. In rejecting this view I do not opt for what 
might easily be taken to be the natural alternative to it, i.e. the 
view that moral principles are the principles of human excellence.
The alternative adopted by me is based on the notion of competing 
fields. By a field I mean a set of standards which apply to our conduct 
irrespective of our own choices; thus morality, self-interest and 
religion are fields in my sense. These fields compete with each other 
both by having border-disputes as well as by threatening one another 
with complete subjugation.
This enquiry is thus in part a plea that a major function of 
ethics is the study of the various moral concepts and of concepts 
belonging to other fields which are of importance in understanding 




1. The possibility of using cognate words and expressions inter­
changeably seems to be implied by calling them cognates. One might 
indeed deny this under the influence of a theory of the ’mot juste’, 
but when stylisitic or logical perfection is not the aim such a 
denial can only be absurd. And once general objections of this kind 
are disallowed, it seems possible to investigate in detail the 
usage of each of a set of cognates, in order to determine the many 
ways in which they are interchangeable. The set of cognates I shall 
be concerned'with, more than any other, is the set of which ’rules’, 
’laws’ and ’principles’ are perhaps the most important members. 
Whatever philosophical value such detailed cartography may 
generally have, it seems to me that, in their case, for reasons 
which I hope to make plain later, it is best to keep certain 
questions of a logical nature constantly in mind, and to study 
their usage in piecemeal fashion, mainly in subordination to these 
questions.
One such question may be raised in the following way. There 
are certain features of the use of these words by moral 
philosophers, especially when preceded by the adjective ’moral’,
i.e. of expressions like ’moral rules’, ’moral principles’ and 
’moral laws’, which though seemingly trivial, are likely to repay
2.
a deeper probing. Thus, very often, they have shown a preference 
for one of these expressions, as generally the most suitable, or, 
sometimes, they have avoided one of them almost completely. I 
shall briefly give a few examples in support of my claim. Both 
these features are to be found in Kant. He used, almost . 
consistently, ’moral laws* as the preferred expression, and, 
negatively, completely avoided ’moral rules’. Bradley, though not 
clearly a deontologist like Kant, shows the same negative prefer­
ence. Among the later utilitarians, Sidgwick showed a fairly
1 '
strong preference for ’moral rules’. Other examples can no doubt 
be found in the history of ethics. But perhaps the best illustra-
Ï «
tion is provided by comtemporary British ethics. There is a wide-
2
spread preference for ’moral rules’, and a universal avoidance of 
’moral laws’.
It would be highly implausible to maintain that choices of 
this nature are made on stylistic grounds. Being rather blanket 
choices, they betray an insensitiveness to the distinctions of 
ordinary speech: considerations of style would therefore demand 
just the opposite. Nor can they be explained solely as referential 
devices, used to refer indifferently to any member of a large class.
No doubt the need for such reference sometimes arises, and I shall
1. See his History of Ethics.
2. to. R. M* Hare’s use of ’moral principles’, though untypical, 
is no less single-minded. See his Language of Morals, passim.
myself use •requirement’ or ’standard’ for this purpose. But it is 
not so frequent as to explain such systematic choices. And, moreover, 
why should the choice of such devices diverge in such systematic ways 
between writers from different schools? I shall now maintain that 
there are only two ways of making a general choice between these 
expressions; one legitimate, and another the source of a good deal 
of confusion. And, further, that when the’ choice is not quite 
general, as it is in the above examples, but departs clearly from 
ordinary untheoretical speech, it is to be explained in one of the 
same two ways. It may either be made in terms of an ethical theory, 
sometimes backed in turn by a more general philosophical theory, or 
to claim application for an independently valid logical distinction. 
Obviously, this is too brief a statement to establish a clear 
difference between the two; I shall however try to do so in the 
course of this chapter.
In illustration of the first way, let us take the utilitarian 
predilection for ’rules’ to refer to the general requirements of 
morality. Since writers opposed to teleological theories - and ipso 
facto to utilitarianism - do not, in the main, countenance ’rules’ 
in moral contexts, is it not reasonable to assume that it is the 
preoccupation with a means-end model which determines the 
predilection? But a single explanation of this sort is not always 
available. What, for instance, does the current predilection for
4.
’moral rules’ reflect? I am inclined to think that it springs 
partly from a notion that moral requirements are, in an important 
sense, practical in character; and partly also perhaps from a 
philosophical theory of rules, derived ultimately from Wittgenstein; 
but I feel that possibly at the same time it is meant to stress 
their resemblance to rules which seem quite unmysteriously man-made. 
Where the choice lies between the other two expressions the position 
may be more complicated. A large number of analogies suggest them­
selves, and their resultant may not always point unmistakably in one 
direction. In Ross, for instance, the preference for ’laws’ suggests 
a preoccupation with the notion of obligation; but does it also in 
Kant? Now it is not important that the explanations I have given . 
should be^  correct; but it does seem to me that generally the 
correct explanations are of this kind; i.e. that generally they are 
explanations in terms of some special feature of an ethical theory.
There is no clear example, as far as I am aware, in the 
history of ethics of the second way of making a general choice. Kant 
came perhaps closer than any other moral philosopher in providing 
one. Let us recall his distinction between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives. In the Grundlemmg. as generally elsewhere, 
the former are called ’laws’ or ’commands’; the latter being sub­
divided into ’technical’ and ’pragmatic’ imperative^, and called, 
respectively, ’technical rules’ or ’rules of skill’, and ’maxims’ or
5.
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•counsels’# Superficially it seems that his choice of ’moral laws’
as the appropriate expression for moral requirements is also a
choice in terms of an ethical theory, vizi his theory of the
4
categorical imperative. But underlying the imperativist phraseology 
is a logical distinction pertaining to a difference in importance 
which does not depend on any theory. No doubt the notion of importance 
often, though not necessarily illegitimately, finds applications 
which are not purely logical in character. Thus to the government of 
a poor country economy may understandably be a more important 
consideration than efficiency, just as financial gain might, though 
less understandably, rank higher in the calculations of a certain 
type of artist than the purely artistic qualities of his work. There
X f
is no lack of good reasons in such cases, but it is characteristic 
of them that the notion of importance is not applied as a logical 
notion. For the same reason the moral philosopher, in choosing 
between our three expressions, cannot, when he is not making a 
distinction between fundamental and derivative moral standards, 
appeal to it, without abandoning the logical impartiality of ethical 
theory. But Kant’s division of imperatives can be construed as the 
application of a purely logical notion of importance. It is a logical 
truth for him that moral requirements are the highest kind of 
requirements, and that, ipso facto moral considerations override
3. Second Section. Abbotts translation (tenth edition,Longmans).
4. Kant’s theory of the categorical imperative is discussed in 
chapter V. ,
6.
all other considerations* '
Can we also speak of some kind of precedence or over­
ridingness as between Kant’s two kinds of hypothetical imperative? 
The difficulty here seems to be that, while moral considerations 
bind us irrespective of our purposes, considerations of happiness 
or efficiency seem to hold only in the context of our purposes#
Kant thought that happiness is something all men aim at, but he did 
not think that it was a necessary fact about human beings. But 
perhaps a simple dichotomy between analytic and synthetic 
propositions would not do here* The connection between what we 
understand by human nature and the pursuit of happiness seems to be 
quasi-logioal, even if it is not analytic in a straightforward way* 
On the other hand, there seems to be nothing necessary about the 
interest we show in skills of various kinds. But whether this would 
give us a logical distinction similar to the one w© iiave already 
drawn is highly doubtful.
Now the construction I have put on Kant’s distinction between 
hypothetical, and categorical imperatives is probably not faithful 
to his intentions. It is in fact quite possible that his choice of 
’moral law’, like Ross’s, was intended to emphasise the importance 
of the notion of obligation in morality. But there is, nevertheless, 
an advantage in my suggestion:that such an interpretation is possible 
is in itself quite significant. This is obscured by the fact that
7.
morality is itself one of the terms of the distinction; i.e. since 
the distinction (as here interpreted) refers to the precedence of 
moral considerations over non-moral ones, there is no genuine 
question of its application within morality. (And, for the same 
reason, no real possibility of extending it elswhere exists).
Here I want to anticipate a possible objection. It might be 
said that the fact that certain requirements are the highest kind 
of requirement does not imply that they are the requirements of 
morality; that, therefore, Kant’s distinction, as I interpret it, 
may still have application. There are two reasons why this 
objection must be overruled. Firstly, for Kant the expressions 
’highest requirement’ and ’moral requirement’ imply each other; 
that is, what is to be done unconditionally must, for him, be what 
is morally required. Secondly, in ordinary speech also we rule out 
the possibility of asking ’Why ought I?’ only when an action is 
held to be morally required.
I want to draw a distinction which does not suffer from this 
defect, i.e. a distinction none of whose terms is tied to any 
particular subject matter. I shall define a way of using ’rules’ 
and a sense of ’principles’ which will enable us to make a genuine 
choice of the second kind between our three expressions. It will, 
moreover, give a distinction which is, as I believe, extremely 
rich in its possibility of application. But to ensure that it is
8.
in fact so, certain difficulties will have to be overcome. Before 
I begin to do so I want to do Kant justice, especially after having 
submitted him to a somewhat Procrustean procedure.
In distinguishing between three kinds of imperatives, and in 
selecting different terms from our set of cognates for each of them, 
Kant showed a commendable willingness to observe distinctions - a 
virtue not as common among philosophers as may be believed. Eis 
choice of "moral laws", even if my interpretation of it is not 
faithful to his intentions, served, in its setting, to mark off 
what is distinctive about morality as an aspect of "practical 
reason". A deceptively similar belief about the "practical" 
character of morality has led in recent ethiçs to just the opposite 
result. It is claimed that moral language is best studied as part 
of a much larger sphere, with which it is supposed to share many 
important characteristics, the sphere, namely, of "practical 
discourse* (Nowell-Smith) or "prescriptive language* (Hare).
Though there is something to be said for this view, it has in 
practice meant too great a stress on the analogies in a large and 
heterogeneous collection of types of speech - as if the wood alone 
mattered and the individual trees counted for little. Against such 
a background of theory it was hardly to be expected that the 
temptation to extend a central choice indiscriminately would be 
resisted. An amusing example of it is provided by Hare’s use of
"principle* when he calls "One ought never to put magenta cushions
5
on top of scarlet upholstery* a principle. A certain moral earnest-
t-
ness, reminiscent of Kant, is perhaps behind his choice of "moral 
principles", as though the acceptance of a moral requirement was 
always an occasion of great moment. And no doubt there are occasions 
of no less moment in other fields. But why the fact that magenta 
cushions do not go with scarlet upholstery should be called a 
principle fundamental to the art of interior decoration is quite 
mysterious.
2. The distinction which I want to draw between "rules" and 
"principles’ is not a distinction which is clearly reflected in the 
ordinary usage of these words. It is, however, closely connected 
with some of their important uses. The distinctive function of 
"principle" - i.e. the function which marks it off from its cognates 
lies in the fact that in many of its uses, it has retained a large
part of its original Latin sense (principium - beginning). The
Concise Oxford Dictionary article on "principle* begins with its 
use to mean a "fundamental or primary element", as when in the
ancient world water "was held to be the first principle of all
things"; and proceeds to list two analogous uses for "a fundamental 
truth as basis of reasoning" and "general law as guide to action".
I do not wish to suggest that these definitions are quite clear
5. Op.cit., p.156.
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and precise; nevertheless, they do, each in its own way, involve 
a notion of importance, in a way which is not purely subjective - 
in other words, what is called a "principle" in any of these ways 
occupies, in virtue of its relation to other elements in some 
scheme, implicitly or explicitly referred to, a position of 
importance. Can we, similarly, distinguish some characteristic 
feature of "rules"? Now, as a result of the general fluidity of 
usage of these cognates, there is seldom any feature which we can 
ascribe to all uses of one of them; generally speaking, all we seem 
to be able to discern is one or more features which belong to one 
of them more than to the others. There is however, one feature of 
"rules' which all its uses possess: it always makes sense to say 
of a rule that it has been broken. In the case of "laws" and 
"principles" it does not always make sense.even to say that a law 
or principle has been observed or followed. But there is another 
cognate word - "standards" - in whose case we can always say this. 
The difference between "laws" and "principles' on the one hand, and 
"rules" and "standards" on the other hand, we may here mark is that 
the latter necessarily involve the notion of success or failure, 
while the former do not. One of the differences between "rules" and 
"standards" seems to be this. In the case of the latter word, the 
notion of blame or praise from others seems to be closely involved. 
Thus I can have rules of personal convenience, but I cannot have
11.
standards solely for my own desires and wishes.
There is thus this broad difference between ’"rules* and
"principles*; the latter is characteristically connected with the
6
notion of importance; while the former regularly involves doing 
without implying a necessary connection with praise and blame. 
Against this background of difference we may draw our technical 
distinction between them.
To take "rules* first. There is a class of types of rules in
7
whose case conflict between two rules within the same body of rules 
is rare and if such conflicts are found to arise in certain oases, 
the body of rules is deemed to be more or less defective. Standard 
examples of this class are the official rules of sport, the rules
of mathematics and the rules of logic. Mr. B. J. O'Connor, in his
8
paper on Validity and standards calls such rules "constitutive
6. Professor Austin has pointed out that "doing an action", as used
in philosophy, is a "stand-in used in the place of any (or almost
any?) verb with a personal subject". He asks; "is to think some­
thing, or to say something, or to try to do something, to do an 
action?" It is, like "thing* or "quality", a "dummy*. (A Plea 
for Excuses; Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, 
195^-57). But "doing" or "doing something" raises fewer 
difficulties than "doing an action". Thus to say something, to
' take one of his examples, is, in a perfectly good, non-
philosophioal sense, to do something. Similarly, where thinking 
involves reasoning, thinking is "doing" or "doing something" 
though we often contrast the two.
7. In the case of mathematics a rule may forbid what is jointly
permitted by two or more rules; but for the sake of simplicity 
I shall ignore this possibility.
8. Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, Vol.LVII. 1956-57#
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rules*. But his characterisation of them differs from mine. He 
ignores certain important differences between them and, as a result, 
attributes more to the class as a whole than can legitimately be 
done. Thus, with respect to the possibility of remedying conflicts 
between rules belonging to any member of it, he treats official 
rules of sport as the paradigm to which the others conform. He says; 
"Because such rules are,,in this way, constitutive of the activities 
to which they relate, they are only exceptionally, if ever, 
conflicting or indecisive through vagueness. If they do turn out to 
be so the defect can always be remedied by amending the rules." Now 
it is certainly true of games like cricket or chess (to take his 
examples) that conflicts of rules do not arise in them, and that if 
they did ever arise, they could be remedied; but to say that this is 
true also of mathematics and logic is quite misleading. The 
discovery of paradoxes within his system may lead a logician to 
despair (as, according to Russell, Frege was by the discovery of 
the class paradox); and in mathematics sometimes the remedying of 
such defects may come after generations of effort.
For O'Connor not only is the absence of conflict essential 
to such rules, but so also is the absence of "indecision through
vagueness*. This makes the class defined by his expression
, ■
"constitutive rules* much narrower than the class which my use of 
k*ules" defines. The reasons why I want to use "rules" in my way
13.
be made explicit only in stages# But there is some similarity 
between the purpose of his distinction between rules which are 
•constitutive" and those which are not, and the purpose for which 
I want to draw a distinction between "rules* and "principles*.
He wants to show that only in the sense of constitutive rules can 
we speak of validity in a standard sense; whereas I am concerned,to 
show that it is inappropriate to speak of "moral rules*, where 
"rules* is understood in either the sense of his "constitutive 
rules" or in my sense of "rules*. He thinks that only rules which 
lack both these conditions, i.e. which* are imprecise and 
conflicting, can serve as "evaluative standards"; for to put 
forward an "evaluative argument"is to "offer evidence that the 
facts under consideration satisfy rules of the latter type".
Since I want later to question the distinction between evaluation 
and description, as it has been recently applied, and which, in 
its current form O’Connor seems broadly to accept in this paper, 
it is not necessary for me to question this view directly. But an 
important reason which leads him to adopt such stringent 
requirements for "constitutive rules* must here be examined. "It 
is worth noting", he says, "that this sort of conflict and 
indecision arises where the subject matter antedates the rules 
and standards for its evaluation. (Men had conduct, language, 
social disputes, dogs and plants long before they had moral rules.
14
grammar, law, dog shows and botanical classification, the 
respective devices for their ordering)*. This passage exhibits, 
in a more acute form, the same mistake as the passage I have 
criticised above ; he attributes to a whole set what is true only 
of some of its members. Only in the case of the last two of his 
examples, viz., botanical classification and dog shows, is it true 
without qualification that the * subject matter antedates the rules 
and standards for its evaluation*. Men could have "conduct* only 
by having rules (do animals have "conduct"?), even though the first 
rules were moral only in a rudimentary way. Similarly, social 
disputes imply juridical procedures, though not of the 
sophisticated kinds we have in the modern world. And does not 
justice partially "define* morality just as much as the L.B.W. 
rule defines cricket? No doubt men had language before formal 
grammar, but on what grounds can we assume that an artificial 
language could, like a calculus, have precise and consistent rules 
without becoming a device of limited application? 0"Connor is led
f -
to force, in this way, a simple pattern on complicated cases by 
a deeper fallacy. He fails to realise that vagueness and mutual 
inconsistency, or their opposites, are not contingent properties 
of rules, but depend essentially on the field to which they belong, 
and on their function within it. I shall try to show that 
imprecision and mutual clash are essential to the rules of morality '
15.,
(or moral principles as I shall call them) in virtue of the nature
of morality. And, for this reason, in making claims of this nature
in any given case, one claims to be in a position to characterise,
to an important degree, the logical nature of the field concerned.
That the degree of precision attained by a rule depends on
its function within its field may be seen by considering some of
O’Connor’s examples of’’constitutive rules’.
He contrasts legal requirements with rules of sport. ’Many
of the characteristic disputes of the law’, he rightly observes,
’are carried on by methods of reasoning which are typical of
disputes in valuational matters’. But the contrast between such
characteristic legal disputes and disputes over rules of sport may
9
not always be sharp. Thus, two of the official rules of cricket, 
viz. 45 and 46, are concerned with the ’duties of the umpires’• 
They are, inter alia ’the sole judges of fair and unfair play, and 
the final judges of the fitness of the ground, the weather and the 
light for play in the event of the decision being left to them’; 
and if they disagree ’the actual state of things shall continue’. 
Now though these rules are quite precise in defining the authority 
of the umpires, the matters over which such authority is exercised 
are, by their very nature, subject to dispute. The need for this 
’last court’ is thus as obvious in cricket as it is in law. And
9. Or ’laws of cricket’ as they are called. Official Rules of 
Sport and Games, 1950-1951 (Nicholas Kaye).
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there may be - indeed there are - ’divergent precedents’ for 
settling questions about ’the fitness of the ground’ etc. (Yet 
we have no last courtV not even a first court, for mathematical 
disputes).  ^ *
O’Connor thinks that the satisfaction of certain constitutive 
rules is ^ always a precondition of the application of evaluative
standards. ’And even in such primarily evaluative activities as
' { 
assessing conduct or judging dogs, there are constitutive rules
which must be satisfied before we turn to evaluation, though for 
the most part such rules remain in the background and unnoticed.
It would, for example, violate the constitutive rules of Cruft’s 
Show if a dog were entered which had not been registered with the 
Kennel Club. Such a dog would not qualify for a prize, however well
he conformed to the standards of his breed. And so in the field of
ethics, apes, infants or maniacs do not qualify to have their 
conduct evaluated in accordance with any principles of morals-’
Now it is a truism that before anything can be rated in a certain 
way it must be eligible for such rating; but there is no obvious­
ness about the need to satisfy criteria defined in terms of
constitutive rules. The examples he gives are again mixed. It is
obvious that, though the ordinary criteria of a dachshund are 
neither precise, nor perhaps even consistent, the Kennel Club 
cannot operate with such criteria. And we do not experience any
17.
hesitation in recognizing apes and infants, though these latter 
are rather question - begging examples. But surely maniacs come 
in a very different category. Where ’maniac* is not used loosely 
as a,term of abuse, but to exclude someone from the community of 
moral agents, the possibility of disputes and heart-searching is 
endless. Here there is no possibility, as there is in framing 
rules of entry for dog shows, of ending our difficulties by fiat.
But the relation between the general requirements that are 
held at any time to operate in a field and that field itself is a 
matter of systematic investigation. Here we may recall a famous 
saying of Aristotle. In the Nichomachean Ethics, he says, .
it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each 
class of things just so far as the nature of the,subject admits; 
it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from 
a mathematician as to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs’ 
(1,3). It seems to me that the value of what he says in this passage 
has been exaggerated. That we should only look for the degree of 
precision which a subject admits is quite indisputable, if not 
obvious, but the real difficulty is to determine whether or not the 
precision we happen to be content with is essentially what the 
subject admits of, and, whether, when our expectations have been 
belied in a given case, this was due to an over-optimistic estimate 
of the potentialities of the subject or a failure of ours.
18.
Vfe may now see how the two conditions I have stipulated 
for rules (in my sense), nsuaely, that conflict between them 
should be infrequent, and that such clashes should be deemed to 
be defects in the body of rules to which they belong, may be 
expected to operate. A body of rules which was intended to meet 
the second condition, but failed to meet the first, may have to 
be discarded altogether, just as a garment with many holes in it 
may not be worth mending. But this is not necessarily so. Thus 
conflicts of laws are frequent, and since it is one of the aims 
of legal reform to make such conflicts less common, this must be 
held to be a defect; nor, moreover, is this aim always achieved 
by replacing such laws by entirely new ones. Laws then cannot be 
called rules in my sense; but the difference between the two is 
not 30 great as it is between laws and O’Connor’s ’constitutive 
rules’. They occupy an intermediate position between my rules and 
principles (as I shall define this word), since, though they 
conflict frequently, there seems no limit to the possibility of 
reducing such conflicts.
5* I shall now explain the sense in which I intend to use 
’principles’. There are, often, certain general requirements in 
a field which conflict with one another in a systematic way, in 
virtue of their subject matter and their function in that field, 
and therefore without thereby indicating a defect in their
19.
formulation. Rules of batsmanship (’Play with a straight bat’), 
the maxims which guide historians, and general requirements of 
morality like ’Be just’, ’Be truthful’ etc. may be taken as 
representative examples. I must here point out that I am using 
’requirement’ as the'word is ordinarily used, without intending 
to place it on either' side of the current dichotomy between 
’normative’ and ’descriptive’ uses of language. In my use of 
’principles’ therefore, principles are neither coincident with, 
nor a sub-class of, ’evaluative standards’ (whatever that 
expression means).
Broadly speaking, we may distinguish two kinds of 
application of ’principles’ in ray sense. A principle may be a 
general recipe which is not meant to be followed without exception, 
and one which may therefore be ignored without necessarily 
committing a fault; such recipes being the best that can be hoped 
for in the field concerned. Thus we are told to play with a 
straight bat and, also, to try to demoralise a bowler, even by 
hitting him against the spin, when he has gained a psychological 
upper hand over the batsmen. In our dealings with one another 
honesty is said to be the best policy; but we are also advised 
not to expect too much from people. These recipes are genuine 
examples of the principles of batsmanship and the art of savoir 
faire, not just because they frequently have exceptions and often
20
- .
give oonflioting advice, but also for the following further reasons. 
They deserve to be called principles because they are what the nature 
of the fields in which they occur would lead us to expect. If we 
could formulate rules which work in the way in which the rules of 
say, mathematics or engineering work we should not be playing 
cricket (or be practising the art of living). Nor are they merely
, I
beginners* guides which can be expected to be replaced by sets of, 
rules which dovetail into each other. For the expert is here in the 
same boat as the novice; and if he comes to possess an infallible 
skill in such matters he ceases, ipso facto, to be expert in batsman- 
ship or savoir faire. The second kind of application may perhaps 
be.best illustrated from the field of morals. Here certain 
fundamental ends like justice, benevolence, loyalty etc. are 
accepted,.and the principles in which such virtues are enunciated 
cannot be regarded as merely recipes (except on some philosophical 
theory)•
A question that arises here is, whether, scientific laws like,
for'instance, dnell*s law are principles in my sense. No simple
answer to this question seems, however, to be available. On a view 
10
like Hopper’s it seems that they are neither rules nor principles 
(in the way I use these words). Not being *falsifiable* (by the 
possibility of producing counter-instances) in the way scientific
10. See his Logic of Scientific Discovery> especially Chapters I 0 
and IV.
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hypotheses are for him, they are in principle redundant; thus, if 
we accept his view of science, they cannot be principles, for to be 
principles in my sense they must be essentially connected with their 
subject matter (i.e. physics). Nor can they be rules, for when we 
operate with them we find that beyond certain well defined limits 
they simply do not work.
Nor do they seem to satisfy my requirements of a principle if 
we take Mr. Toulmin’s view of them. His view is expressed in the 
following passage: "Since the parts which different laws of nature 
play are so very different, one cannot expect them to have many 
features in common. But one such feature they do have; and it is 
one whichV in the case of Snell’s law, proved of the first 
importance. They do not tell us anything about phenomena, if taken by 
themselves, but rather express the form of a regularity whose scope 
is stated elsewhere; and accordingly, they are the sorts of state­
ments about which it is appropriate to ask, not “Is"this true or
not?", but rather "To what systems can this be applied?" or "Under
11
what circumstances does this hold?"’. There are two reasons why, if 
this account of scientific laws is accepted, we cannot call them 
•principles’. Firstly^ I use ’principle’ in a way which permits us, 
as a rule, to ask ’Is this principle valid?’ as a meaningful 
question; secondly, the scope of a principle can never be stated
11. The Philosophy of Science, p 86.
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full^i i.e* the typea of instance in which it is to be followed
I
form an open class* But» nevertheless, in an important respect 
scientific laws are like my principles* The fact that they do 
conflict is not a defect in them*
I have said that principles conflict in a systematic way in 
virtue of their subject matter, while mutual clash in the case of 
rules is deemed by us to be a defect in their formulation* The 
question may naturally be raised why, in drawing my distinction 
between rules and principles, I should thus introduce an asymmetry 
in my criteria; why, i*e., do I relate the possibility of 
(systematic) conflict in the latter case to their subject matter 
alone without making the same stipulation in the case of the former 
also? In seeking to eliminate conflicts in such cases we assume or 
presuppose that the idea of treating conflicts as defects makes 
sense; so, in a sense, there is at one remove a connection even here 
with the relevant subject matter* The asymmetry then is only at a 
certain level* But the main advantage I secure in framing my 
definition of rules in the way I do is that it enables me to define 
a wide enough class for ray purposes# How the point of linking the 
possibility of conflict with the subject-matter in the case of 
principles is that, then, the idea of modifying or abandoning a 
principle on the ground that it conflicts with another does not, in 
consequence of its position in the field in which it occurs, make
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sense* I want, In other words, to claim that there are certain 
fundamental entities in a number of fields which play the part they 
play only by being entities which conflict in the way I have 
described# In saying this I am not, of course, pretending to justify 
fully the precise form I give to my distinction; the only adequate 
justification it can be given is by showing that, in the form in 
which I make it, it is extremely rich in application# But some more 
light can be thrown on it even here by examining a notion which is 
of some relevance to this enquiry, namely, the notion of a ’rule of 
thumb * •
The shorter Oxford Dictionary explains it as followsi
’A method or procedure derived entirely from practice or experience,'
without any basis in scientific knowledge; a roughly practical method*.
As so often with dictionary explanations, this account is too wide to
exclude certain applications of the expression which we should
regard as inappropriate, at least when we use it with care. But, even
as it stands, it reveals some of its distinctive features* Thus it
would not be a sufficient condition of calling a rule a rule of
thumb that we cannot always apply it successfully (as we cannot
12
always apply Snell’s law)# But what it fails to take into account is 
that we expect a minimum of intelligibility even from rules of thumb#'
12# Though scientists seldom call scientific laws rules, they can be 
given the form of a rule by treating them as rules of calculation# 
The law Ke»g- can be treated as a rule for calculating kinetic 
energy#
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For suppose a farmer found that if the village idiot looked morose, 
the weather on the following day was nearly always dull; that would 
not give him a rule of thumb for predicting the weather. Another 
essential element in thie notion is that the possibility of a more 
efficient procedure must be recognised before we can take a rule to
15
be a rule of thumb. If a game very much like cricket were played, 
in which the tallest player’s twenty-two paces determined the length 
of the pitch such a rule would not be a rule of thumb because it 
could not, even conceivably, be improved upon. Very often we speak 
of a rule of thumb only because a better procedure, though it is 
known to exist, is not to hand or is too inconvenient in the actual 
situation. (l am inclined to think that this is its standard use).
Three conditions seem therefore to be necessary for calling 
a procedure a rule of thumb*
i A more efficient procedure must be believed to exist 
or to be discoverable;
ii It must be intelligible in terms other tiian mere 
success.
iii Even frequent failures must not count against its 
status as a rule of thumb.
How why is ’Always play with a straight bat’ not a rule of thumb?
15. call the farmer’s weather lore rules of thumb because we 
think the Meteorological Office is equipped with a better 
technique. But could such rules have been called rules of thumb 
two thousand years ago, when the possibility of a science of 
meteorology was not seriously entertained?.
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It fails to satisfy the first condition in consequence of the fact 
that, as far as we can say, any teaching of sound batsmanship must 
include it. It is not a provisional recipe but one which describes 
an important factor in the scoring of most runs ; though that does 
not mean that it is always obeyed when a good score is made; merely 
that it can be ignored only when there are grounds for ignoring it.
The conclusion I want to draw from this brief excursion into 
rules of thumb is not the obvious one that we are not entitled to 
quarrel with our tools when none better are visualised. It is rather 
that when we claim to deal with a subject matter in a systematic way 
we cannot, in the same breath, disclaim any important connection 
between our pursuit and our quarry. When speaking of rules of thumb 
we explicitly leave such connections aside, but the search for them 
is not the monopoly of scientists. And when we have discovered the 
best that seems to be available in our field, we have done as much 
as the scientist can do in his own. In short, if what I am saying 
is not riddled with fallacy, there is no prima facie ground for 
holding that the category of principles (as I define it) has not 
many applications.
4* Having given my distinction between rules and principles a 
fairly precise formulation I shall now comment very briefly on 
certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s view of rules which are of 
relevance here. He uses ’rules’ in a sense very similar to the sense
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in which I propose to use this word. Thus the various language- 
games described in The Brown Book all employ ’rule* in this way;
and the same applies to the rules described in the Investigations.
/
In the latter book he argues, as he did earlier in The Blue Book, 
that all the possible ways of understanding a rule cannot be called 
its ’interpretations’, for what makes it possible to talk of 
interpretations is the fact that there is a form of behaviour which 
is observed in actual practice. He says* ’This was our paradox* no 
course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course 
of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was* 
if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can 
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the 
mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one 
interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least 
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 
"obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases’. (I,201).
Again* ’To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to 
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)* (l,199)« 
Wittgenstein is not simply identifying a rule with a uniformly
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observed custom, for that would be to make a crude behaviouristic 
reduction of rules, to ’abolish logic’ as it were. Rather* ’It is 
one thing to describe methods of measurement and another to obtain 
and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is 
partly determined by.a certain constancy in results of measurement’. 
(1.242) But his thought here is not easy to understand. At times he 
seems to make the connection between rules and agreement in 
behaviour far too close; for instance when he says, ’Disputes do 
not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether 
a rule has been obeyed. People do not come to blows over it, for 
example. This is part of the framework on which the working of our 
language is based (for example in giving descriptions)’ (1,240).
But it is not necessary for me to quarrel with Wittgenstein over so 
cardinal an element in his philosophy; what I propose to do is 
rather to show that his famous saying ’What has to be accepted, the 
given,-is so one could say - forms of life’ (p.226), applied as it is 
by him uniformly to rules, cannot mean the same when applied to 
principles. In other words, if we assume that a principle is not a
14
mere collection of consistent rules, then adopting a principle is 
not adopting a form of life in the way in which adopting a rule is.
Suppose I was teaching someone a rule of chess - say, the rule 
that the bishop moves diagonally - and, however much I explained to
14. As Hare seems to. See Infra, Chapter III.
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him, he never quite caught on to it* I should in that case be left 
with only one possibility, I could ask him to observe different 
players at play, and every time a player moved a bishop I could 
say ’Look*I ’This is how it is moved.* This is exactly the sort of 
example Wittgenstein gives. But now suppose I wanted to teach 
someone the principle ’Play with a straight bat*, and that 
explanations alone did not, as they naturally would not in such a 
case, prove sufficient for the purpose. V/hat sort of possibility 
is left to me here? If I were to ask my pupil to observe a 
’practice’, the practice, namely, of batsmen playing with straight 
bats, what might I achieve? Suppose the players I asked ray pupil 
to watch always played with a straight bat; i.e., with them 
playing with a straight bat was an absolute principle. This would 
be a self-defeating lesson; for its very success would be the 
failure of its purpose and I should have only taught him a rule. 
The explanation of our difficulty is that a different notion of 
sameness is involved in ’principles’ from the one which is 
involved in ’rules’. Wittgenstein rightly points out that the 
criteria of sameness vary from rule to rule. But it has to be 
noticed that this variability of criteria does not alter the fact , 
that, in relation to forms of life or customs, they are criteria 
of the same logical kind, whereas the criteria of sameness in 
principles stand in another, and far^  more complex, relation to
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conduct. While it is true that we obey principles in the same way 
in which we obey rules it is a mistake to assume that the criteria 
for saying that a principle is accepted are of the same kind as 
the criteria for saying that a rule is accepted. I might accept the 
principle ’Help the needy’ without in any way feeling obliged to 
share my limited means with all my impecunious neighbours, for the 
simple reason that there are other not lesà important principles 
which I also accept.
Rules, like principles, differ not only in being of various
15
kinds, but also in belonging to different fields and activities.
To disobey a rule one accepts is, unless extenuating circumstances
16
are pleaded, to incur a certain kind of blame, i.e., the blame 
which is attached to failures in the activity or field concerned.
But to disobey a principle may not give rise to a corresponding 
kind of blame, even when the principle is accepted and no defence 
is offered. This may be expressed in political terms by saying that, 
ideally speaking, each rule is, within the field to which it belongs, 
independent and self-sufficient - a temporal monad as it were; while 
principles enjoy only a shared sovereignty.
It must in fairness be said here that Wittgenstein did not 
find a. place for the category of principles in his philosophy in
15. These two terms will later be distinguished. See Chapter V.
16. This needs some qualification. We do not usually blame people 
for disregarding a rule they profess when it is purely agent- 
regarding, unless it relates to a standard of prudence which 
we accept. See Chapter V.
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part at least because he showed, at least in his published works, 
little interest in ethics. There is however some indication that he 
thought that it was essentially redundant in ethics and aesthetics. 
In his third article on Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930~55 (Mind. 
Jan. 1955)1 G. E. Moore reports him as saying that in these fields 
reasons are ’of the nature of further descriptions’, as in a court 
of law’’where you try to "clear up the circumstances" of the action 
which is being tried, hoping that in the end what you say will 
"appeal to the judge" ’, There is however another, and perhaps 
incompatible, suggestion that in aesthetics reasons take the form of 
an appeal to an ’ideal*, i.e., to a particular which serves as the 
exemplar to which the work of art in question is claimed to conform.
17
Miss R. Meager, in her paper The Uniqueness of a Work of Art takes 
up this suggestion and argues that, in both aesthetics and morals, 
we employ rules in which an ostensive model is appealed to, and that 
this is the characteristic form of reasoning in these fields.
’Given a highly complex object to be evaluated for its own sake and 
not functionally with some general end in mind, like Rosie or a 
symphony, it seems perfectly rational to refuse to commit oneself to 
generalisable evaluations of particular characteristics, however 
precisely defined. On the other hand it seems an adequate 
acknowledgment of the demand of reason for consistency and general 
evaluations rather than avowals of atomic .particular preferences,
17. Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, Vol.LIX. 1958-59#
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to provide a general principle of the ostensive form "Anything 
sufficiently closely reproducing the features of Rosie, in the 
excellent way and excellent combination in which they are manifested 
by her, is lovable". These features may then even be isolated for 
special mention, like the characteristic movement of the bass in 
Wittgenstein’s example. "Anyone insouciante in a way sufficiently 
like Rosie has a good chance of being lovable." "Any passage in a 
work resembling this one sufficiently closely where the bass moved as 
much as this baas moves has a good chance of being spoilt". But the 
force of these comments as general principles of evaluation clearly 
resides in the model, and not in the general value of the character­
istics mentioned’. It seems to me that Miss Meager is here assimilating 
morals far too closely to aesthetics, and her example of Rosie and 
her young man is hardly a case of moral appraisal. It may be noticed 
that her ’ostensible general principles’ resemble my ’rules’ and 
that consequently, she shows, in illustrious company no doubt, a 
strong tendency to treat principles as largely redundant to morals.
In the next chapter I shall discuss an approach to moral 
principles - what I call the formalist view of moral principles - 
which constitutes the main antithesis of my position in this enquiry.
If I succeed in refuting it, I shall have given some justification 
for trying to develop a view along the lines of my theory. Another 
important purpose I hope this negative undertaking will serve is to
52.
remove what is perhaps the strongest temptation to confuse the 





1. The naturalistic fallacy is often taken to be the principal 
source of error and confusion in ethics. If it is of the type of an 
ordinary logical fallacy, as has generally been claimed, it is a 
matter for surprise that it should have attracted so much attention. 
It seems to me that the importance of this fallacy has been 
exaggerated, and that this has led to a fallacy of a graver kind 
which, though it differs from the former in implying no simple 
logical mistake, is nevertheless related to it. Very roughly, and in 
quite general terms, I shall characterise it in the following way* 
it consists in holding that the distinctiveness of ethical judgments 
is to be seen not so much in their subject matter as in being of 
a certain form (namely, the universal form), or in involving 
reference to judgments in this form, and in possessing a character­
istically superior status in relation to certain other kinds of 
utterance with which they form a special class(often called the 
class of ’value-judgments*)• I shall call it the formalistic fallacy. 
The preoccupation with the naturalistic fallacy has resulted 
in a denial of any essential content to morality because in practice 
this fallacy arises most frequently in discussions of words like 
’good’, ’ought’ and ’right*, which have no necessary connection with 
any specific content. It was natural therefore to assume that these
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are the most distinctive moral words (and these are the words most 
moral philosophers have been mainly concerned with since the 
naturalistic fallacy was brought into prominence by G. E. Moore).
Both these notions (namely those of the naturalistic fallacy 
and of the formalistic fallacy) connect themselves with what may 
be called the problem of demarcating (to use a term which Popper 
uses in another connection) the sphere of the ethical. Thus that 
the naturalistic fallacy was originally intended to serve this 
purpose is plain in G. E. Moore’s Frincipia Sthica. For him goodness 
is the simple, non-natural quality which defines the ethical, and 
the naturalistic fallacy arises when an attempt is made to describe 
this quality in non-ethical terms, whether natural or metaphysical.
I shall argue at a later stage that some later versions of this 
fallacy connect themselves with the same problem, though not so 
directly as in Moore.
But the formalistic fallacy connects itself directly, and 
quite generally, with that aspect of the problem of demarcation which 
naturally suggests itself in an enquiry such as ours, viz., the 
problem of the criteria or distinguishing characteristics of those - 
general requirements of morality which are called ’moral principles’, 
’moral laws’, ’moral rules’, etc. (l shall henceforth call them 
’moral principles’, postponing the defence of the assumption thus 
implied that the category of principles applies to them at a later
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stage). It is this form of the problem that I shall be principally 
concerned with in this chapter. The advantage of beginning in this 
way is that we shall in fact be dealing with a question which, 
apart from being of central importance to our enquiry, can be 
sharply defined, and provides, moreover, an early opportunity of 
introducing in a precise form the notion of the fallacy, namely 
the formalistic fallacy, which plays a role in my position 
analogous to the role of its better known counterpart in a large 
number of present-day ethical theories. Towards the end of the 
chapter I shall state my own definition of a moral principle.
This is the definition I want to recommend, largely on philosophical 
grounds ; but I shall not be able to explain its full significance, 
nor to defend it adequately, till later. When doing that, and in 
criticising certain views opposed to mine, I shall suggest that 
certain attempts to distinguish the ethical are vitiated by a heavy 
formalistic bias, I shall not however claim that they are 
completely formalistic in character. ^
In recent discussions of the problem of the criteria of 
moral principles attention has tended to be focused on the 
characteristic of universality, which provides an indisputably 
formal criterion. Largely as a result of this, moral philosophers 
have generally failed to see that^there are other criteria which
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are of equal, if not greater, importance, and with a status not 
easily assigned. In claiming that the importance of the former 
criterion has been exaggerated I shall draw attention to a mistaken, 
criterion of moral principles which, though not so obviously formal 
in character, deserves to be so considered. This will involve me to 
some extent in the difficulties of the notion of logical form; 
nevertheless I shall not attempt to define logical form. I shall, 
without attempting to define the class of formal criteria, claim 
membership of it for a certain putative criterion of a moral 
principle.
1
Mr. ii). A. Gellner, in his paper "Ethics and Language", 
distinguishes a class of ’rules or plans of action’ which are 
capable of being ’formulated with the help of a symbolism employing 
only predicates, individual variables, operators and logical 
connectives’. He labels these as of ’If-type’ as against those of 
’E-type’ which cannot be formulated without ’personal reference’.
In his paper on ’Universalisability’ Hare accepts this distinction 
and puts forward reasons for the view that a moral judgment involves 
reference (implicit or explicit) to a rule or principle of the 
former type. He points out that it is important to see what Gellner’a 
account of U-type rules and principles excludes and what it permits.
.1. Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, Vol.LV. 1954-55*
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Thus; ’Roughly speaking, proper names (in the ordinary, not the
logical sense), personal pronouns (hut not the pronoun "one", nor
the pronoun"I"as it is used by some legal writers), and all token-
2
reflexive expressions are excluded’.
I have claimed above that universality is an indisputably 
formal characteristic. We may now show this quite easily without 
involving ourselves in the problem of logical form. The distinguish­
ing characteristic of a U-type rule (or maxim or principle) lies in 
the fact that its statement involves no reference to particulars. 
Since E-type rules are just the type of rules which do involve such 
reference, we can say that within the class of rules, maxims, 
principles etc. there is a division between those which involve 
reference to particulars and those that do not. We can eliminate all 
mention of rules etc. and say, further, that within all discourse 
there is a distinction between particular involving and non­
particular involving utterances. And this is a paradigm case of 
difference in logical form.
2, I shall distinguish two forms of the formalist position in
respect of moral principles; they may generally, and very roughly, 
be characterised by the nature of a common question they seek to 
answer. The question they are answers to is not so much 'ï/hat kind 
of principles are moral principles?*, but rather ’When does a
2. Ibid.
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principle become a moral principle?*. Undoubtedly these questions 
are not free from ambiguity, but there is a broad difference in the 
assumptions they suggest. The assumption underlying the first seems 
to be that the distinctiveness of moral principles lies in something 
intrinsic to them (though admittedly this is vague); whereas the 
latter seems to assume that a principle becomes a moral principle 
when it is held in certain circumstances or in a certain manner.
The constructive parts of this chapter are an attempt to 
answer the first question; the polemical parts, on the other hand, 
are in large part concerned to show the erroneousriess of theories 
which take the latter as their starting point.
The two forms of formalism I want to introduce are to be 
distinguished as a stronger and a weaker thesis, mutually related 
in a rather complex way, and possess, as we shall see, one feature 
in common* I shall start with the weak form. It takes the seemingly 
simple form of claiming that any principle which satisfies the
5
requirement of universality is capable of being a moral principle. 
Since the question when the transition is made from a principle 
which is only capable of being a moral principle to a principle 
which is actually a moral principle still remains to be answered,
5. Generally no distinction is observed between rules and
principles by those who commit themselves to this variety of 
formalism, but it could reasonably be assumed that, if they 
observed it, they would be formalists in respect of both.
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the original answer has to be supplemented by an answer to the 
latter question. Whether the answer to this is also simple remains 
to be seen. The only direct avowal of such a position known to me 
occurs in a paper contributed by Mr. Jonathan Harrison to an 
Aristotelian Society symposium on ’When is a principle a moral 
principle?’. He writes: ’I am inclined to think that any principle 
can be a moral principle, provided that certain formal requirements 
are fulfilled. By this I mean that, for a principle to be moral, it 
does not matter what it enjoins, so long as, for example, it is 
general, applies to everybody and does not need proper names for its
4
expression’. The latter sentence expresses in a less precise form 
the universality criterion which Gellner states in the passage quoted 
earlier.
This variety of formalism faces a serious threat of 
incoherence when we seek a way of making the transition from 
principles which are only potential moral principles to those that 
are actually so. For the transition lias to be made in such a way that 
the additional requirement stipulated in the process does not exclude 
any principle which satisfies the initial universality requirement, 
i.e., the requirement must be of such a nature that any U-type 
principle can meet it. And, furthermore, the transition must on no
4. Supp. Vol. XXVIII (1954) p.112. See also John C. Harsanyi,
’Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives’ (Mind, July, 1958)
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account be viewed as the fulfilment of a second formal requirement, 
which the strong form of formalism stipulates in addition to the 
requirements of universality (which it shares with the weak form); 
for otherwise the distinction between the two forms would disappear.
These two essential conditions can be met only with some 
difficulty, and even then not satisfactorily. But before enquiring 
into the possibility of doing so I must explain the second variety 
of formalism. This will occupy me in a rather lengthy section.
After illustrating it by an example in a further section I shall 
tackle the problem of establishing a genuine distinction between the 
two forms.
5. The stronger form of formalism, unlike the weaker form, 
attempts to provide the criteria for distinguishing actual moral 
principles from non-moral ones; not merely criteria for distinguish­
ing potential moral principles. But it shares with the latter a 
belief in universality as an essential feature of both potential and 
actual moral principles. Thus the difference between the two 
varieties can only lie in their modes of transition from potential 
to actual moral principles. The stronger form makes this transition 
in terms of a mistaken view of the notion of overridingness or 
ultimacy. It seems to me that, if rightly understood, this feature 
of moral principles cannot function as a criterion for
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distinguishing moral principles from other kinds of principles. A 
principle, in my view, does not become a moral principle by being 
an ultimate principle; rather, it is because certain principles are 
moral principles that they are ultimate principles. In other words, 
the ultimacy of moral principles is a consequence of their being 
moral principles. But in saying this I am not trying to beg any 
question; I am merely stating a counter-thesis which I want to 
establish against the formalist. I shall later try to show that 
ultimacy has been used as a criterion. I shall now argue that to 
employ it in this way is to employ it formally, and try thereby to 
determine as precise a sense of ’formal* as possible (which, in view 
of the importance I attach to the need to avoid the errors involved 
in the type of theory I want to attack, it is obvious I am obliged 
to do).
I have hinted earlier that the formalist’s notion of over- 
ridlngness is not a formal notion in an obvious sense. I shall now 
claim that it is so by a strong analogy with what deserves to be 
called a formal characteristic on a quite strict view of logical 
form. Now'though I do not propose to attempt a definition of logical 
form I must point out that there are at least two ways of approaching 
logical form which are unsuitable for our purpose. An account of 
logical form may fail to make provision for certain distinctions 
which we want to be able to make. The Aristotelian view that all
42,
propositions are of the subjeot-predicate form is an obvious example. 
Russell’s definition of logical form in The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism, suffers, at one level, from the same defect. He writes, ’I 
mean by the form of a proposition that which you get when for every
5
single one of its constituents you substitute a variable’. Russell
takes it to imply that ’Desdemona loves Casaio’ and *A is the right
of B ’ are of the same form, and the difference between them that
one is intransitive and the other transitive is thus obscured.
On the other hand, an account of logical form may be unsuitable
because of its connection with a special theory of meaning. Thus
when Russell says that ’the constituents of propositions . . .  are
6
the constituents of the corresponding facts’, we are faced with the 
difficulty that the form of a proposition deî^ ends not on what it 
geserts, i.e., not on the various logical relations it can enter
7
regardless of its truth or falsity, but on what is the case. It may 
be recalled here that Wittgenstein’s somewhat similar characterise 
ation in the Tractates of logical form as ’the form of reality’ led 
him to relegate the ethical, and much else besides, to the realm of
the ’inexpressible’. I shall therefore select a view of logical
form which does not suffer from either of these defects. Mr. P. F. 
Strawson’s account of logical form in his An Introduction to Logical 
Theory Is just of this type and is likely, with an important
5* Logic and Lan.?uafret Essays 1901-1960 (edited by Robert C. Marsh),
p.238.
6. Loc. cit., p.248.
7, The ideal language in which the correspondence is taken to hold 
being a dream rather than reality, the notion of form now becomes 
idle.
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emendation, to meet our requirements. In choosing it rather than any 
other I do not, however, wish to commend it as an essentially correct 
account of logical form from the general point of view of logical 
theory.
At the end of.§ 13, in the chapter on ’Formal Logic’, Strawson 
writes: ’This account of logical form attaches the notion of logical 
form firmly to those classes of inferences, etc., for which formal 
logicians frame general principles or of which they give general 
descriptions. The classification of statements with respect to their 
logical form is made to depend upon the formal logicians’ class­
ification of inconsistencies and validities. This restriction of the 
meaning of ’’logical form* is historically correct. There are many 
other kinds of general logical resemblance and difference between 
statements which are of philosophical importance. But there is no 
point in blurring the distinction between different kinds of logical 
classification’. This passage affords a good indication of what is 
characteristic of Strawson’s approach to logical form; but, taken as 
a general statement of his position, it is in need of supplementa­
tion. Since it is characteristic of his approach in this book that 
he is constantly raising questions of the relation between what 
transpires in logical systems and what corresponds to it in ordinary 
language, Strawson finds it necessary, in seeking to provide an 
account of logical form with respect to ordinary language of a degree
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of strictness parallel to the actual practice of the formal logician, 
to explain (though not in detail) the mutual bearing of the procedures 
of formal classification in the two fields. As a rule, when the formal 
logician distinguishes a logical type there is, corresponding to it, 
a separate expression (e.g. ’not* or ’all’) which performs a 
standard linguistic function (e.g. negation or generalisation). There 
are, in other words, ’representative verbal patterns’ corresponding 
to the formal logicians’ classification of validities and
inconsistencies. Now thie relation is not accidental. The existence
.
of such patterns is ’almost a sine qua non* of our noticing the formal 
analogies which are the basis of the formal logician’s classification. 
But even this is an understatement of the strength of the relation.
For when the resemblances in the verbal patterns of valid inferences 
are sufficiently striking for us to speak of their sharing a common 
form, though there is no detachable framework of words for which we 
can lay down a logician’s rule, there is an important difference 
between the role of the logician’s rule in such a case and the cases 
where the representative verbal pattern exists. Take for example 
transitive relations. ’Ancestor of’ and ’congruent with’ are 
transitive relations, whereas ’loves’, ’hates’, ’amuses’, ’is the 
square root of’, etc., are intransitive. But there is nothing in 
language, except the ’descriptive meaning’ of such expressions, to 
indicate whether ’xHy and yHz, xRz’ (i.e. the inference pattern
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of transitive relations) applies in a given case. And so ’we must 
not think of ourselves as having discovered the general principle of 
this class of entailments’(p42); whereas we could say this in the
I
former case. Though this distinction is fundamental to Strawson’s 
account of logical form, he is unwilling to apply it on any clear- 
cut basis. On the first of the two accounts of logical form given by 
him we may say that two statements are of the same logical form in 
so far as they play similar parts in ’inferences (etc.) of the same 
general class’ (p.50). The second, and more perspicuous, account of 
logical form is closely linked to logical formulae. Thus ; ’be may say 
that two statements are of the same logical form when they could 
correctly be made by the use of sentences (i) which exemplify the 
same logical formula and (ii) in which the logical constants have the 
logical use which is the standard use for the given system of rules’ 
(p.52). The demerit he sees in this account is that it places ’an 
unwanted restriction on our talk of logical form’ ; (p-53); for it would 
not permit us to refer to those classes of statements for which no 
representative verbal pattern suitable for quotation in a logician’s 
rule exists as having the same logical form. But if this limitation 
is not accepted then the reluctance he shows in applying the 
criterion that when a general description of what is common to a class 
of inferences is possible then there exists a ’formal analogy’ 
between the members of this class, by which all inferences of the
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transitive kind share a ooEunon logical form without restriction has 
been provided with no justification. Thus the move from the specific 
to the general (e.g,, to take Strawson’s own examples, from ’This is 
a cat’ to ’This is an animal’, or from ’This is green’ to ’This is 
coloured’) is as much valid on formal grounds alone as is the move 
from ’X is congruent with Y and Y is congruent with Z’ to ’X is 
congruent with Z’. But he is less certain of the desirability of 
extending the application of the notion of formal analogy in the 
former case than he is in the latter. What needs pointing out here 
is that both transitivity and the relation specific-general are the 
concern of the formal logician. The source of his hesitation lies 
in his fear that the distinction between ’those cases in which the 
resources of language allow of the framing of genuinely represent­
ative verbal patterns suitable for quotation in entailment-rules 
and those cases for which no representative formula can be framed 
for a general class of entailments’ may be blurred by ’the dictum 
that all inference is formal’ (pp.54-55). How while this fear is 
reasonable no good grounds of a philosophical nature can be given 
for drawing the line just where"one’s conservatism inclines one to.
We may now state Strawson’s difficulty in the shape of a 
dilemma. He is not prepared""to claim his alternative account to be 
fully adequate because this would exclude certain kinds of inference 
from the class of inferences which are valid in virtue of their form
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alone, but which we should want on other grounds to include in it.
But if he extends his account of logical form to cover these, by 
adopting instead his first account, then the grounds for restricting 
the scope of formal analogy become purely pragmatic.
I shall now bring our discussion of logical form so far into 
relation with the stronger form of formalism. I have said earlier 
that the formalist mistakenly takes overridingness to be a criterion, 
but that, when so taken, it functions (as I want to show) as a 
formal characteristic. How while transitively relational statements 
yield a class of inferences which resemble each other formally 
transitivity itself cannot function as a criterion of validity
(i.ei yield a ’principle of inference’, in Strawson’s terminology).
8
This means that between Strawson’s ’extensions’ and the mistaken 
view which treats overridingness as a criterion there remains this 
fundamental difference; such extensions can never yield a criterion, 
but we can always take overridingness to be a criterion; the mistake 
in the latter case being not that of falling under an illusion that 
there is a criterion when none in fact exists, but rather of mis­
understanding the nature of moral principles.
As a result of this difference Strawson’s way of extending the 
application of ’logical form’ or ’formal’ is quite unsuitable for my 
purpose; for what I need is an application of them in virtue of a 
feature which can function as a criterion. But this calls for an
8. They are not genuine extensions because there is only one step 
which properly constitutes an extension, and the further 
’extensions’ are merely consequences of this initial step.
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Important addendum to his acoount of logical form. I have spoken 
above of formal features or characteristics. Kour Strawson does not 
apeak in this way; he speaks only of formal analogies and inferences; 
or of statements and inferences being of the same logical form. We 
can no doubt give a description of most formal features in terms of 
his first account; such a description being of the form; a formal 
characteristic X of a statement is a characteristic of it which
exists when that statement stands in logical relations R, S, T to
other statements of type a, b, o, respectively. But such
descriptions are not the only kinds of descriptions we need. The two
formal features which are of special importance to me, and to which 
I want to relate by analogy the formalist’s mistaken notion of over­
ridingness, are primitiveness and derivability. Obviously these 
latter cannot be described in the way in which universality or 
conjunctiveness or disjunctivenesa may be described. We can under­
stand the concepts corresponding to them only by understanding the 
idea of a system, and they have their primary applications only 
within systems. To attribute either feature to a well-formed 
expression is not to attribute a set of logical relations with 
certain other well-formed expressions which hold whenever any such 
attribution is made. For suppose p is a primitive proposition in a 
system S. The attribution of this formal characteristic to p is in 
no way dependent on our being able to specify certain logical
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relations which hold between every primitive proposition in that 
system and certain other propositions# For primitiveness is a 
property which applies to one proposition only because it applies 
to a set. The relation of derivability between such a set and the 
rest of the system to which it belongs is not a relation which can 
be specified in terms of a unique class of entailments and 
inconsistencies. There is indeed a unique class of entailments, 
etc. but this class is unique only to the given system and 
characterises only a special instance of derivability: it does not 
define derivability as such for the simple reason that this class 
varies from system to system.
The failure of Strawson’s account of logical form to cover 
these two characteristics arises from its being solely in terms of 
the logical powers of single statements, without any reference to 
the notion of a system. It might be argued that these two 
characteristics are radically different from those which are covered 
by Strawson’s definition, so that there is little point in trying to 
cover them by means of the same definition; even such divergent 
definitions as those of Russell and Strawson have this in common 
that they do not cover these two. But this objection can be met. In 
so far as 3trawson*s account is an account of what concerns the 
formal logician the decisive answer is surely this. In saying that, 
for instance, a proposition is primitive in a system we are implying
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nothing about its content; and whose concern is it, if not the formal 
logician’s, that certain propositions in a system he is studying are 
primitive? Nor is this notion so simple that it is exhausted by its 
analogy with the premises of an argument. For the concept of a 
primitive proposition involves the idea of a deductive system. And 
the set of propositions entailed by, or derivable from, a set of 
axioms is not necessarily finite; whereas an argument can have only 
the conclusions which are validly drawn from it. But this is not a 
subject we need pursue here.
The difference between the kind of formal analogy with which 
Strawson is concerned and the kind I am primarily interested in in 
this chapter may now be explained. There are certain classes of 
inference which are logically valid in the sense that the meaning of 
the expressions occurring in the statements comprising them ensures 
their validity, but there is no formal logician’s rule on the basis 
of which we can discover them to be valid. But there is, nevertheless, 
an element of formal resemblance in each such case. The extension of 
the notion of formal analogy which this involves must not, however, 
obscure for us the difference between the formal logician’s sphere 
and the sphere of the lexicographer. The analogy between over- 
ridingness and primitiveness, with which I am concerned, does not 
present such a danger. This is so for two simple reasons. First, 
there is only one concept whose analogy I am seeking in the formal
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logician’s doings, whereas the possibilities of formal analogy of 
the kind Strawson is dealing with are very extensive. Second, the 
property of primitiveness is clearly the formal logician’s concern 
even though there are difficulties of including it in an account of 
logical form.Thus my concern is with a specific analogy with an 
undeniably formal attribute.
We may now see how formalism in its strong form, in taking 
overridingness to be a criterion of moral principles, treats it in 
a way analogous to the way the primitiveness of certain propositions 
function, in a deductive system* For this variety of formalism 
claims that when a universal principle is taken as an overriding 
principle it is a moral principle. The fact that any U-type 
principle can be chosen as an ultimate principle corresponds to the 
fact that in a deductive system any well-formed formula can be taken 
as primitive. The relation between ultimate and non-ultimate 
principles corresponds, in a number of ways, to the relation between 
the primitive propositions of a system and the theorems derived 
from them. Both are asymmetrical in the following way: in both 
justification or validation is possible only in one direction. Both 
are symmetrical in this respect. When we decide upon our axioms we 
have determined what can be derived, and when, on the other hand, 
we have certain theorems to be proved then only within a certain 
range can our choice of axioms be made; similarly in choosing our
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ultimate principles we put certain restrictions on our choice of 
non-ultimate principles, and, correspondingly, only certain sorts 
of ultimate principles can validate a given set of non-ultimate 
principles. The broad analogies here do not hide the divergencies; 
the possibility of noticing negative analogies is almost quite as 
strong as the possibility of noticing positive ones. But I do not 
intend to claim that the two notions are strictly parallel.
An obvious complicating factor which restricts the 
possibilities of comparison between them is my distinction between 
rules and principles (and the conjoined claim that the category of 
principles is rich in application). But the analogy, in the form in 
which I have stated it above, is not affected by this distinction.
It becomes stronger if we accept a view of principles which takes 
them to be a species of rules (which on my view would be a mistake). 
On a view which preserves the distinction between them the 
relationships between the class of overriding general requirements 
and the class of non-overriding general requirements are rather more 
complex (as we shall later see); but the broad analogy we are here 
concerned with remains substantially unaffected by this additional 
factor. I shall now proceed to give examples of philosophical 
arguments in which the formalist thesis in its strong form is used.
I propose to do this by examining, firstly, a passage from Hare’s 
The Language and Morals. Since he holds a reductionist view of moral
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principles this illustration will be in terms of an example rather 
favourable to me* But this need not be misleading if it is made 
clear that the general claim is not as strong as the illustration 
seems to imply.
4. Commenting on the utilitarian theory of justification and a 
view such as Mr. Toulmin’s that *an act is justified directly by 
reference to the principles it observes, and these principles in 
their turn by reference to the effects of always observing them*,
Hare says: ’The truth is that, if asked to justify as completely 
as possible any decision, we have to bring in both effects - to 
give content to the decision - and principles, and the effects in 
general of observing these principles, and so on, until we liave 
satisfied our inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a 
decision would consist of a complete account of its effects, 
together with a complete account of the principles which it observes, 
and the effects of observing those principles - for, of course, it 
is the effects (what observing them in fact consists in) which give 
content to the principles too. Thus, if pressed to justify a 
decision completely,we have to give a complete specification of the 
way of life of which it is a part. This complete specification it 
is impossible in practice to give ; the nearest attempts are those 
given by the great religions, especially those which can point to 
historical persons who carried out the way of life in practice.
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Suppose, however, that we can give it. If the inquirer still goes 
on asking "But why should I live like that?" then there is no 
further answer to give him, hecause we have already, ex hypotheai,
9
said everything that could he included in this further answer■.*
Though I do not’, at this stage, propose to discuss the problem of
moral justification, the approach to it which underlies this
passage can be shown to lead to highly paradoxical results. In
showing this I shall be showing an analogy between a formal system
and ’a way of life* which Hare’s position here assumes*
It is essential to point out first of all that Hare prefers
to use ’effects* in a way which excludes the possibility of saying
that * it is immoral, on certain sorts of occasion, to consider the
10
effects of doing something* * A writer is of course free to use a 
term in his own way so long as he makes it plain that he is using 
it in a special sense ,and provided that good grounds can be given 
for doing so* Hare assumes that in deciding to do something - in 
deciding, say, that ’it is immoral to fail to right an injustice 
whose effects will j^ aximise pleasure* - one always decided between 
different ’sets of effects’. Now this is true in one sense, but 
not in the sense in which Hare seems to understand it. When an 
action is described as falling under the principle that ’One ought
9. Op. cit., pp.68-69* 
10* Op. cit., p.57.
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not to fail to right an injustice • # . etc.* one is obviously 
claiming that the former sort of effect is better than the latter. 
But there might, in a given case, be other morally relevant
effects. There might, for instance, be the possibility that in
( ■
maximising pleasure under such circumstances one weakens the moral 
sensitiveness of the people, including oneself, one is hoping 
thereby to benefit. In practice such consequences are often not 
only present but are also known to be present. But this does not
mean that in making one’s decision of principle one has also taken
into account all such effects. The point of saying that it is
immoral, under such circumstances, to consider the effects is
precisely to rule out of consideration such results. We are likely 
to take such a stand as a result of the importance we attach to 
the avoidance, or the performance, of an action (such as righting 
a wrong) rather than because we have already anticipated all the 
likely morally relevant results of doing what we thereby commit 
ourselves to. And when such a firm stand is taken the original 
description of the action (’failing to right a wrong whose effects 
will maximise pleasure’) is not ipso facto declared to be a 
logically complete description (in its morally relevant aspects), 
however complete it might be in practice.
The need for preserving the distinction which Hare questions 
may be brought home by the following further argument. It is
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logically possible for some one to follow a moral principle in a
way which precludes the possibility of its yielding before another 
11
moral principle. For example, some one might believe that on no 
account is human life to be taken. Let us call such a principle a 
master moral principle. (Logically there is a fundamental 
difference between such a principle and a principle like the 
Greatest Happiness Principle. The latter is intended to function 
as a higher-order rule in which ordinary moral principles - taken 
in this case to be like rules - have their raison d’etre; whereas 
the former has no such function). We might say that, in terms of 
what is obligatory under a principle, as against what is morally 
relevant, a master principle can be stated in terms of a single 
description of an action (’killing’ or ’punishing an innocent man’) 
if we use ’effects’ in the ordinary way (i.e., in a way such that 
we can distinguish between an act and its foreseen consequences).
It is a sufficient explanation of our master principle ’Thou 
Shalt not kill’ that it forbids killing regardless of the 
consequences I so that even when the circumstances include an 
anticipated and, on its own account, unwelcome result we are still 
forbidden from making an exception. Such a description is of course 
not possible in the case of a non-master principle. For what we
11. Cf. G. K. M. Anscombe, ’Modern Moral Philosophy*, 
i hilosophy. January, 1958.
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are required universally to do in obedience to it is not simply 
describable as telling the truth or being just; obviously the 
multiplicity of description here required is in principle endless# 
But if we adopt Hare’s use of ’effects’ it becomes impossible to 
draw a distinction between these two kinds of principle, and what 
we can be forbidden absolutely is only actions which contain in 
their description mention of every morally significant element 
which the agent expects to arise when confronted with an actual 
situation of choice. We cannot always abstain aimpliciter from 
taking human life; often someone who kills anticipates consequences 
which, if they existed alone, would be quite desirable, V/hat a 
master principle lays down is not that no undesirable result will 
arise from following it absolutely, but that, however undesirable 
these results might be, nothing will count as outweighing the 
undesirability of breaking it.
But this difficulty is only a symptom of the extreme 
formalism of Hare’s position. The following fundamental 
disanalogy between a formal system and a ’system’ formed^by a 
class of moral principles in conjunction with a class of general 
requirements towards which the former may play a justificatory 
role will have occurred to the reader. Once the axiom and rules 
of inference of a system are given, the system is already 
completely determined, all its theorems being thereafter derivable
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mechanically, Irt the/latter kind of ’system*, however, there is no
strict relationship of this kind. Broadly speaking we may say that
the framework of the moral requirements we call moral principles
leaves us a wide sphere of choice. But it would seem that on Hare’s
view of moral principles this cannot be so, and the analogy with a
formal system becomes much closer when we notice that for him a
’complete’ justification of a decision involves ’a complete
specification of a way of life’. In fact in one respecta decision,
and by the same token a moral principle, forms an even more
integral part of the way of life to which it belongs than a theorem
does of the system in which it occurs; for it is possible that a
given theorem may be derived without involving in any way one of the
axioms of the system concerned.
Another paradoxical result of Hare’s position is this, Since
the content of a principle consists for him of the effects of
obeying it, it follows that two very different societies can have
12
no common moral principles, for even when they express some of their 
moral principles in the same verbal form this will not mean that 
they have any principle in common,
I shall argue in the next chapter that the content of a moral 
principle has nothing to do with its effects, and that it can vary 
only as a result of changes in the applicability of a predicate
12, For a similar view cf, Toulmin’s The Place of Reason in Fthics,
pp.152-155.
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occur lug essentially in its statement. On my view this can happen 
only as a result of an additional moral principle’s coming or 
ceasing to he held. But this will not involve me in formalism in 
view of the fact that for me all moral principles are essentially 
tied to some one or other predicate belonging to a special set of 
predicates.
Hare uses ’way of life’ as though it was synonymour with ’life 
in accordance with a moral code’. But ordinary speech provides little 
justification for such a use. The historical persons who figure in 
the great religions as ’models’ were not always, and sometimes did 
not pretend to be, guided by moral considerations alone. Thus it 
would be very strange indeed to claim that Abraham’s ’sacrifice’ 
was made on moral grounds. The only explanation of this 
identification is this. For Hare, apart from universality, the 
most essential characteristic of moral principles lies in the 
special status they possess in relation to other principles (etc.) 
which govern our actions, rather than in any category of actions 
they may require of us. It might be argued that by ’way of life’
Hare surely means ’human way of life’, and that since moral 
principles are for him ’architectonic’ of a way of life, they must 
be distinguished, at least as a class, by some determinate content. 
But Hare denies himself the right to use this argument by making 
comparisons between different ways of life logically impossible.
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For this means that, providing we are prepared to accept the 
implications of our respective choices of principles, wë are always 
entitled to call them ’moral principles’. If, on the other hand, 
we restrict our choice of principles by adopting a conception of 
human excellence, it will always make sense to say that one way of 
life is better than, or not as good as, another (since it conforms 
more or leas successfully to this conception),
5# We may now consider the question, raised earlier, whether the 
weak form of formalism can make the transition from principles 
which are merely capable of being moral principles to those whicli 
are actually so, without becoming indistinguishable from the strong 
form and without debarring any principle which satisfies the 1
initial universality requirement from qualifying as an actual moral 
principle, Harrison (who, as we have seen, holds the weak form 
of formalism) gives two separate and rather inconsistent answers 
to it, I shall start with the second of them. Distinguishing 
between ultimate and derivative moral principles he says that, 
while not any principle can be an ultimate principle, any 
derivative principle can become a moral principle. This may happen 
in the following way. Derivative moral principles are ’contingent 
and variable* in that, if we take an ultimate principle as 
supplying the major premise of an inference, then it is always 
possible that in consequence of the truth of a factual minor
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premise it becomes our duty to obey a principle which seems prima
\
f&oie to be clearly non-moral in character, * It could be my duty 
to act on the principle "Do not walk on the black lines on the 
pavement", if, as Mrs, Foot suggests, other people were so 
peculiarly constituted that this distressed them, or if doing so 
detonated explosive charges’ (p,125)« The difficulty with this 
answer is that it involves either abandoning the universality 
requirement or virtually abandoning the very claim it sets out to 
establish. If the facts which justified the derivative principle 
were variable in such a way that they obtained only in certain 
parts of the world then the principle would not hold as a universal 
principle. But if they are facts common,to our world then the 
original claim becomes rather empty and all we are being asked to 
concede is that it is possible to imagine a change in our world 
such that it would be our duty to act on such a principle.
The other answer which Harrison gives is this. He says:
’Though I may be (linguistically) eccentric, I personally would 
say that a man who exhibited signes of remorse when he stepped on 
the black lines of the pavement, tried to persuade others not to 
tread on them, tried to make unlined pavements by law compulsory 
and so on, did hold this as a moral principle. It is true that I 
should also say that he was very probably mad, but why should not 
insanity manifest itself in moral as well as in factual delusions?
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And though we may think his moral views erroneous, is he otherwise 
so very different, logically or psychologically, from ourselves?’
(p.115)) Harrison is here taking what may be called the criteria 
of assent to a moral principle (remorse, etc.) to be the criteria 
for deciding whether a principle is a moral principle. But this 
answer is hardly consistent with the previous answer. Normally we 
apply such criteria only on the supposition that the principle in 
question is in fact a moral principle, and the only question they
settle is whether the agent sincerely accepts it as such# But in
\
this form they are of no use in answering the present question. If, 
on the other hand, they are understood in the sense in which Harrison 
seems to take them then the latter answer is imoompatible with the 
former. For on the former answer a principle may have to be called 
a non-moral principle because it cannot be derived from any 
ultimate moral principle; though, in terms of the latter view, it 
deserves to be called a moral principle because it satisfies all 
the criteria of assent.
But the weight of Harrison’s preference is in favour of the 
first answer (in which the criteria of assent provide the 
transition from potential to actual moral principles), Harrison’s 
appeal to the notion of an impartial observer is here of relevance.
He attaches great importance to it as a means of distinguishing 
between correct and incorrect moral principles. Now however fruitful
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this notion may otherwise he, its value for this purpose is 
curtailed to the minimum by Harrison’s formalism. If what is 
important about its application as a criterion is the idea of an 
infallible judge it becomes an empty notion like that of divine 
grace. For now, though all universal principles can become correct 
moral principles, this can only happen miraculously, so that any 
principle of this type can be elected by such an observer, just 
as divine grace can descend on the unworthiest of us. If on the 
other hand its significance lies in the infallible reactions of 
such a being on the basis of certain criteria, then clearly we must 
have some idea of what such criteria can be. This rules out certain 
principles as incapable of being those which an impartial observer 
would adopt. The only way in which Harrison can preserve his 
formalism (and with him we our distinction between the two 
varieties of formalism) is by resort to a highly odd way of 
distinguishing between correct and incorrect moral principles. He 
has now to say that all U-type principles are moral provided they 
are sincerely believed to be so, the correct ones among them being 
those that an impartial observer would adopt on the basis of 
certain criteria.
Since the weak form survives as a bare logical possibility 
the only serious claimant to our attention now is the strong form,
I cannot, without stating the showing the strength of my own
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alternative view of moral principles, hope to expose the full 
extent of the error in the formalist thesis. But I have already, in 
explaining and illustrating it, shown some serious faults in it.
I shall now draw a further consequence of it to show that it runs 
radically counter to our conception of morality. Whether the 
revision of some of our fundamental concepts implied thereby is 
defensible at a more fundamental level is a question I shall not 
examine; if fully examined it would have to be the subject of 
another enquiry.
: We have seen that for Hare a set of moral principles
determines a way of life very much like the way in which to give 
the axioms and*rules of inference of a system is to give that 
system. Now, as I have said, this is not the correct way of looking 
at moral principles. But if a set of moral principles cannot 
determine a way of life uniquely then the question arises in what 
relation they stand to a way of life for the formalist. For, since 
his view of a moral principle is in terms of form alone, how can 
moral principles govern a way of life as ’architectonic’ to it?
In other words, how can the office of governor belong to them when 
they are quite free to have, in terms of the formalist account, 
any content? Jhe obvious answer ot this question is that the office 
belongs to them not singly but as a set. But this gives rise to 
the further question whether some of our moral principles are
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essentially of a certain nature, i.e., whether some at least must 
be ’about’ certain sorts of actions. In answering this latter 
question we have to remember that the formalist has initially 
placed no restriction on what a moral principle can be about. We 
must not therefore use the first ’about’ in such a way that this 
initial lack begins to disappear. We must, furthermore, see the 
concession which our definition seems to contain against a back­
ground of analogy with formal systems. Formal logicians are usually 
interested in systems of a certain degree of ’richness’. But, 
though richness and power are not formal attributes, nor are they 
material attributes in a straightforward sense; we might therefore 
say that the formalist’s primary concern is with principles of a 
certain degree of richness, and the only content which moral 
principles can possess essentially as a set is the content which 
’govern* and ’life’ can provide. And this is surely insufficient 
to provide us with a sense of ’moral’ such that there exists a 
broad distinction between moral requirements, the requirements of 
prudence, and requirements which have their source in some great 
fear such as the fear of divine wrath.
7, I shall now sketch a radically anti-formalist view of moral 
principles, whose defense I shall postpone to later chapters. It 
will largely be in the shape of a few rather rapid steps leading 
to a definition of ’moral principle’. The definition I propose to
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offer waa suggested to me by a reading of.Mrs. Foot’s contribution 
to the Aristotelian Society symposium referred to earlier. In thus 
acknowledging my debt to her I do not, of course, want to claim that 
she would endorse the simplification and modification I practise on 
her views.
I shall begin by pointing out that Harrison’s sole objection
against Mrs# Foot’s anti-formalist position rests largely on a
misunderstanding# Disagreeing witfi her contention that only a
’background’ can make some principles, like the one about the lines
on a pavement, into moral principles he says;'The trouble with
what Mrs* Foot says is that it is at least bordering on circularity.
If the "background" of a principle consists of other moral principles,
then what are we to say about them? Must we say that they are not
really moral principles because they themselves have no background,
or must we go on finding backgrounds for backgrounds ad infinitum?
Similarly, it cannot be true that a principle can be moral,only if
it has a connexion with moral principles, for how, in this case,
would we establish whether the principles with which it was connected 
13
were moral?"’. The charge which Harrison makes here - whether we take 
it as a charge of circularity or as a char^ that an infinite regress 
is involved in tos# Foot’s position - largely fails, and can be 
shown to be easily avoidable, if we consider’some of the things she
13. Log.cit., pp.112-115#
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actually aays. She points out on page 108 that words like ’honesty*, 
’sincerity’, ’murder’, ’stealing*, ’ostentation’ and ’treachery*, 
or the concepts (which I shall later call the ’moral concepts’) 
corresponding to them play, ’an important part’ in ’making it 
possible for us to grasp another man’s views on matters of right 
and wrong’. ’Concepts of this kind’, she continues, ’enable a man 
to connect new, and possibly surprising, applications of "good" or 
"bad" with one particular set of other cases - to say, i.e., that 
wearing bright colours is bad in the same way as boasting. And each 
expression of this kind carries with it a special way of looking at 
something; it is wrong to think of these terms as having a 
descriptive element of their own, but an "evaluative" element in 
common. We understand the kind of reaction that a man has against 
something if he uses the word "treachery" for instance. (We might 
think of the case in which he said that it would be treachery to 
hide the truth from someone who had asked to know if he was dying). 
This explains why it is so often#, Boncept rather than a superior 
principle which turns some odd^punding principle into something 
we can understand enough to %all it a moral larinoiple. We are often 
right to feel that we do not really know what a men’s moral principles 
are until we are supplied with a concept of this kind, and for this 
reason une .>rstanding what someone says about what is right and wrong 
is not like understanding an order’ ^ (italics mine). Mrs. Foot’s
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suggestion that it is the presence of a moral concept, rather than 
a ’superior* principle, as background.to an ’odd-sounding principle’ 
which accounts for our ’understanding’ a principle as a moral 
principle does not necessarily invite the objection that, on such a 
criterion, even those principles which we do ’undei'stand* to be 
unquestionably moral in character must also have some moral concept 
as background. The regress may easily be avoided by pointing out 
that the question of background arises either in cases which are odd, 
or on those in which a moral concept, though easily supplied, is 
not mentioned; in other cases there is no need to supply such a 
background because the principle itself mentions a moral concept.
Thus the first step in my progress towards a definition of a moral 
principle is to stipulate what exists in this passage only as a 
likely line to take* viz., a principle can be a moral principle 
only in virtue of a connection with a moral concept.
The definition which suggests itself at this stage - that a 
principle of U-type is a moral principle when it contains a moral 
concept as ’background’ or when a moral concept occurs essentially 
in its statement^- is liberal enough to cover most uses of ’moral 
principle’ in ordinary speech. But the definition I want to adopt 
in this enquiry is much more stringent and would be rather arbitrary 
without strong grounds of a procedural or philosophical nature. It 
is precisely on such grounds, namely as a means of isolating the more
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important aspects of certain problems and as an illuminating way 
of looking at morality, that it is chosen. I shall arrive at it in 
two further steps, the first of which is the more important, while 
the second is necessitated largely as a consequence of it.
The major step towards my definition is taken by means of the 
following stipulation* a moral principle must, in its statement, 
contain mention of a moral concept as constituting its scope. The' 
best examples of principles which meet this stipulation are provided 
by those principles which specify one of the main moral virtues 
(’One ought to be generous’, ’One ought to keep one’s promises’, 
etc.). How though I do not intend to use ’moral conce&t’ in such a 
way that only concepts of this class qualify as moral concepts, my 
use of it is strict enough to exclude Mrs. Foot’s examples of ’odd- 
sounding principles’ from the class of moral principles. I must now 
draw attention to a distinction, firmly embedded in our language, 
which puts a limit on the range of the class of moral principles.
We distinguish between what might be called a requirement of 
morality and what is required, or becomes a duty, on moral grounds; 
and to preserve this distinction is as important as that we draw it 
at the right point. We cannot admit that it is a significant 
distinction and yet give it no application whatsoever. Once however 
an application is given to it the mere presence of a background to 
what can be stated in the universal form ceases to be a sufficient
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condition of its being a moral principle, unless we are prepared 
to say that any form of action that can be described in universal 
terms, and which it is our duty to perform on moral grounds, is a 
moral principle. That such a position would be highly paradoxial 
does not imply that the distinction must be drawn in such a way 
that ray stipulation issues as a necessary consequence from it. But 
the question what criteria operate in the customary distinctions 
between general requirements of a political, economic or a . 
educational nature and the requirements of morality which are taken 
to deserve being called moral principles is not an easy one, and I 
am not sure I know the answer to it. The following may perhaps be 
of some help in answering it.
< When form of behaviour is taken intrinsically to be 
morally indifferent, we feel no strong inclination, however certain 
we might be of its having morally significant results, to see it as 
the subjeot-mattersof a moral principle* Thus someone may be quite 
convinced that a vegetarian diet makes men less aggressive than 
they would.be on a non-vegetarian one* If this is a purely morally 
indifferent means-desirable moral end situation then I am inclined 
to think the facts of our speech do not provide any strong grounds 
for upgrading vegetarianism to the level of a moral principle. But 
a Hindu would not, of course, see it in this way; for him meat- 
eating is morally repugnant, and vegetarianism morally becoming,
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regardless of their results* And someone might, for a similar 
reason, be a socialist; i.e., he might see a socialist form of 
social organisation as intrinsically valuable, whether or not it 
increased human welfare* One good ground then for assigning to 
certain social, economic or educational standards the status of 
moral principles is that they seem to involve morally significant 
elements as more than causally dependent results.
Another possible ground for applying the distinction between 
a requirement which is made moral by having moral grounds for it 
and a requirement which is itself moral strictly is this. In the 
case of one of Mrs. Foot’s * odd-sounding principles’, that one 
ought not to walk on the lines of a pavement, a possible ground was 
that there were explosives under it which might thereby detonate. 
How it is of course possible that such a situation exists in a 
certain part of a city and even that we temporarily live in a world 
in which all pavements are affected in this way. But this would 
only yield some spatially or temporally limited moral principle. V/e 
might indeed imagine ourselves being permanently in such a world. 
But if the other features of the world remained unchanged this 
would be a fact which belonged to it rather capriciously. On the 
other hand there are facts which belong intimately to our world or 
to us. It is such facts, rather than any facts, which incline us to 
take certain principles to be moral in character. For example, a
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moral principle which forbade corporal punishment would, quite
14
unexpectedly, have to rest on facts of the former kind.
It is clear from these examples that in ordinary speech what 
counts as a ground of morality often contains an empirical element; 
in other words, what constitutes such a ground would lose some or 
all of its force if certain facts were otherwise than they are (e.g. 
it is conceivable that certain forms of corporal punishment did 
not do any harm). It is precisely for this reason that I do not 
propose to use ’moral concept* as coincident with ’a possible ground 
of morality*, as the latter expression may be taken to function in 
ordinary language. My use of it is such that the validity of a moral 
concept does not depend on the nature of any empirical fact. Moral 
principles represent therefore for me an a priori element in 
morality (in the sense in which perhaps Kant used * a priori *). But 
even so they form, as we shall see, a class of rather diverse 
elements. The gain to be made by viewing moral principles in this 
way lies in the resulting isolation of the distinctively ethical in 
terms of its distinctive concepts (the moral concepts) from 
elements which obscure it and confuse us into asking the wrong kind 
of questions about it. Problems like the nature of moral justification
14* Yet we do not normally consider ’Do not burn people’ to be a 
moral principle. ’Burning someone’ falls with such ease under 
’hurting someone* that there would be gross redundancy in having 
an extra moral principle ’Do not burn people*.
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which, as traditionally conceived, is really a collection of 
distinct problems) and the scope and function of morality take thereby 
a clearer aspect. Now a device which makes certain terminological 
innovations would be purely procedural if it merely facilitated a 
task which could also be done without thsm. But my recommendation is 
not purely procedural in this way. Behind it are important logical , 
reasons, some of which are discernible even at this stage.
The second further step is necessitated by the first in the 
following way. Saying that a moral principle is a universal principle 
in whose statement a moral concept occurs as constitutive of its 
scope covers quite well our major moral principles. But there are 
other moral principles of an a priori kind which can be covered by 
this definition only by taking a somewhat artificial view of the 
function of moral concepts. Thus suppose we define flattery as a form 
of striving to attain from another by unfair means something that one 
wants, namely the form which consists in inducing in him an estimate 
of his own worth which is higher than what the agent would sincerely
15
ascribe to him. Clearly on this definition flattery always implies 
deception and the.-question arises how the former can be a moral 
principle if we already subscribe' to ’Do not deceive’ which also
15. Professor Acton has.pointed out to me that a man could be
flattered in respect of his real deeds. But, though this gives 
an indication of the complexity of the concept of flattery, I am 
inclined to think that one could not flatter without deceiving 
in some way. One need not tell a single falsehood in order to 
deceive.
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forbids what it serves to forbid; for would it not then be
necessarily redui lant? How this is a situation which occurs often,
and the appearance of paradox can be dispelled only by a correct
approach to the problem of the relation between specific and more
general moral principles. The form of answer I want to give it is,
that, in a more specific moral principle the moral concept of the
more general principle behind it is modified in some important
respect so that we have a new moral concept.
Thus flattery is a different moral concept from deceit;
whereas lying and lying to one’s grand-mother do not differ by being
two different moral concepts. But though the difference between the
two cases is intuitively acceptable, its rationale is far from obvious-
why do .we consider ’Do not flatter’ a moral principle but not ’Do not
lie to your grand-mother’ (assuming that we already have ’Do not
deceive’ and ’Do not lie’ as moral principles)? How if moral principles
behaved like rules there would be no better case for treating it as
a moral principle than there is for treating the former as one; both
would be equally redundant. The function of the moral concept which
occurs essentially in the statement of a moral principle being .to
16
name a consideration, the difference we are here concerned with must 
really be the difference between the relation which obtains between
16. See Chapter III, section"
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deception and flattery and the relation between lying and lying to 
one’s grand-mothtr qua considerations. If some special situation 
of responsibility were necessarily involved in one’s dealing with 
one’s grand-mother, as they are in the dealings between a doctor 
and his patient, then one would indeed have strong grounds for 
treating ’Do not lie to your grand-mother’ as a moral principle; but 
this is not so. Take on the other hand ’Do not lie to a dying man’. 
Here an important new element seems to be necessarily involved. A
17
more complete example would perhaps be ’Do not lie to your enemies’ .
Therefore, logically speaking, it is not enough that a moral 
principle contains a moral concept as constitutive of its scope; for 
if we are to avoid redundancy we must stipulate that no moral 
principle can do the job which another moral principle already does; 
i.e., each moral principle must essentially contain a moral concept 
which is in some way distinctive of it.
We have now arrived at our definition of a moral principle.
A moral principle is a universal principle which contains in its 
statement a moral concept belonging to it in its own right as 
constitutive of its scope. As may have already been noticed, my 
expression ’constitutive of its scope’ avoids involvement in the
17. Dome further indication of the complexity of the inter*
relations of moral concepts will be given by my discussion 
of the problem of conflicts of duty in section 5 of the 
next chapter.
76.
dispute between those who hold that moral terms are essentially 
’evaluative* or •prescriptive’ and those who hold, on the contrary, 
that they are descriptive in a fundamental sense of ’descriptive’.
I shall later interpret my definition in a way rather sympathetic 
to the latter approach. In doing this I shall naturally venture into 
territory of a highly controversial nature. But I do not see how I 
can avoid taking sides in such a dispute when it is necessitated by 
a main task of our enquiry.
I can now make good the claim I made at the beginning of this 
chapter that the division between formal and material criteria with 
respect to moral principles is not exhaustive. If my definition of a 
moral principle is justified philosophically we can see that the last 
step towards it bears on a requirement which cannot be assigned to 
either of these two classes. That a moral principle must have a 
certain kind of content is clearly a material requirement, as the 
stipulation that it should be universal is formal in character. But 
that its content should be distinguished by a unique moral concept 
is not a matter of form or of content. It is a stipulation of a 





1. The definition of a moral principle I have just given hinges on 
the notion of a moral concept, a notion which is far from clear* It 
is therefore incomplete in all hut form, and we are confronted with 
the task of explaining what a moral concept is. But I cannot hope to 
perform this task by giving a definition; for even among concepts that 
are taken to be centrally and indisputably moral there are fundamental 
differences, and a characterisation of this group alone presents many 
difficulties. Taking the entire class of moral concepts as a whole, 
we find ourselves in territory large parts of which are in constant 
and systematic dispute. We are, in other words, dealing with a title 
which is rather more widely claimed than it is conceded. It must, more­
over, be plain by now that for me a large part of ethics is an enquiry 
into this larger class of concepts - into their functions, their modes 
of formation and application, their development and modification, the 
complicated pattern of interrelations into which they enter, and so 
forth. It would be folly to try to anticipate the main results of such 
an enquiry; but one thing can be said in advance of it which may be 
expected to come out unfalsified. It would not make possible what was 
impossible initially on logical grounds; the very disputedness of the 
notion of a moral concept rules out the possibility of a definition 
which is at once precise and neither too wide nor too narrow.
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I claimed at the beginning of the previous chapter that the 
preoccupation with the naturalistic fallacy has lead to an opposite 
fallacy, that of formalism in ethics. But I did not explain what I 
meant by formalism in this context - i.e., generally in relation to 
ethics, as distinct from the question of the nature of moral 
principles * apart from saying that it consisted in taking the view 
that the distinotiveness of ethical utterance does not lie in its 
content, but in a certain combination of form and status. The meaning 
of this rather obscure remark may now be explained. Hare, as may be 
remembered, claims in his paper on ’Universalisability’ that giving 
reasons for a moral judgment involves reference to a U-type principle. 
Since what makes a U-type principle moral is for the formalist not a 
matter of content, he cannot, without inconsistency,-tie moral 
judgments to any specific content. All that he can claim is that each 
moral judgment must refer, or involve reference, to a specific kind 
of action; and that a judgment of the form ’X is wrong’ must in this -* 
way be related to, say, an action which is describable as ’unkind’ or 
’unjust’ (or, since he places no limit on what can be described as 
moral, ’stepping on the lines of a pavement*).
But the question why this negative view of the content of 
morality should arise as a result of a preoccupation with the natural­
istic fallacy still remains unanswered. I shall answer this question by 
commenting on two related theories of the nature of moral and
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evaluative terms - namely those of Hare and Unason - which employ a
mode of insurance against this fallacy which denies (this is more clearly
true of the former writer) to these terms any essential content. Both of
these theories are based on a model which fits only a sub-class of them.
The formalism of both these naturalistic fallacy obsessed theories is
therefore much wider than the formalism in relation to moral principles
we discussed in the previous chapter and covers a number of fields. The
formalism now in question, we might say, applies to the fields of
prudence, honour and etiquette no less than to that of morality.
Before discussing these, theories in which the naturalistic
fallacy i^  committed not only when the ethical is confused with the
natural, but also when there is a confusion between the latter and the
evaluative, a brief comment on G.E.Moore’s original version of the
naturalistic fallacy may not be out of place. Though goodness on his
view stood for a quality, he used ’good’ in a way close enough to its
ordinary use to place only the fewest of limits on its possible range of
application, so that the quality of goodness was a quality in.so
1
attenuated a sense that it was no genuine quality. And so what , 
distinguished the ethical could be a matter of content only in this - 
rather marginal sense.  ^ >
In Hare’s theory a distinction is made between ’descriptive’ and 
•evaluative’ meaning. Value terms, except in certain derivative uses, 
and terms used evaluatively have an unchanging evaluative function and a
1. See A. N. Prior, Logic and the Basic of Ethics, Chap.l.
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more or less varying descriptive content. The naturalistic fallacy
arises from a confusion of these two kinds of meaning; i.e., when from
the presence of certain purely descriptive elements we infer the
extistence of something good or bad. Ee thinks that ’good’, ’right’ and
2
’ought* are ’typical value-words’. There is a radical separation between 
the possible criteria for applying ’good’ and the meaning of ’good’, so 
that one might teach its meaning to someone in terms of examples where
3
one does not oneself know the criteria of its application. Though he 
denies that other evaluative words are so loosely tied to their criteria 
as these words are to theirs, his view of the class of evaluative words 
is built on the assumption that the former group of words are its 
paradigm. Thus* ’Although with "good" the evaluative meaning is primary, 
there are other words in which the evaluative meaning is secondary to the 
descriptive. Such words as "tidy" and "industrious". Both are normally 
used to commend ; but we can say, without any kind of irony, "too tidy" 
or "too industrious". It is the descriptive meaning of these words that 
is most firmly attached to them; and therefore, although we must for 
certain purposes class them as value-words (or if we treat them as purely
descriptive, logical errors result), they are so in a less full sense
4 ' “ '
than "good".’ It would seem that Hare is assuming in this passage that
if a word can be used pejoratively without implying irony its primary




meaning- cannot be evaluative. But this can easily be shown to be a
mistake, and the class of value-words which do not fail to be primarily
evaluative by this test turns out to be actually rather narrow. One could
say ’too generous* or ’too kind’ or ’too honest’ without irony, though
5
how this is possible is a matter for investigation.
Hare’s view that there are varying degrees to which a word may be 
evaluative - some being evaluative in a more ’full’ sense than others - 
links up with his assumption that when a value-word gets firmly tied to a 
descriptive content, so that its evaluative meaning ceases to be primary, 
the standard it may be used to express becomes ’conventional’. If this 
assumption is justified then the standards of morality could only be 
expressed by words which did not suffer from this defect, for otherwise we 
should have to face the alarming prospect of our moral principles becoming 
conventional and morality turning into an enslaving ritual. The best way 
to ensure that this does not happen is surely to see morality in terms of 
words which are evaluative in the fullest sense, namely in the sense in 
which ’good’, ’right’ and ’ought’ are. Of these three ’right’ and ’ought’ 
clearly cannot be corrupted by the faults which ’tidy’ and ’industrious*
5* One reason among others why we can speak in this way is perhaps this. 
Sometimes the claims of morality are waived in favour of those of 
self-interest, - though in doing so we cannot, as it seems to me, 
partially contract out of morality.
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suffer from* one does not say ’He is too, right*, either pejoratively or
ironically; and similarly ’Don’t do too often what you ought to’ is
significant only as a counsel against a wrong kind of earnestness.
Though ’good’ can be used pejoratively in the way ’tidy’ and=
’industrious’ often are, it can be made to fall into line by
6
distinguishing between its ’inverted-commas’ use and its primary use#
The ’ inverted*comma8 ’ use can exist only when the primary use 
exists. The latter being, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, 
•the most general adjective of commendation’, is dispensible only in the 
sense in which human existence is dispensible. I could on the other hand 
dispense with the evaluative use of certain moral words, like ’kind’ and 
’generous’, simply because I could commend kindness and generosity in 
varying degrees by using ’good’ or the other fully evaluative words, 
without adopting a use of either of the former words (i.e., of ’kind’ 
and ’generous’) which was evaluative.
On Hare’s position an evaluative use of a word is constituted by 
thé imperatives entailed by it. The over-all action - terminating 
character of imperatives ensures that the primary use of ’good* is 
essentially similar to that of ’ought’ and ’right’.
The formalism implicit in this two-fold classification can now be 
explained. What are ordinarily taken to be moral predicates, and many
6. Op, sit., p.124#
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evaluative terms, though presumably not so secondarily evaluative as 
’tidy* and ’industrious’, can be used purely descriptively while their 
evaluative function is allowed to fall into disuse. Therefore the 
autonomy of ethics, if it were hinged to these words, would be somewhat 
precarious. But we could not let the other kind of words become purely 
descriptive without having to invent new ones with similar functions; 
for these are functions implied by human existence - a man who did 
not follow any rules, who made no choices and decisions, being 
inconceivable. But this is to misconceive the autonomy of ethics. It 
does not consist in the fact that a man, so long as he is alive, must 
accept some standards which govern his life; on the contrary, it 
consist3, as I shall later argue, in the existence of certain standards 
which apply irrespective of whether or not we follow them in our lives.
Apart from failing to give us the differentia of moral terms 
Hare’s theory of evaluative meaning leads to an emasculation of them. 
Being a sub-class of the larger class of value-words, moral words are 
evaluative only to the extent to which they entail imperatives; for in 
so far as they do not they merely describe. To ensure that a moral word 
necessarily carried an evaluative force we should have to legislate 
that its use in ’too just’ or ’too kind’ is derivative (as in the case 
of the ’inverted#commas’ use of ’good’). This would empty the primary 
use of all content that belonged to it essentially - for if it had any 
the word would immediately become capable of being used pejoratively. 
Since moral words are to have but one function, that of commending or
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or condemning, albeit from a position of superiority, they would 
register nothing but what we put on a special pedestal or place in 
abject pillory.
We saw in the previous chapter that Hare’s view that the content 
of a principle cannot be described without stating all the effects of 
observing it leads to the strange conclusion that two rather different 
societies cannot have a single principle in common. In the chapter in 
which the passage about the justification of decisions occurs Hare 
makes a comparison between moral instruction and instruction in 
driving, and claims to make his account of the latter sufficiently 
general to cover all the different ways in which ’a skill or any 
other body of principles* may be learned (p.68). I shall now quote 
the latter passage at length, for it provides considerable 
justification for the implications I have drawn above from Hare’s 
theory of evaluative meaning.
’. . . there are two ways of looking at driving instruction*
(1) We establish at the beginning certain ends, for example 
the avoidance of collisions, and instruction consists 
in teaching what practices are conducive to those ends. 
According to this way of looking at them the principles 
of good driving are hypothetical imperatives.
(2) We teach at first simple rules of thumb, and the learner 
only gradually comes to see what the ends are, at which 
the instruction is aimed.
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It must not be thought that either (l) or (2) by itself gives 
a complete account of our procedure* What method we adopt depends 
to a great extent on the maturity and intelligence of the learner* In 
teaching African soldiers to drive, we might incline more to the second 
method; if I had my two-year-old son to teach, I should have to adopt 
the same methods as I now adopt for teaching him to refrain from 
interfering with controls, when I am driving myself. With a highly 
intelligent learner, on the other hand, we may adopt a method which 
has more of (l) in it than of (2).
It must not be thought, however, that method (2) is ever 
entirely without a place even in the case of the most rational of 
learners. It may be that the desirability of avoiding collisions is at 
once understood and accepted even by comparatively stupid learners; but 
there are a great many more ends than this which a good driver has to 
aim at. He has to avoid causing many kinds of avoidable inconvenience 
both to himself and to others; he has to learn not to do things which 
result in damage to his vehicle, and so on. It is of no use to 
establish at the beginning a general end, "the avoidance of avoidable 
inconvenience", for "inconvenience" is a value-word, and until he has 
had experience of driving, the learner will not know what sorts of 
situations are to count as avoidable inconvenience. The general end or 
principle is vacuous until by our detailed instruction we have given 
it content. Therefore it is always necessary to start, to some extent.
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by teaohing our learner what to do, and leaving it for him to find 
out later why» V»e may therefore say that although moral principles, 
which are normally taught us when we are immature, are taught largely 
by method (2), and principles of driving preponderantly by method (l), 
there is not an absolute division between the two sorts of principle 
in this respect.’
It seems to me that Hare’s parallel between moral instruction
and àrlying instruction breaks down at least in one respect. It
proceeds on the assumption that moral instruction consists in imparting
an ability just as much as driving instruction, and since I think that
this is not so I reject his claim to have made his account sufficiently
general to cover all the different ways in which a skill or any other
body of principles may be learnt. The success of moral instruction is
judged primarily in terms of actual performance and not as knowledge 
8
of what to do.
T. Op. Git., pp.66—67#
8. Professor Ryle, in his paper ’On Forgetting the Difference
between Right and Wrong’ (Essays in Moral Philoaphy. edited by 
A, I, Melden), shows how in many contexts ’the notions of learning. 
teaching, and knowing lock in with the notions of caring, i.e., 
enjoying, admiring,despising, trying, avoiding and so forth’ (p.lS6). 
•There seems’, he says, ’to be a sort of incongruity in the idea of 
a person’s knowing the difference between good and bad wine or 
poetry, while not caring a whit more for the one than for the other; 
of his appreciating without being appreciative of excellences.
When we read "We needs must love the highest when we see it" we 
incline to say, "Of course. We should not be seeing it if we were 
not loving it". The "needs must" is a conceptual one. At least in 
this field, the partitions are drawn between the Faculties of 
Cognition, Conation, and Feeling’, (p.152).
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But I shall not press this criticism here. What is immediately 
relevant here are his reasons for holding ’the general end or principle’ 
to be initially vacuous, Ee takes ’avoidable inconvenience’ to be 
vacuous at the beginning of driving instruction, presumably because 
only when we begin to know what a driver can avoid within, say, the 
Highway Code does this end have any practical significance. It may be 
inconvenient for me to have to wait for the traffic to pass when using 
a road which crosses a number of main roads, but this is not an 
inconvenience which can be avoided. Therefore the force of the principle 
’Avoid avoidable inconvenience’ for the good driver in this sense can 
quite plausibly be said to be in the specific kinds of inconvenience he 
actually avoids. But Hare is wrong in supposing that this is so becuase 
’inconvenience’ is a value-word. For the same situation would exist if 
we had a principle’like ’Avoid avoidable horn-blowing*.
Thus Hare is attributing to ’inconvenience’ what can only be 
ascribed to ’avoidable’. The latter word has the same verdict-giving 
sense which belongs to ’right’ and ’wrong’. A verdict may be favourable 
or unfavourable, but when we know the verdict we do not thereby know 
its grounds. That something is inconvenient is not a sufficient ground 
for declaring it to be avoidable; whereas when we decide that an action 
was avoidable we have made a judgment which may later turn out to be 
mistaken but which cannot be overriden by another judgment.
Hare’s choioe of ’Avoidiavoidable inconvenience’ as an example of
88$
a ’general end or principle* is therefore extremely significant. If 
OUI' general ends were generally named by terms like ’the avoidance of 
avoidable inconvenience’ then his thesis about the initial vacuity of 
the general end would indeed be highly plausible. But this thesis 
rests on a confusion. He is right in so far as learning a moral concept 
like justice or kindness well is not only to learn a word with a 
multiplicity of application, but also a word which becomes applicable 
or ceases to be so according to what other moral beliefs we hold. Thus 
take ’kindness’; If an employee turns up late every morning and is 
generally inefficient it would not be unkind to dismiss him. But 
suppose his employer believed that it was his duty to treat his man as 
his children; it would then be incumbent on him to treat an erring 
worker more leniently, and ha could not then be so certain of escaping 
blame on the score of unkindness by dismissing him. Nevertheless, to 
learn to apply a term is one thing and to leam to decide whether when 
an action is covered by that term it is also obligatory another. This 
confusion does not arise in the case of ’avoidance of avoidable in­
convenience’ only because it represents an end which, by definition, 
cannot be overriden. But most moral ends - as indeed most ends - are 
not of this kind. We have not merely to apply terms like ’truthfulness’ 
and 'Justice*; we have also to learn when the ends they represent give 
way before other ends. Once this distinction becomes clear the thesis 
about the initial vacuity of the general end loses a great deal of its
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force; for our not knowing at first when one end gives way before 
another (when, for instance, convenience yields to safety) does not 
in the least lessen our knowledge of what either end requires.
We can now see what role moral concepts play in Hare’s view of 
moral principles. The view I want to suggest of the relation between 
moral concepts and the principles in which they occur essentially is 
that they name a consideration which the principle declares to be valid; 
or, in other words, that a moral principle declares a certain kind of 
action, named by a moral predicate, to be good or bad, and this is 
precisely what on my view their content is. But Hare cannot take such a 
view. In his view moral principles are a form of ’prescription*; and a 
prescription is for him a prescription only in so far as it entails 
imperatives. There is nothing to distinguish a prescription from a 
descriptive statement apart from the imperatives it entails. But the 
language of considerations implies precisely the opposite. To accept a 
consideration is not to accept a specific set of imperatives; for the 
imperatives issuing from it are not a function of it alone, but equally 
of what other considerations are adopted. Moreover, this view is so 
closely linked to his theory of evaluative meaning - that an evaluative 
term is primarily evaluative in meaning only when we cannot use it 
pejoratively - that the two necessarily go together. And this provides 
additional support for my interpretation of his theory of evaluative 
meaning* his imperativism involves such a theory.
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It is plain now that for Hare the category of principles cannot 
have any application in morality, and that he must avoid a view which 
takes conflicts of duty to be inherent to morality. For if conflicts 
are implied by the nature of morality, so that the standards we adopt 
as moral agents are not reducible to sets of commands of the form *Do 
such and such*, his imperativism must be mistaken. But if moral 
principles could be reduced simply to the commands we are prepared to 
obey when we adopt these principles there is nothing to prevent us from 
making these commands consist with one another.
Hare’s reductioniam takes the form of the claim that moral
9
principles function as premises in deductive arguments, which, when 
valid, establish a duty to perform an action; not a prima facie duty, 
as in Ross, or the validity of a consideration, as in my theory. On such 
a view conflicts of duty are, of course, logically not necessary. How 
such conflicts - essential as they are in my view - are resolved I shall
if .- '
discuss in the last section of this chapter. Here I shall merely
reproduce an argument of Mr, A. Phillips Griffiths against Hare which
seems to me to be decisive. In his paper on ’Formulating Moral 
10
Principles* Mr. Griffiths points out that, on Hare’s view, when 
'precisely and correctly stated a moral principle must mention all 
possible classes of cases providing an exception’ (p#40). But we can 
never be certain that all the possible exceptions have been covered 
in the statement of a moral principle; thus our moral principles
9, Language of Morals, p.56.
10. hind, Jan, 195^ .
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become provisional approximations to an unattainable ideal. Moreover
the uncertainty belonging to the major premise which states the
principle is necessarily communicated to the conclusion. In other words,
the essential fault of this approach is that moral principles are
conceived as A propositions, a form unattainable by them.
11
2. In his paper *0n Grading’ Urmson, unlike Hare, does not attempt 
to treat all evaluative terms on the model of a small sub-class of them. 
But the model which he applies to moral concepts proves, as I shall try
to show, to be applicable at best to just those concepts whose claim to
be treated as moral concepts may be disputed.
In this paper Urmson argues that by stretching in a perfectly 
legitimate way the ordinary notion of grading we can show a large 
majority of terms which philosophers nowadays call evaluative to be 
’grading labels’. Analogous to Hare’s distinction between ’typical’ 
value words like ’good’ ’right’ and ’ought’ and non-typical ones such 
as ’tidy’ and ’industrious’, Urmson makes a distinction between 
’professional’ grading words and a class of ’specialised’ grading words. 
Thus ’good’ is a professional grading word; so are ’first class’,
’third rate’, ’indifferent’, ’bad’ and ’medium quality’. ’These can be 
used as grading labels without explicit warning; they themselves give 
warning, if it is not otherwise evident, that the object of the
exercise grading. Furthermore, it is easy and natural to choose sets
11. Mind. 1950. Reprinted in Lo^ic and Language.second series edited
by Antony Flew. The pagination of the quotations is from the latter.
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whose order is clearly defined. It would be an abuse of language to 
use "indifferent" of a higher grade than "good"'(p,l63). The first of 
these points may be put more forcefully in this way; these words would 
not be the words they are if they did not grade, and a user must, 
except in a limited range of contexts, use them for this purpose. The 
second point reinforces the first; ordering being an ’almost necessary’ 
qualification of them, their main use cannot be but grading.
But not all of Hare’s typical evaluative words are grading words 
of this kind; ’ought’ for instance is not, nor is ’wrong’ or (presumably) 
’correct’. In fact suoh words are not grading words at all (Urmson does 
not say why, but the reason can easily be supplied).
Urmson’s view that most virtue-words can be treated as a sub-class 
of ’specialised’ grading words, however, presents difficulties which, in 
my opinion, he does not fully face, I shall criticise him on three main 
grounds. He underestimates the difference between such words and the 
class of professional grading words, and tends to lean towards formalism. 
Secondly, he fails to give a correct account of the nature of the stretch 
in the normal sense of grading he asks us to accept in calling these 
words grading labels. And, thirdly, the central moral concepts are not 
grading in character; the moral concepts which lend themselves to a 
grading analysis are only marginally moral in character, I do not however 
propose to argue for the marginal character of the latter on the ground
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that they seem to respond to a grading analysis; on the contrary, I want 
to show that they are marginal by appealing to the facts of our speech.
In respect of the latter 1 shall further argue that the success of 
Urmson’s treatment is largely illusory.
At the beginning of his paper Urmson says* , I intend to
extend the epxressions "grading" and "grading labels" beyond their normal 
employment to cover operations and words which, from the point of view 
from which 1 shall discuss them, seem to me to be essentially similar to 
grading in its narrower sense. There will be no harm in this if we 
realise that we are doing it and if we make sure that the other 
operations and words are really essentially similar to the more obvious 
cases of grading’, The first of these ’extensions’ or ’stretches* is 
designed to enable us to call ’good’, ’fair’, ’excellent’, etc. - i.e., 
the ’professional’ grading words - grading labels. The stretch in their 
case takes place in the following way. Normally when we grade apples or 
railway sleepers we are dealing with large numbers. We might, however, 
using the same criteria, apply the same grading labels to single objects 
’without explicit reference to any others’. Clearly the stretch thus 
implied makes no essential difference to the meaning of ’grading’ or 
’grading labels’.
Urmson makes his second stretch when he calls words like ’rash’ 
’brave’, ’cowardly’, ’extravagant’, ’liberal’, ’mean’, ’boorish’, 
’eligible (bachelor)* and ’arrogant’ grading labels. I shall quote the 
paragraph in which he pleads for regarding this stretch as legitimate.
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*If any Army Commander were, as a preliminary to choosing a band 
of laen for an important operation, to go through his Company roll marking 
each man as "rash", "brave" or "cowardly" we would surely not find it 
abnormal to say he was grading them (from a special point of view)* If 
one were merely to say "He is a brave man" one would not normally call 
it grading; but I cannot see that the stretch of the word so to call it 
is harmful* One resistance to calling ’brave* a grading label arises from 
the fact that being more specialised than "good" it enables one to predict 
more accurately, though in a narrower field, the behaviour of a man so 
graded* This inclines people to think that it is a descriptive word in 
the way that "ferocious" noramlly is* But this is just a mistake; the 
resistance must be overcome. It would be better to regard "brave" as a 
grading label restricted to human behaviour in tight places, whereas 
"good" grades in all places, including tight ones,’ (p,l64)*
Urmson does not find it necessary to explain why he thinks that 
’ferocious’ is normally descriptive while ’brave’ is not. Is it because 
we say of, for example, tigers that they are fierce and of lambs that 
they are gentle, implying neither an unfavourable attitude towards the 
former nor approval of the latter, but merely thus far to describe their 
respective natures, whereas ’brave’ cannot (except ironically) be used 
without such commitment, and is therefore not a describing but a grading 
word? An appeal to the lexicographer might settle this question, but 
there still remains a more fundamental logical problem to deal with -
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whether the kind of words Urmson is interested in always convey the 
same minimum of identical information. We have seen that this is not 
so in the case of professional grading words. Therefore, the difference 
between the two classes of words is either merely that the former grade 
generally while the latter have a narrower field of application (that, 
for instance, ’brave* indicates its range of application in the way in 
whioh .’super’ indicates its - apples), but neither carry a common 
descriptive meaning necessarily, or the latter carry also some 
descriptive content apart from indicating their field of application.
How precisely the passage should be interpreted on this question I shall 
not attempt to argue. But it seems to me that the former alternative is 
untenable, while the latter raises difficult questions about the nature 
of Urmson’s second stretch,
" On the former interpretation there is no difference between ’good’ 
and ’brave’, except that since the former word can be applied in an 
unlimited range of places it does not by itself give any information, 
apart from the fact that something is being graded, whereas the latter 
word tells us fairly precisely what its range of application is - rather 
as an ad hoc label like ’super’ tells us that it is applied to apples.
The absurdity of this position is shown by the fact that it is
inconceivable that we should call a man who fled before danger ’brave’,
(On the other hand it is quite conceivable that some people should prefer
apples which are sour and bruised to those which are sweet and free from
blemishes,)
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Though ’tight’ is somewhat neutral-sounding, even so, in the use here
in question, it can describe and so indicate the kind of places it is
applicable to, only by determining to a large extent the corresponding
applications of brave, A dying man in a state of unconsciousness is not
to be described as being in a tight place, whereas a man who knows he is
suffering from an incurable disease is. The logical point here is that
we cannot know the grounds for saying that a man is in a tight place
without also deciding how we shall apply ’brave* in his case. Thus if
our incurably sick man was constantly complaining and lamenting his
misfortune we could not call him brave.
But this raises tiie question of the nature of the stretch Urmson
is asking us to make, and whether it is in fact to be described as a
stretch at all. For central to Urmson’s account of grading is the model
of a set of criteria on whose satisfaction the grading label becomes
applicable. If the so-called criteria and the grading label, so to say,
interpenetrate, as they seem to in the case of ’brave’, is it not time
we looked for an alternative account?
In a foot note (p.l64) Urmson refers to Aristotle’s remark in the
Hichomachean Ethics at 1107a that there are some ’passions’ like spite,
shamelessness and envy, and actions like adultery, theft and murder
which do not admit of a mean because they ’have names that already imply 
12
badness ’and says that this’ applies to nearly everything which he 
discusses in this work’, in the sense, as Urmson puts it in the text of
12, Ross’s translation.
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his paper, that they 'show order of merit*. Now Aristotle, in his 
treatment of such words, puts the most essential element of grading - 
the notion of a common scale •• in the centre of the picture. There is 
no mean of adultery because there is no mean of 'excess and deficiency*, 
and similarly there is no mean of courage because, being itself a mean, 
it can have no mean (and no excess or deficiency). But the attempt to 
provide a common scale often leads Aristotle to Procrustean beds.
Thus when he treats truthfulness as a mean with boastfulness and 
humbleness as the extremes he distorts the logic of this word; for in 
its primary use *true* contrasts only with 'false* or 'untrue' - one 
could boast truthfully or be truthfully humble. And it is hard to see 
how adultery can be placed on any kind of scale at all.
Urmaon rightly insists that just as 'adultery* and 'malice* are 
essentially condemnatory so is 'brave* essentially merit-assigning.
The difference between them lies in the fact that whereas 'brave* seems 
prima facie capable of being placed on a scale, at least in the case 
of 'adultery* no scale seems to be available. As we have seen IJrmson 
does not regard 'right' and * wrong' to be grading. I suggest that 
'adultery* (rather 'adulterous') is more like 'right* than like 'brave*.
There is a sharing of merit in the case of the former only in 
the sense that adultery is worse than non-adultery. But this no more 
makes it a grading word than it does 'right* and 'wrong*. For the kind
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of soale we' require involves not merely differences of praise and blame, 
but also a set of common features correlated to such differences.
Let us now see what kind of stretch the attempt to view 'brave* 
as a grading word actually involves, and whether we can in face preserve • 
this sense of a common scale in doing so. The specialised point of view . 
from which Urmson's Company Commander might grade his men would be 
largely limited to conduct on the battle field. But even he would have 
to take into account certain individual characteristics of his men; 
he would have, for instance, to take into account the state of a man's 
physical fitness. The moral grader and the Army grader are in this 
respect doing the same operation. When we are using the will to face 
danger as the main criterion of bravery we must determine a man's 
dangers by considering the resources available to him and by what ho 
knows and believes his situation to be (which includes up to a point 
what he takes it to require of him morally or socially). Now ordinary 
grading is quite different in this respect; it would be ridiculous to 
grade an apple favourably as a result of its having been borne by an 
old and unlucky tree.
Consider what 'brave' is contrasted with. If we take the other 
two members of Aristotle's trio how can we make an honest merit- 
assigning scale of the three? For what is it that they all possess 
in different degrees? The difficulty of taking the will to face danger 
as a criterion is that 'danger* suffers from the same defect from which
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'avoidable* suffers; we must not shirk the dangers we are in, as we 
must not cause any avoidable inconvenience. But this does not apply 
to risk-taking; we may take too many risks or too few (or just the 
right number). Does the brave man then take risks whose number is 
an average of the risks which the coward and the rash man each take? 
This may or may not be the approach which lies behind Aristotle's 
characterisation of these words; but in any case it has only a remote 
connection with our concept of bravery, whether or not it has a closer 
connection with the Greek concept of it. Nor can we say that there is 
a class of good risks such that the brave man takes a number which 
forms a mean between those that the rash and the cowardly together take. 
For a man who takes many good risks is not rash but bold or daring.
We might in the end be forced to say that a brave man takes the 
right kind of risks, a rash man the wrong ones and the coward shirks 
the ones he ought to take. But by how many stretches would this still 
be grading? y
I want to suggest in parenthesis that the natural contrast is 
between 'brave' and 'cowardly*, and 'rash* is brought in rather 
gratuituously in the interests of a theory; in other words, the 
notion of a scale is somewhat foreign to 'brave'. But admittedly 
only a full analysis could establish this point.
.Another point of no less importance is this. Calling a man
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bold is not indisputably pro tanto to praise him morally# Nor it 
seems to me is to call anyone brave# This is something moral 
philosophers have failed to notice; but it is nevertheless, I suggest, 
a fact of paramount importance.
I have 30 far assumed that the terms which Urmson calls 
specialised grading labels are necessarily evaluative, whether or 
not they are grading in character. We might however ask the more 
radical question 'Why should we not treat them as essentially 
classifaotory labels which are in fact used almost universally in 
order also to mark our evaluations?* I shall answer this question 
by considering a form of answer implied in Mrs. Foot's paper on 
•Moral Arguments' (Mind, Oct. 1958). In an argument designed to show 
that an evaluative conclusion may be entailed by descriptive premises 
alone, she takes the'concept of rudeness from the field of etiquette. 
If someone says 'a man is rude when he behaves conventionally' or 
•a man is rude when he walks up slowly to a front door', 'not 
because he believes such behaviour causes offence, but with the 
intention of leaving behind entirely the usual criteria or rudeness . . 
• . with the usual criteria of rudeness he leaves behind the concept 
itself.» (p*508). For her 'rude' is an evaluative word (since it is 
condemnatory), so that a man who admits the presence of the usual 
criteria of rudeness in a given case but refuses to call the
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behaviour in question rude is really refusing to disouss points of 
etiquette. I do not want to retract my earlier objection against the 
suitability of the criteria - evaluative label model in the face of 
this argument; but the following conclusion can be drawn from it for 
our present purpose. *Eude*, and many other words, including a number 
of moral words, are evaluative in character. When the criteria of 
&PPlyl#& 'rude* are fulfilled one must apply it unless one is prepared 
to abandon etiquette. The consequences of the refusal cannot be any 
less far reaching because, firstly, the notion of rudeness is central 
to etiquette, and, secondly, 'rude' is an evaluative word in a way 
which requires that one uses it evaluatively unless one is prepared to 
abandon the concept itself. If we had. chosen a non-central word, say 
'correct dress', we should not indeed have to abandon etiquette 
itself, but a part of it would be lost to us. Thus it would seem that • 
for Mrs; Foot evaluative terms like 'rude' have quite stringent' 
conditions for their use; one cannot use such terms as calssificatory 
labels* one must use them as a badge of participation in a code of 
standards. For if one didn't the relation of entailraent which exists • 
between certain descriptive premises and an evaluative conclusion
would cease to hold. '
But I do not find this answer to our question satisfactory. I 
shall state my objection in terms of a distinction which I want to 
employ subsequently in developing my own approach to these questions. 
We may distinguish between what I shall call refusing to s_peak the
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of Q- game, and refusing to play a game. Mrs. Foot's man who 
says a man is rude when he walks slowly up to a front door is refusing 
to speak the language of etiquette; and similarly, we might say, a man 
who wants to * leave behind* the usual criteria of justice is refusing 
to speak the language of morality (though this does not imply that he 
escapes blame in either case). A man does not necessarily refuse to 
speak the language of a game when he refuses to play it; he might 
remain a spectator.
The value of this distinction may be seen if we recall the 
discussion between Hare and Geach on good and evil which took place 
about three years ago in Analysis. In his paper *Good and Evil*
(Deo. 1956) Mr. Geach argued that 'good* has a primarily descriptive 
force. A man might not care two pins about cricket and still be able 
to say * Hut ton was batting on a ''good" wicket*. Hare in reply (* Geach; 
Good and Evil*, Analysis. April 1957) concedes this, but he claims 
that this is only true when 'good* is used in conjunction with 
functional words like 'batting wicket* and 'hygrometer*. But Geach 
holds that *good* is quite generally descriptive and not in this limited 
respect only. He is able to do so by treating all uses of 'good* as in 
an important sense functional. Thus 'a good human action' is 
descriptive because, as Aristotle says, 'acting well . . . is a man's 
aim simpliciter . . . and qua man»; 'an% man has to choose how to act,
80 calling an action good or bad does not depend for its effect as a
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suasion upon any individual peculiarities of desire.» (p.40). As can 
be seen, they both assume that if 'good* is used in conjunction with 
a word related by definition to a function or a nature (the function 
of a hygrometer is to measure the humidity of the atmosphere, and the 
nature of a man is to be just) it is primarily descriptive in that 
case. Hare seems to make the further assumption that an expression 
containing 'good* in it would be primarily evaluative only if it did 
not carry a 'fixed descriptive meaning' (p.108); while Geach proceeds 
to take the position that an application of 'good' guides action as a 
result of the presence of certain wants.
But this lead© to a hopeless stalemate, which neither side is 
able to dislodge the other from its chosen vantage-points. I suggest 
therefore that instead of discussing endlessly the question whether 
or when 'good' is primarily evaluative, we consider the more general 
question what would be involved in deciding to use a term, among those 
we have been considering, as a descriptive term only. With 'good' we 
can see that it cannot be used purely descriptively, not because there 
is a large class of uses in which it iiaa no 'fixed descriptive meaning' 
but because its descriptive use presupposes an evaluative one. If 
someone refuses always to use it evaluatively he is denying himself 
not simply an important use of a major linguistic tool; he is refusing 
to use the word altogether. And, furthermore, he is in fact refusing 
to use a word which is logically implied in the existence of human
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beings as social and rational beings - how could human beings be 
imagined apart from standards?
This seems to show that my distinction between refusing to speak 
the language of a game and refusing to play a game cannot be drawn in 
at least one case - in the game of standards, with the notion of 
goodness standing at its centre. But this apparent possibility arises 
from a misunderstanding. The game of standards is not a game in the 
sense here concerned, but rather a precondition of any game.
A very simple illustration of the distinction may be taken from 
cricket. The man who refuses to call a wicket 'good* which satisfies 
the usual criteria of a good wicket is refusing to speak the language 
of cricket. In doing this he makes a logical mistake; he assumes that 
a lack of interest in cricket entails a lack of right to use its 
vocabulary.
At a more sophisticated level we may say that a man who makes 
an arbritrary application of 'rude' is mistakenly assuming that an 
indifference to etiquette implies tliat one cannot intelligibly speak 
about it. But where I expect my distinction to be most fruitfully 
employed is in ethics. I do not see any logical difficulty in supposing 
that a man - any one person, that is - may be indifferent to morality 
and yet be able to speak quite intelligibly about the standards of 
morality and describe human behaviour in terms of its categories, 
though it may be doubted whether such a person would not have to
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practise hypocrisy on a large scale.
But in speaking of the 'practical* nature of morality, or of its 
'function', moral philosophers have never suggested that it would 
operate only if there were no amoral beings. The really interesting 
(and difficult) question therefore is; whether morality is wholly, 
and if not wholly up to what point, dispensable and the alternatives 
that may be necessary in its place. For at the level of cricket we 
can easily imagine that it simply ceased to be played; then we might 
all speak of it as spectators - as of a game whose interest is now 
purely historical. What, if any, analogies of this situation we might 
expect to find in morality could of course be discussed at great 
length; I can only hope to indicate a few points of attack on the 
problem. This I shall do in the latter part of the next chapter, where 
I shall attempt to provide a more positive account of moral concepts 
than was possible in this chapter, by examining a traditional question 
in ethics - whether moral principles are principles of a practical 
nature.
5, I have already admitted that my definition of a moral principle 
does not correspond to the ordinary meaning of 'moral principle'. The 
main and really important respect in-which it diverges from ordinary 
speech is that it is too narrow. It does not, i.e., fail by taking 
certain principles to be moral when in fact, in terms of the criteria 
implicit in actual speech, these principles are non-moral in character; 
it fails by leaving out certain principles which may be treated as
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moral principles without any logical infelicity. There are however 
many advantages in defining a narrower class in this way. One major 
gain is obviously this. In this way attention is focused on a large 
group of moral principles each of which requires us to concern 
ourselves with a class of actions defined without restriction by a 
moral predicate. The only reason moral predicates are able to play 
this role in the statement of moral principles lies in the fact that 
they name considerations in their own right. Since justice, truth- 
telling and promise-keeping are considerations which necessarily 
belong to morality the principles corresponding to them are moral 
principles only in virtue of the fact that the former are moral 
considerations. A clash of moral principles in my sense of 'principles' 
being thus a clash of moral considerations, any argument designed to 
show that we can have a set of rules which provides us, however 
adequately, with a mode of settling conflicts between moral 
considerations cannot prove that the category of principles is 
redundant in morals. This is so simply because some moral principles 
arepresupposed in the formulation of,such rules. It is only because 
certain accepted duties clash that the need to adjudicate between 
them can arise. If we did not sometimes wish to help a friend in 
difficulty and also, at the same time, to keep an appointment with 
our neighbour, we should not face any moral indecision. That when 
faced with such a situation we are generally able to determine for
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ourselves a better and a worse course to follow does not make it 
parallel to situations in which two rules clash. For the modified 
rules we obtain in the latter type of situation are what our revised 
considerations now are; whereas the fact that a lie is sometimes 
justified by the need to save valuable property does not qualify the 
original consideration that lying is to be avoided. In other words, 
certain moral considerations remain permanently unchanged, however 
elaborate the procedures for adjudicating between them that we might 
have evolved. The presupposition of such considerations is essential 
to morality, and the only way to state them is by employing the 
category of principles.
The argument that if we could formulate rules of morality which 
did not conflict,then moral principles would become a superfluous 
notion is therefore invalid. For nobody assumes that we con operate 
with considerations without a more or less adequate system of 
priorities between them. But this argument can and does mislead. For 
in 30 far as it encourages the hope that such an order of priorities 
may in principle be complete, it shows obsession with a model which 
may at best work only in highly rigorous deductive systems. Even more, 
it obscures the major point that moral concepts express open 
considerations which cannot in principle be defined in terms of the 
classes of actions they make obligatory.
This fundamental logical point is obscured by formalism in
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over-emphasising the importance of what I have called verdict-giving 
terms, like 'ought', 'right', and 'avoidable inconvenience', as 
paradigm value-terma; it tends to view the many typically moral terms 
which do not seem to conform to this model as somehow having been 
robbed of their original purity as evaluative terms as a result of our 
standards becoming over conventionalised. Since, however, morality has 
no essential content for the formalist it is made all the easier to 
view moral language in terms of a few such words, and thus to take 
the category of principles as redundant in morality.
Nor is the situation in the area of what are ordinarily taken 
to be the predicates of morality so eiaple that a rejection of formalism 
makes moral language essentially non-overall in character. For some 
moral predicates seem to have about them a verdict-giving air. Thus, 
despite the fact that we are sometimes 'cruel only to be kind', 'cruel' 
is more like 'avoidable inconvenience' than like 'truthful'. The 
infliction of pain ceases generally to be described as cruelty when 
the justification for it is seen to be present. 'Generous* has a 
similar tendency to be used in a non-ceteris-paribus sense. For an 
action seems, almost pari passu# to become desirable to the extent to 
which it is generous, and even when we are called upon to do an action 
which is not generous it does not, because it is not generous, become 
something which is ungenerous; as seems often to be the case with 
actions which, because they are not truthful, are thereby untruthful.
109.
It is not a matter for surprise that moral philosophers with a 
bias for the rules model should often show a predilection for 
imperativism. Imperatives are essentially over—all and are not issued 
subject to considerations outside themselves* Moral principles are 
fundamentally different in this respect.
How are conflicts of principle in morality settled? There seem 
to be only two ways of answering this question. We may, either, follow 
a more or less revisionary line and adopt a criterion, such as the 
Greatest Happiness principle, which throws overboard fundamental 
distinctions of moral speech; or we may look to the rich and complex 
articulations of the categories of our actual moral thought and 
utterance for clues to a satisfactory answer to it. Saying that we 
decide in terms of consequences, or that we make our decisions in the 
light of our chosen way of life, seems to me to be neither here nor 
there. Nor does the answer that we decide by intuition seem.any kind 
of genuine answer. For the question is not, how we come to know what 
we do come to know, but rather what kind of answer is the answer that 
we may correctly give (in whatever way we may have arrived at it). I 
want to suggest the following view.
As we have seen, the reason why the category of principles 
applies in morality is that a clash of moral considerations does not 
necessarily invalidate either of them. That we are sometimes justified
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in lying in order to avoid causing suffering does not make the lie, 
even in those circumstances, anything but regrettable. Here G. E. Moore's 
principle of 'organic unities* may be Invoked against me. It may, for 
instance, be argued - and I shall not disagree - that the pain which 
may be meted out as desert to a cruel man is not bad. But the validity 
of this principle does not make my position in any way untenable, 
though undoubtedly it does show that the situation here is extremely 
complicated.
Both these kinds of example indirectly illustrate a point of 
great importance, which neither Moore nor his successors seem to have 
noticed. A moral consideration is sometimes (whether or not always) 
waived because the situation in question falls under the concept which 
seems to be a modification of the concept involved in the original 
consideration. Thus, to take Moore's example, though causing pain is 
bad, causing pain to a cruel man may not only be not bad but even 
positively good. Similarly lying is sometimes necessary because the 
original consideration (though it holds in a way which it does not in 
the previous example) gives way to the special consideration that 
lying to avoid suffering is good. The conflicting considerations of 
not lying and avoiding suffering are here mediated by the consideration 
that lying to avoid suffering is good. This more specialised concept 
gives us, in its turn, a new moral principle.
But the more specific requirement is again only a principle which
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may be overridden by another, moral principle. The answer 1 want to 
suggest is a generalisation of situations of this kind. Since it is 
not necessary for me to assume that a moral consideration can never 
cease to hold when it gives way to a more specific consideration 
corresponding to it (as in Moore's example), but only that frequently 
such is not the case, the argument from the principle of organic 
unities does not raise any impediment to my doing so.
My answer to the problem of conflicts of duty is therefore the 
following. Â conflict of duties is decided by appealing to a third 
principle whose concept mediates between their respective concepts.
We are often reminded by philosophers of the importance of judgment 
and good sense in the application of moral notions. But unless we have 
some such procedure as I have just indicated in our moral discourse, 
judgment and good sense can do very little. It is only because we have 
the framework in which these qualities can be exercised can we ever 
begin to deal with the infinite complexity of moral situations.
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CHAPTER IV
Moral Conoepte and Moral Principles II 
Are moral principles practical principles?
1* The view that moral principles are practical in character has, 
like many familiar theses in other branches of philosophy, caused a 
good deal of confusion in ethics* Its deceptive simplicity has lulled 
moral philosophers into an illusory feeling of being in possession of 
an important truth, blocking thereby important lines of enquiry#
Though I should on the whole prefer to see it rejected as at least 
seriously misleading, if not fallacious, my object in this chapter 
is primarily to investigate it in a systematic - though far from 
complete - way in order to isolate what is clearly false in it from 
what may bear serious examination, and to introduce some of the 
essential qualifications it must be made to carry in the respects in 
which it is true* I shall therefore distinguish a number of senses 
of 'practical', without implying however that all of them are in fact 
well represented in our speech* And I shall introduce a major division 
between those which indicate the nature of the relation between a 
locution and something taken to be practical, and those that pertain 
to the nature of a field or activity claimed to be practical* In 
other words, I shall distinguish those senses of 'practical' which 
concern merely the question of the place of a mode of utterance in 
relation to something already taken to be practical, and the senses
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which are germane to the question of the manner in which a practical
field or activity is practical; or, very roughly, between the inner
and the outer senses of the word. While disputes over the
justification of morality relate mainly to the latter senses of
'practical*, the former are of considerable value in showing the
futility of many blanket theories of morality.
Some indication of the stultification which results from
failing to draw distinctions in this field can be given even at
this stage by considering Professor Nowell-Smith*s characterisation
of ethics in terms of his distinction between • theoretical* and
'practical discourse'. The former has the purpose of enabling us
'to understand the nature of things' while the latter 'consists of
answers to practical questions of which the most important are "%at
shall I do?" and "What I ought to do"?. If I put these questions to
myself the answers are decisions, resolutions, expressions of
intention, or moral principles. If I put them to someone else his
answer will be an order, injunction, or piece of advice, a sentence
in the form "Do such and such". The central activities for which
1
moral language is used are choosing and advising others to chooseL' 
The two related questions he is answering here - viz., whether 
moral discourse belongs to theoretical or practical discourse, and 
if practical what makes it practical - are dealt with on the basis
1, Ethics, p.11,
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of an ambiguous as sumption* He assumes that there are certain 
activities which are practical in nature, and a form of discourse 
is practical if it is employed in such activities# How an activity 
may be classed as practical as a result of its place on two very 
different kinds of scale# Thus seeing, contemplating, observing, 
inferring, choosing and deciding constitute a scale the last two 
of which are clearly practical (while inferring may or may not be 
so taken)# On the other hand, we might say that angling, racing 
mathematics, worship, eating, drinking, industry and commerce 
constitute another scale the last four of which are practical# (Ho 
doubt both these scales are rather odd assortments, but 'activity*, 
as used in philosophy and elsewhere, is itself an omnibus word which 
makes such diverse assemblages possible)# In taking choosing and 
deciding as examples which illustrate the practical character of 
moral discourse Howell*Smith is clearly thinking of the former kind 
of scale# But I suggest that this is a mistakei Choosing and advising 
are activities performed by scientists no less than by moral agents# 
What can distinguish the scientist's talk from the talk of the moral 
agent, so that the former is theoretical while the latter is 
practical, must lie in their respective subject matters (the former 
being concerned with electrons and genes, while the latter pertains 
to such things as picmisee and debts)# The scale that is relevant 
here is the second and not the first, whether or not we decide
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subsequently that moral discourse is practical# For what I am 
denying is not that human discourse can be divided into theoretical 
and practical discourse on the basis of the first scale, but rather 
that moral discourse can be placed at any given point on it# 
Nowell-Smith*8 choice of an inappropriate scale is also 
accompanied by an attempt to apply it fairly strictly# Thus, though 
to appraise is not to perform a practical activity, it has no point, 
and would not belong to practical discourse, unless it links up 
with our subsequent behaviour# 'But the great philosophers of the 
past always treated questions of appraisal as subordinate to 
practical questions# They assumed - and who would not? - that the 
point of telling you that Jones is a good or a bad man is that you 
should imitate or should hot imitate Jones, that you should or 
should not give Jones the job, or do whatever else might be in 
question#' (p#12). Two objections may be made against this 
statement# Firstly, the connection between appraisal and conduct 
need not be so close even in Nowell-Smith's own examples# When 
a man who lives in a very different social and cultural world from 
ours is praised as a good man there is little question of imitating 
him# The extreme variety of moral situations often precludes this# 
Secondly his examples are question-begging# If we consider a fairly 
specific moral judgment on a remote historical person there need 
not be any practical point to it# Thus it is difficult to see how
Ir
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a judgment like 'Qubla Khan ought to have spent more time with 
his favourite concubine* can, when made by a historian, and without 
reference to his general moral outlook,have any bearing on the 
conduct of present-day English readers.
Hare's distinction between 'prescriptive' and 'descriptive' 
language is similar in purpose. He seems to succeed where 
îîowell-Smith fails by the simple device of making it analytic 
that a prescriptive use of language entails an imperative. But, 
as 30 often when success is sou^t by decision to use a word in 
a special sense, this does not solve the problem. Except where 
the form of words is itself in the imperative mood, or can be 
taken as operating as an imperative in its context, some form of 
a procedure for deciding, in a given situation, what actually is 
entailed in the shape of an imperative must be provided by the 
advocates of this connection between prescription and imperatives. 
The failure to do so is not a deficiency of detail but a point of 
considerable logical importance. All that the definition can 
secure is a minimum of commitment which all prescriptive use of 
language must carry; but what minimum is it? A somewhat empty 
sense of commitment to an imperative would be this. The judgment
•r ' ----t
on qubla Khan, for instance, might be taken to commit our 
historian to asking all subsequent Qubla Khans to do what the 
first ought to have done.
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The reason why no practical conclusion of any significance 
follows from certain uses of prescriptive language is that, 
though they can be regarded as applications of principles, the 
relation between the two is not necessarily a one-one relation and, 
as in our example, the terms in which the judgment may be defended 
can vary* to say is wrong* is not. necessarily to make plain 
one's grounds for saying so. Very often, the more specific the 
action described in a judgment of appraisal the less definite 
the practical conclusion that may be drawn from it. Thus to say 
that divorce by mutual consent should be allowed commits one to 
the position that divorce is a revocable contract, but to say 
'X ought not to have divorced his wife' gives little information 
about one's moral beliefs#
It would seem that the verbal form in which a moral 
principle may be stated can provide little indication of its 
logical character. The following sentences, though differing 
among themselves gramatically,, express the same moral principle.
Never tell a lie.
Thou Shalt not lie.
One ought not to lie.
Lying is wrong#
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The main common feature, to offset the difference in tense and mood, 
seems to be that they all employ an action-word, namely 'lying*, But 
that does not seem to have any importance here» For a sentence like 
'Lying causes dyspepsia», which, in terms of Nowell-Smith'a 
distinction, belongs to 'theoretical discourse* employs the same 
action word. And since the kind of action mentioned is not always in 
the future his view that appraisal is subordinate to questions of 
conduct has no justification in grammar*
Our approach to the wider problem of the sense in which moral 
discourse is practical must therefore be by a less obvious route.
The diversity of moral discourse, furthermore, makes it incumbent 
on us to distinguish more than one sense in which morality as a 
whole - i,e,, from the outside - may be viewed as practical. Leaving 
aside the wider question of the different external senses of 
'practical' for the present, let us now distinguish some of its senses 
which pertain merely to the relation in which a form of utterance may 
stand to an activity or field which is already assumed to be practical, 
2, The following sentences may be considered as illustrating 
some of the ways in which an utterance may be taken to be practical 
in virtue of its relation to an activity or field assumed to be 
practical,
(l) Spring vegetables have a low protein content (probably 
a false generalisation in dietetics).
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(2) Pain is evil,
(3) Always bring forward your pawns quickly,
(4) Always move a bishop diagonally,
(5) Be just.
The first sentence can be taken as stating a practical truth 
because our interest in the information provided by it is likely 
to bo a practical one. The protein content of spring vegetables 
is a matter of interest largely because they are grown for human 
consumption. This is of course a contingent matter; it is easy to 
imagine circumstances in which the chemical composition of spring 
vegetables was studied for its own sake, just as some physicists 
are supposed to investigate the properties of matter from pure 
curiosity. This gives us the minimal sense of 'practical*. But 
before conceding the title of 'practical' to (l) an important 
distinction has to be drawn. It is obvious that we must not admit 
a sense of 'practical' which would permit us to treat every 
utterance in the general or universal form as practical in nature; 
to do so would rob the distinction between 'theoretical' and 
'practical' of all value. There are some locutions in whose case 
it would be absurd to say that our interest in them is a practical 
one. Thus while the rule of non-contradiction is enunciated at 
times with a practical view, it would be inappropriate to say that 
someone, or a group of people, took interest in it from a purely 
practical point of view.
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ïhis arises - apart from the fact that clear thinking is not a 
practical activity of any kind - from the impossibility of any 
talk about practical purposes which does not presuppose this rule* 
The inappropriateness of calling the rule of non­
contradiction 'practical' seems to extend itself to a law like the 
law of gravitation. But this, I suggest, is a different kind of 
inappropriateness. Partly it is because laws of the latter kind 
are held to be true beyond question, even though they are not 
necessarily true, that we do not wish to call them 'practical'. 
Another and perhaps stronger reason seems to be this» The 
connection with actions which laws of this kind bear is quite 
indirect, For ordinary non-technical purposes they do not give us 
any indispensable information; whereas for purposes whose 
satisfaction depends on scientific knowledge they are only a 
starting point and very far indeed from providing information which 
can be acted upon.
Thus while (l) can be called 'practical* the possibility of 
taking an interest in it with some practical view must be understood 
in such a way that if no alternative to it were conceivable, or if 
it formed a condition for any talk about purposes, then we could 
not be interested in it in this way, Bet us call this sense of 
'practical' sense A* Here it must be noted that though in calling 
(l) a practical locution m  do not depart from ordinary usage in
!■
121.
any important respect, in sense A even the law of gravitation is 
practical in nature. The divergence from ordinary speech can no 
doubt be rectified by further stipulations; but to do so would add 
unnecessary complexity to our discussion. There is no danger or 
misunderstanding if it is recognised that our minimal sense of 
'practical' is a technical one.
The sentence 'Pain is Evil' does not state a moral principle 
in the way in which 'Be kind* does, 'Just?, 'kind*, 'brave', etc, 
are necessarily applied to kinds of action and characterise, in 
different ways, the conduct of agents; but to say 'X is painful' 
is not to say necessarily that someone is responsible for X,
Nor does a principle like this provide information in which 
our interest might or might not be of a practical nature. Even if 
we do not take the view that words like 'good' and 'evil' are used 
to refer to attitudes ('pro' and 'con' attitudes, to use Nowell- 
Smith's terminology) or for the purposes of 'commendation' (Hare's 
term) and condemnation, so that they are primarily evaluative, (2) 
has a justificatory role which precludes it from being contingently
connected with actions. To say »X is eviP is to imply that X ought
» 4
to be avoided. But to give the chemical composition of a substance 
is not to imply anything about what actions one ought to take in 
regard to it (except when the context provides the necessary 
assumptione). (2) may thus be said to possess a non-contingent
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connection with actions in the field to which it belongs# At the 
same time it does not mention a class of actions to be avoided in 
the way *I)o not lie* does# Let us call locutions which posses these 
two features ’practical* in sense B#
’Always bring forward your pawns quickly* resembled ’Pain is 
Evil’ in not being related to actions in a contingent way only.That 
is, it is not possible to regard it as a valid principle of chess 
and at the same time not to hold that onefe chess-playing should be 
guided by it* This is not to say that it does not differ from the 
latter in being necessarily connected with action in some other 
respect} for it differs from it in that in stating it we necessarily 
mention a type of action#
But while a principle or standard of this form is necessarily 
practical, it is not necessary that in the activity or field 
concerned there should be a place for it# This sense too deserves a
separate label; let us call it sense 0#
Sentences (4) and ,(5) are rather similar and may be considered 
together# They differ from (3) in being not merely locutions which 
are necessarily connected with practice, but also express norms 
necessarily belonging to the activity or field concerned# They 
differ mainly in that the former states a rule while the latter
states a principle, a difference of no importance to the distinctions
we are now making#
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It will have been noticed that all the four kinds of examples
I have considered may be taken as illustrating, each in some respect
differently, the contingency or necessity of the connection between
an utterance, or what is expressed by it, may have with actions
belonging to a field or activity already assumed to be practical*
Where these different ways of being practical are best illustrated
by a moral principle I have, with some hesitation, not restricted
myself to non-moral examples# Let us now consider how far moral
principles, or any sub-class of them,qualify for the title of
’practical* in our four senses*
I shall give two reasons for not regarding moral principles
as practical in sense A* Firstly, as we saw, it is a matter of what
interest we take in a locution for it to qualify as practical in sense
A. ’Spring vegetables have a low protein content’ would in this sense
belong to diatetics or to chemistry, depending on how wo look upon
it. A moral principle oould only belong to morality, whether or not
2
we cared about morality* The second reason is this* There is a 
fundamental difference between a moral principle and a straightforward
descriptive statement* This may sometimes be denied* On a view like
G. E* Moore’s, for instance, moral predicates are definable in purely 
descriptive terms, since for him ’good’, the term which nemes the
2. For qualifications to this statement see next chapter* Here it 
may be sufficient to point out that the content of morality could 
only be appropriated by some other field, such as self-interest 
or religion, but not by anything which sought merely knowledge.
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quality whose realisation is the sol© purpose of moral endeavour, is 
like ’yellow’, a descriptive word# As moral principles can be stated 
in the indicative, on his position it is possible ,to say that the
function of moral principles is to inform us of the presence or absence
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of a quality in certain types of actions. Recent critics of 
intuitioniat theories like Strawson and Hare have claimed that to do 
this is to rob value-words of their characteristic function - that 
which makes it possible to draw inferences of the form ’One ought to 
do X’* We can however - without going into the question whether and, 
if so, in what respect words like ’good*, ’just’, etc. are descriptive 
words - show that moral principles cannot be regarded as practical in 
sense A by means of the following argument, based on the difference 
between practical advice and moral advice#
Normally when someone offers practical advice what is practical 
about the advice is its claim that, if followed, it would lead to the 
results which the recipient of the advice desires} or, if not the 
results he is aiming at, then those at which he would aim, if ho knew 
the possibilities of the situation. The meaning of ’practical’ in this 
use of ’practical’ is, roughly, that which works. If the advice is 
based on some general beliefs then those beliefs are practical in a 
sense closest to our first sense of ’practical’»
When a belief operates as a practical belief in sense A and 
advice is offered on the basis of it the adviser must hold it to be 
true » He can then be said not only to offer practical advice but to
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advise someone to act on a piece of information which he holds to be 
true. He could not however be said to do this if he did not accept the 
belief himself.
But this is certainly not true of moral advice. I can advise a 
friend to take a vow of celibacy because for him this is the supreme 
condition of spiritual cleanliness, even though I myself regard it as 
at best a harmless fad. It might therefore seem that moral advice 
purports to indicate a way of acting which would lead to the fulfilment 
of the addressee’s purpose of doing his duty in tenaa of the principles 
he accepts and is thus similar to the normal cases of practical advice. 
But this is surely a mistake* It is not always the case that advising 
someone on how to apply his moral principles is moral advice. This is 
because sincerity is not a sufficient condition for a form of behaviour 
to be morally right* And unless I think that it is right for someone 
to act in a certain way I cannot be said to give him the advice to do 
so, though that does not imply that when I cannot advise oomeone to 
follow a moral principle which he holds this must be because I hold 
that it is always a vfxoixg principle to follow. It merely implies that 
in the circumstances in which it follows from his principles that he 
should act in a certain way I cannot (morally) advise him to do so 
unless it is justifiable in moral terms which I accept* One of the 
gro unds on which I may ask someone to do something is that this is the
sort of action required by his moral beliefs*
My argument against viewing moral principles as practical in
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sense A may be summed up in the following way. Only beliefs which are j 
held*by the adviser to be true can qualify as practical in sense A; 
and once this condition is satisfied advice to act on them can be given. 
But in the case of moral principles this qualification is not necessary, 
so that advice to act on a moral principle can be given even when the 
adviser does not himself hold this, principle to be valid, i.e. a |
principle worthy of adoption, not simply a principle he must in certain |
circumstances recommend someone to act on because the person advised 
believes in it. '
’Pain is evil* is not, as I have said, a typical moral principle. 
Though some - for instance, the Buddhists - would regard it as the 
supreme principle of morality, its status as a moral principle, as 
that of its Utilitarian counterpart, may be questioned. IVhen construed 
as forbidding pain-causing behaviour, and thus as employing pain-causing 
behaviour as a moral concept, it seems to do some-violence to our 
moral language. To call an action ’unjust* is to provide a very strong 
prima facie reason for condemning it. On the other hand, even the best I
of OUI' actions so often result in pain that it may be doubted whether 
there is a general onus on us to justify the painful consequences of 
our actions. (Does the asoentic merit moral condemnation for the pain 
he inflicts on himself?). The so-called duty to avoid pain must not 
be confused with duty not to be cruel or unkind. Both the latter 
kinds of ajction capise pain but the reason why they are bad is not 
this. TÊeir badness is to be explained on other grounds - for instance,
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because they cause pain which is unmerited or unnecessary, or because 
they hurt where the obligation is to help.
Both the Buddhist and Utilitarian principles purport in fact to 
re-define the scope of moral behaviour. Instead of the normal 
multiplicity of moral criteria they are meant to serve as the one 
supreme test of the morality or immorality of actions. Whether such 
revolutionary proposals are accepted or not they must not be confused 
with moral principles in the ordinary sense.
The extent of the analogy between sense C of ’practical* and the 
sense in which moral principles are practical is a matter of dispute: 
’Always bring forward your pawns* is a principle within the frame-work 
of chess rules and the aim of winning at chess} but there are no agreed 
definitive rules which delimit the field of morality, nor is there an 
agreed, much less clearly defined, aim of morality. Here we get a 
good example of an external sense of ’practical* impinging on the 
application of an internal sense of that word. Depending on how the 
aim of morality is taken we should expect various possibilities of 
dividing moral principles in respect of the necessity or contingency 
of the place held by them within it. If the analogy between moral 
principles and principles or rules which are practical in sense C is 
a strong one we should expect a large number of our moral principles 
to be contingent in this way. But there will always be some in whose 
case the search for alternatives makes no sense.
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This brings us to sense D. We saw earlier that the principle of 
justice is practical in this sense. How in general moral philosophers 
have not held that all moral principles are practical in this sense.
3
Ho doubt for Kant all moral principles are a priori in character. But 
this only implies that only valid or correct moral principles are 
practical in this sense. If we assume that there are good and bad, or 
correct and incorrect, moral principles - as we must unless differences 
in moral matters are held to be never differences in moral principles - 
then only valid moral principles can be practical in this privileged 
sense.
How a principle may be necessary to morals in two rather different 
ways. The principle of justice is necessary to morality in that anyone 
who does not accept it could not be said to have a moral standpoint at 
alia On the other hand there can be principles without which a man 
could have at best a rudimentary sort of morality. They may be necessary 
in the sense that he cannot acquire a developed morality without them.
In this latter category might be put kindness, generosity, etc. Clearly, 
however, in relation to a developed morality, both kinds of principles 
are necessary in the same sense} such a morality is inconveivable
A
without these principles.
A principle may thus be not only a valid moral principle but a 
necessarily valid moral principle. V/hen a principle is valid in the 
latter way - and ipso facto in the former - it has no conceivable rival.
5* ^etaphysio of Morals# Introduction.
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At this level there is no distinction between correct and incorrect 
moral principles,
A parallel with fundamental logical rules may help here* If some­
one were to deny the law of non-contradiotion - as Marxists seem to 
sometimes — ànd claim to have discovered a truer lav in its place# we 
should want to deny the supposed alternative the title of a logical 
rule* We treat such claimants as we treat counterfeit currency| i*e*, 
as worthless articles rather than as inferior goods (as old and worn 
out coins were in the days of the Gold Standard),
But a large majority of moral principles cannot, of course, be
said to be necessary in this double way. There seems to be no necessity 
that helping one’s enemies when they are victims of some natural :i
calamity, or denying help to those who have wronged us, should be a 
moral principle which someone with a more than rudimentary moral 
standpoint should hold.
Thus while Kant was closer to the truth when he thought moral 
principles to be a priori in character than those moral philosophers 
who treat moral principles in a sense quite unlike our sense D, and 
tend rather to treat them as practical principles in sense C, his 
theory left no room for alternative moral principles.
Though the distinction between these two kinds of principles is 
of fundamental importance, the point at which it is to be drawn cannot
be indicated even very roughly without a great deal of detailed
investigation into the structure of our moral beliefs. But one thing
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j’iiuat here be mentioned» This is the difference between the condemnation 
which the amoralist (i*e* the person who denies even the most fundamental 
moral principles) earns at our hands and the censure to which the 
person whose moral awareness is limited or crude is liable. The notion
I
of an amoral person, despite the facility with which some novelists and 
psychologists speak of him, presents many conceptual difficulties, and 
before we can condemn or exonerate someone reputed in this way we 
ought to be clear in our minds about the significance, or lack of it, 
of what is being attributed to him5 whereas the notion of a person whose 
moral beliefs err signigicantly (and are not simply moral by courtesy) 
is, by comparison, far simpler.
3. I shall now draw attention to a miscellany of uses which, though 
of no great intrinsic importance for the purposes of this chapter, are 
likely to throw light on the approval-charged application of 
’practical* to morality in recent ethical theory.
When someone calls a proposal or suggestion practical it is 
natural to assume that he means to praise it. Its end or purpose being 
not under consideration, or being taken to be desirable, the point of 
calling it practical is to admit its claim to be efficacious in what 
it is intended to achieve. The four senses of ’practical* we have so 
far distinguished must not be confused with this use, though where we 
can apply it in this praise-be stowing sense, we can also apply it in
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sense C (because principles in the latter sense of •practical principle* 
are contingently efficacious)# What is important to notice here is that 
we cannot praise a proposal as practical unless there could be one which 
might not be practicable* Therefore, since certain moral principles 
have no conceivable alternatives it follows that the application to
4
thorn of ’practical* in this sense is excluded# A question that 
naturally arises here is whether moral principles which are not 
necessary in either of the two senses distinguished above, since this 
difficulty does not exist in their case, qualify for the commendatory 
application of ’practical* to them. If there were a general end, like 
the greatest possible happiness, in terms of which we rated moral 
principles, then such principles would be describable as more or less 
practical. Now whatever procedure utilitarians, or sociologists of a 
utilitarian persuasion, might adopt, this is not how such principles 
are actually defended or rejected. À principle like ’All wrongs ought 
to be avenged*, for instance, seems to bear little connection with any 
general end of morality#
The pejorative uses of ’practical* are more germane to persons 
than to actions. Often in saying of someone that he is a practical man 
we suggest that he has a limited outlook, that, for instance, ho is
4. Mr. Griffiths in the paper referred to at the end of the previous 
chapter calls moral principles ’rules of thumb’. Since a rule of 
thumb is necessarily ’practical’ in this commendatory sense it is 
clear that an illegitimate generalisation is involved in his so 
calling them.
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innocent or oblivious of finer distinctions} that his life moves in 
narrow grooves, and that he would rather succeed at something 
conventional and commonplace than venture forth into anything bold and 
imaginative* ' '
Sometimes however, ’practical* is used to apply, not to actions 
or persons so much as to a style of acting, without implying either 
unqualified praise or blame* Thus a ’practical appraoch’ may, in certain 
circumstances, connote an approach which, though productive of certain 
results, may be expected to miss something of the original conception 
(rather as a rule of thumb is often good enough for the purpose in hand, 
but sometimes only an approximation to what is desired). Clearly it is 
highly doubtful whether acting on a moral principle can be called 
practical in this sense.
4. We may now consider some of the senses of ’practical’ in which it 
may be usod to characterise morality - or moral principles, as the 
principles of the field of morality - from the outside. The uses I 
want to consider are not, as I pointed out earlier, necessarily
reflected in ordinary speech; nor are they such that the mere recognition
!
of a possibility on my part commits me to the view that they are 
leglmately applicable to morality. I shall in fact argue against the 
possibility of doing so in more than one case*
As a preliminary it would be worth our while to recall here the 
distinction I made in the previous chapter between refusing to play a
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game and refusing to speak the language of a game. I said there that 
refusing to apeak the language of a game is logically senseless, hut 
that to refuse to play a game is not logically impossible. The latter 
part of this statement may now be amplified further. Even when I refuse 
to play a game it may nevertheless be to my advantage that the game 
continues in fact to be played. The cynicism involved in such an 
attitude - i.e. in such a refusal when it is accompanied by an awareness 
that I stand to gain from the others playing it - varies of course with
the game. At a simple level we have the man who scorns, secretly or
r- i -
openly, the labourite pastime of many while benefiting tangibly from the 
fact that they persist in such an inane exercise (e.g. the musical snob
who earns his livelihood by selling records of popular music). Clearly
(
there need be no inconsistency in his actions; for he may think that 
good music can never appeal to more than a small minority. And at perhaps 
the most difficult we have the immoralist who disregards the standards 
of morality but wants other to continue behaving morally. Sometimes 
the problem of persuading him to accept morality is taken to be 
equivalent to the question of what, if anything, will serve as an 
argument which he can only reject by abandoning rationality. But the 
notion of rational behaviour is full of ambiguity. If it is simply a 
matter of consistency, then, prima facie at least, it seems arguable 
that the immoralist can — as a rational egoist - have a consistent
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position. The Classical answer - that it is to his own advantage to 
be moral (or just) - comes up against the difficulty that moral 
behaviour is defined as not merely behaviour in conformity with moral 
standards, but rather such behaviour accompanied by the right reasons 
for acting. It might however be said that, though the person who 
pursues his own interest (however truly) cannot ever be said to be 
acting morally, nevertheless, it may be possible to show that moral 
behaviour achieves in fact the same results as the correct pursuit of 
our own interests. But, how are we to show that self-interest and 
morality coincide, not simply generally, but always and necessarily?
Whether such a dialectical feat is possible or not, at least 
one point which is of relevance to the problem of this chapter does 
emerge. If morality and self-interest achieve the same result then 
we might say tiiat morality is practical in the same external sense 
of ’practical’ as self-interest. Intuitively there seems to be no 
difficulty in saying that to pursue one’s interests is to do 
something practical, and so our discussion would come to a 
satisfactory culmination.
If, on the other iiand, we assume that the two do not coincide, 
then the question in what way morality is practical remains still to 
answer.
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Another possible line of argument might be this. We saw in the 
case of ’Pain Is evil’ and its Utilitarian counterpart that they are 
not like ordinary moral principles but in fact constitute re­
definitions of the scope of morality. But once this is granted we 
might say that morality is practical because it is a pursuit aimed at 
minimising pain (or maximising pleasure) in a systematic way. 
Intuitively also there seems to be a possibility that we can call 
such a pursuit practical. But there are at least two inescapable 
difficulties in taking such a view. There is, firstly, not only no 
conceptual necessity (as I have already suggested) about taking such 
a view of ethics, but, on the contrary, there are strong grounds
against defining ethics in this wayi For normally we take the
/
avoidance of pain to others only to be a duty; in so far as I aim 
at eliminating pain from my own life (or try to maximise my own 
pleasure) in a systematic way without hurt to others I am doing
I
something which is ethically neutral rather than something which is 
morally good or bad. In other words, ethics is ^ characteristically
5
other-regarding. Secondly, pleasure and pain are not such simple
6
notions as this view seems to imply. So often pleasure and pain arise
!
5. with perhaps some qualifications; such as, fhat, I should be 
honest not only with others but also vd.th mjrself.
6m Cf. Professor Ryle’s paper on ’Pleasure’,Aristotelian Society 





as a result of succeas in what we aim at or from frustration in our
i
endeavours, rather than because we are successful in cultivating 
certain feelings or fail in our efforts to avoid certain other 
feelings, that neither of these principles seems to relate to any 
definite pursuit. Though our aim to acquire riches, or to reduce 
illness, is a characteristically practical aim, the avoidance of pain 
or the pursuit of pleasure cannot, for this reason, be treated in a 
similar category.
We'have already seen that morality cannot be characterised by 
reference to certain members of the class of activities formed by 
observing, contemplating, deciding, choosing, etc. Nor, it would now 
seem, can it be by reference to any of the second (angling, games, 
engineering, commerce and indstry). For it does not relate 
specifically to any of them but seems rather to be something of a 
higher order concerned in principle with all of them. But might we 
not extend this second list and include such activities as politics 
and administration, and then treat morality on an analogy with the
i
last two (which we should all regard as practical)? Whether this is 
so oi'* not, there is at least this obvious difference between morality
I
and 'the .entire second list,Veven in its extended form; though we are 
all moral agents, whether we like it or not, those amongst us who
I
are 'politicians or administrators are so by choice. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that, in whatever sense we apply 'practical' to
157.
morality, it will be a somewhat artificial sense, or at least one 
which calls for some explanation. I shall now comment on Mr# Toulmin’s 
attempt to define the ’function of ethics’, as an attempt which faces 
essentially the some problems as the attempt to characterise the sense 
in which morality may be said to be practical.
In his The Place of Reason in Ethics, he writes: ’ • • ♦ we can 
provisionally define it as being ”to correlate our feelings and 
behaviour in such a way as to make the fulfilment of everyone’s aims
7
and desires as far as possible qompatible”.’ And in conclusion:
’Ethics is concerned with the harmonious satisfaction of desires and 
8
interests*. He tries to meet the likely objection that ’compatibility 
of aims and desires’ is possible * on various levels of excellence’ 
by claiming that ’the idea of obligation, as it affects our decisions, 
is primarily moral’. If by thie Touliuin means ~ as seems likely - 
that the idea of moral obligation is logically prior to that of 
obligation in other fields, this might well be questioned; it seems 
to me to be arguable that moral obligation and political obligation 
are correlative notions. But even if he is right this does not 
dispose of the objection. By ’harmonious satisfaction’ or 
’compatibility’ of aims and desires he surely does not mean a process 
whereby we no longer have aims and desires which clash or which call 





we are told what kind of harmonisation is oharacteristically moral, 
we have at best named a function which is performed equally well by 
politics.
The important question therefore is not whether ethics has a
function, but in what sense we may speak of the ’function of ethics*.
In what is perhaps the standard sense of ’function* to speak of a
function is not to imply that it is necessarily applicable to a unique
object or class of objects. Thus though the function of a knife is to
cut it is not necessary that only knives should be used for cutting.
Nor, in this sense of ,the word, do we imply that the referent 
necessarily performs the function in question; though a computer can
compute, it is quite possible that there should be computers which
have never been, nor ever will be, used to compute.
Now imagine a case in which that which performs the function
cannot exist, as it can in the above examples, without the function
itself being performed, though the performing of the function can
I.
happen without this particular performer’s being the one to perform it. 
A king cannot be king (assuming that dethroned kings are not really 
kings any more) without performing the function of holding the highest 
office in his country, though others - such as a president or a chief - 
can hold this office. Here we are using ’function’ in a non-standard 
sense; for now we cannot ask whether the king is performing his 
function (as we noramlly can when we speak of a function). For the same
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reason it is a weaker sense of the word, since to say ’King John is 
performing his kingly functions’ in this sense is merely to say that 
King John is still king (We might in the first sense of ’function’ say 
that a king necessarily reigns but may or may not govern).
Though we speak tautologously when we ascribe the function of * 
reigning to a king (or of holding the highest office to a chief), there 
is no coverse tautology in saying that, in such and such a community, 
the highest office is held by a king or a president. But if we said 
that the kingly function or office is performed by kings we should be 
speaking not only tautologously; we should also be using ’function’ in 
a purely empty way. (For not only does a king necessarily hold the 
highest office in his country; he alone can perform the kingly function, 
and necessarily performs it).
Our question then reduces to the following: in how strong a
sense of ’function’ are we able to attribute the function of
harmonising aims and desires to morality? Consider this further passage
from Toulmini ’ . . . there would be no use for ethical reasoning either
among people whose feelings were wholly unalterable ( and who would
therefore behave exactly the same whether exorted to change or not )
or, on the other hand, among angels, whose dispositions were always of
the best (and who would therefore have no need to enquire or discuss 
9
what to do >. Toulmin commits himself to, (a) the view that harmonious 
94. Op.cit., pp.156-137,
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aims and desires are possible without moral reasoning, and (b) the view ! 
that such a state of affairs may exist without any agency to bring it | 
about* In doing this he seems to treat morality as having a function in I
Ï
a far stronger sense of the word than may plausibly be maintained. It j
may be doubted whether beings whose aims and desires cannot change, ;
»
because their feelings are ‘wholly unalterable’, can be regarded as ?
rational beings; it is not so much that moral reasoning is useless in 
their case as that they are incapable of moral reasoning. Angels on the I 
other hand, being necessarily rational, are quite capable of moral 
thinking. But from the supposition that their dispositions are always 
of the best it does not follow that ethical reasoning has no use for 
them. If ’dispositions’ is used in a Ryle an sense then saying that 
their dispositions are always of the best merely means that they always 
behave in the best way; they might nevertheless employ moral arguments 
in making their decisions. If, on the other hand, their dispositions 
are supposed to be of the best because they have no need to employ 
moral concepts in their decisions, then the question arises whether 
people whose decisions are never moral decisions can be said always to 
make decisions which are morally of the best. Bor can it be said that 
they make no decisions, for beings who make no decisions are, again, 
not rational beings. Furthermore, being angels, they may be presumed 
not merely to do the best but to want to know that they in fact do the 
best. This necessarily gives a use for ethical reasoning in their lives.
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Kant, it seems to me, made a sounder approach to the problem when
he distinguished morality as obligation and morality as the principles
of practical reason. ’A perfectly good will would therefore be equally
subject to objective laws (viz* laws of good), but oould not be
conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from
its subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception
of good*# A distinction of a related nature, to which some will object,
that may be drawn is the following# One might claim that rational beings
must possess moral concepts, without necessarily implying that they
have a morality# In other words, there is a difference between playing
the game of morality and merely having a use for its language# Morality
has a function in the lives of all rational beings in the sense that
some of its concepts are implied by the possibility of intercourse
between them, but not in the sense that they follow moral principles#
11
An example from Mr* Griffiths* paper on ’Justifying Moral Principles*' 
will explain my point* He points out, rightly I think, that a prudential 
justification of moral principles may be given by assuming that God 
is a Utilitarian in this world and a retributivist in the next, but 
that actually such a justification would not enable us to make the 
transition from prudence to morality# Clearly then prudence can do the 
job which morality does in the sense that there could be rational beings
10. g u n d a m e n t e l ' the Metaphyfflg  ^of p.36.
11, iiriatoteQfff |ocie|y, |^oceedinga. Vol.LVIII.1957-58.
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whose alma and desires were regulated by a rational procedure.
But this is not to say that we can always decide in a clear out
way whether a principle is being followed as merely a prudential
principle or as a moral one, nor that the fields of religion and
12
morality can be clearly demarcated. The criteria for deciding whether 
a non-moral principle or rule is being followed are fairly liberal, 
as may be seen from the following example.. My motive in following a 
principle of chess-strategy on a particular occasion may not be to 
play the best game, since I am generally a lazy player, but only to 
impress Jones. I can, in such a case, be said to know that X is a 
correct principle of chess strategy and to follow it when I move 
my chessmen in the right way. It is not that I am merely following 
what Jones thinks to be a correct principle of chesa-strategy; for, 
then, though my action could be described as following what Jones thinks 
to be a correct principle of chess, that would not be an adequate 
description of it. I can imagine a situation in which I know that Jones 
thinks X to be a correct principle without knowing whether it is in 
fact correct. The difference between this and the previous situation is 
precisely the difference which is described by saying that, in the one,
I follow a principle of chess-strategy which I hold to be correct, 
though only because Jones thinks so, while, in the other, I follow a 
principle which, though possibly incorrect from my point of view, I
12, Some further observations on this subject will be made in the 
next chapter.
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know Jones to hold to he true. In other words, it is possible to follow 
a non-moral principle from a motive which has nothing to do with its 
correctness.
#e might on the other hand be inclined to think that the criteria 
for deciding that a moral principle is being followed are straight­
forwardly unambiguous and of the yes-or-no variety. But this would be 
a great mistake. So much of the inspiration behind the moral heroism 
of a religious person is likely to lie in his faith, that it would be 
highly paradoxial to say that he acts on moral principles only to the 
extent to which he neglects his religion.
I siiall now sum up my discussion of the ’function* of morality.
In a weak sense of ’function* morality has a necessary function in 
rational existence. And we might say that morality is practical in 
this special sense of being involved in the notion of rational beings 
in intercourse, remembering how far removed it is from the ordinary 
sense of ’practical*. We might also claim it to be functional in the 
stronger sense of consisting of principles, which may be, and often 
are, followed for their own sake; it would then also be ’practical* in 
the stronger sense that it is one possible mode of deciding between 
conflicting aims and desires. But once we have made either of these 
claims we cannot then also say that there are beings, whether with 
unalterable feelings or with feelings which are of the best, who have 
no ’use* for ethical reasoning in realising their aims and desire.
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For even If there were beings who had no use for morality qua 




The Ultima.oy of Moral Prino^ pjlefl 
1# In arguing that on the whole the statement that moral principles 
are practical principles is extremely misleading, as I did in the 
previous chapter, one may naturally be assumed to indicate a 
prediliction for what seems, at least intuitively, to be the opposite 
view, expressed in the dictum that morality is ’ultimate* or 
’categorical’ or ’unconditional’ in character. Although I did not appeal 
to it in my discussion of the former, but only to the logic of 
•practical’ and related terms like ’function’ and ’use’, and can 
therefore examine it without having to save it as a prop to conclusions 
to which I have committed myself in that chapter, I have already 
indicated my broad acceptance of it in earlier chapters* It seems to 
me that, though the most celebrated and entrenched of dicta are some­
times rightly questioned in philosophy, in the present case tradition
2
is right, and attempts at innovation or revolution are likely to be 
misconceived. But what I propose to do in this chapter is not to 
define a well established thesis, but to analyse or explicate in some
1* I have profited greatly from Mr. Griffiths’ observations on an 
earlier draft of this chapter, though we differ in quite 
fundamental ways. He is of course not to be associated with any
of my mistakes.
2. Mr. John C. Harsanyi, in his article ’Ethics in Terms of
Hypothetical Imperatives’ (Mind# July, 1958/» questions the most 
widely accepted form - the Kantian Categorical Imperative - in 
which it has been held. But, as I hope to show, his view stems 
from confusion.
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measure an obscure but fundamental concept in moral philosophy*
In the title I advisedly speak of ’moral principles’ instead of 
morality for the following reason* To make a judgement of the form 
’X is morally obligatory* implies that there are reasons which rest 
ultimately on one or more moral principles in terms of which it may 
be defended* The latter are what Kant spoke of as ’categorical 
imperatives’ (as against ’The Categorical Imperative*). Though they 
are categorical only because moral judgements are categorical, 
nevertheless they are not, on my position, categorical in the same 
sense. I shall naturally be concerned with both.
Since the thesis that morality is unconditional is rarely 
questioned, disagreement over it takes the form of dispute about how 
it is to be understood: Two extreme views which seem to recur in the 
history of ethics may here be mentioned. It is sometimes claimed that 
the attempt to justify morality is misconceived for the simple reason 
that morality is neither in need of, nor does it admit, any 
justification., Prichard’s ’Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?’ 
is a good example of this mode of approach to our problem. (Here more 
important than the conclusion is .the direction from which it is 
reached* For we saw that formalism triviulises questions of 
justification by depriving morality of any essential content)* The 
Classical view that only the just man can be happy provides the 
the second extreme. It represents an extreme on the other side
5* It receives its latest endorsement in Mrs* Philippa Foot’s 
paper on ’Moral Beliefs’, Aristotelian bociety. Proceedings,
Vol.LIX 1958-59.
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because it assumes that morality is involved in any form of rational
egoism, and gives to the problem of-justification at least one
straightforward answer.
Though I reject both these extremes, my inability to see a way of 
making the transition from the standpoint of self-interest to the moral 
point of view, and the difficulty of applying a strong external sense of 
* practical* to morality, incline me to the former rather than the latter 
But no answer I can think of to the problem of this chapter seems to
t. f
me to be free of difficulty, and the general solution, as distinct from 
answers to fairly specific questions, I shall commend in conclusion 
will be offered with hesitation; for here many of the major sources of
controversy in ethics are, as it were, brought to focus and our
uncertainty (or for that matter certainty) assumes neurotic proportions. 
Where I feel least hesitant is in respect of the role of wanting in 
explaining the logical character of moral judgments, whether they are 
expressed in moral principles, or in the verdict-giving sense of *X 
ought to be done*, and generally of the imperativist approach to ethics.
I shall thus question the importance that is sometimes attached to the 
concept of wanting as a point at which the demand for reasons comes to
h'
a logical end, and also argue that the distinction between hypotheticàl  ^
and categorical imperatives is irrelevant to ethics if 'imperative' is 
taken in a standard non-metaphorical sense*
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My difficulties are made acute as a result of my simultaneous 
opposition to two theses, namely formalism and the claim that the 
category of rules applies in morals in such a way as to make the 
category of principles redundant, which, as we have seen, have recently 
enjoyed considerable support* If they are both accepted the problem 
of this chapter ■virtually disappears, for the question whether, and if 
so why, moral considerations are overriding takes the simple answer 
that moral considerations are the considerations we take as overriding 
considerations* The further assumption that the category of principles 
is redundant in morality gives the notion of overridingness a simple 
logical form by making it unnecessary for us to ask how our overriding 
considerations are to operate if they are to remain overriding, for 
they are no longer stated as open considerations but are just what 
our ultimate rules require. That is, problems such as the following do 
not arise any longer. If a man declares that not lying is one of his 
overriding considerations but nevertheless holds that, even so, he 
could lie in certain sorts of circumstances because lying would be to 
his advantage, we should have doubts whether he was actually treating 
it as an overriding consideration. What makes such cases difficult is 
that as a rule moral considerations are taken as overriding when no 
other sort of consideration is given a generally pre-emptive status 
over them# On my position this sort of difficulty is to be explained 
ultimately in terms of the highly complex relationship in which 
morality stands with other fields like self-interest and religion#
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Sometimes they rather seem to take over the entire content of 
morality as their own; but apart from these extreme situations, often 
there are large areas of conflict between them where a permanent 
condition of stalemate seems to .prevail#
2. I have spoken of morality as a field, and of rival fields
conflicting with morality, without indicating in a precise manner what
I mean by this term. This notion is crucial to the view I want to
develop as an alternative to formalism, as well as to the problem of
this chapter; I can now give a precise sense to it# I shall do so by
contrasting a field with something very different, which I propose to
call an activity#
As I propose to use • activity* in this chapter, an activity is
always voluntary so that one may or may not participate in it, its
standards in the latter case being simply inapplicable to one’s
actions# Thus if I have never played cricket I am neither a good
batsman nor an indifferent one# A field on the other hand, though
4
voluntary in that one may or may not pay heed to its standards, is 
not voluntary in such a way that its standards can ever become - r 
completely irrelevant to one’s conduct# In terms of this definition 
we can say that morality and self- interest constitute fields; so also 
are religion and, perhaps, etiquette#
In each of these fields we can distinguish a set of special
4# Clearly my distinction between refusing to speak the language of 
a game and refusing to play a game has different implications for
a field than for an activity#
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predicates, or at least a set of standards specially belonging to it. 
Thus we could say that a nan is happy or wrètched, prosperous or poor, 
sick or healthy (self-interest); religiously speaking he may be God­
fearing or arrogant, worthy of election or deserving of damation; he 
might, from the point of view of etiquette, be well-spoken or boorish, 
courteous or rude, correctly dressed or bohemian. The predicates of 
morality do not need illustration.
It might be argued against my view that there are a number of 
competing but autonomous fields that in our actual,modes of speech ' 
many restrictions are in fact placed on the application of the 
predicates and standards which may be assigned to the fields I have 
named. Thus it would seem - and I am inclined to agree - that some of 
the prudential predicates (i.e. the predicates of the field of self- 
interest) are inapplicable to the actions of saints; we can hardly 
say that X, a saint, behaved sensibly or foolishly on such and such 
occasion. And, similarly, the point of the distinction between a wicked 
man and an amoral person would appear to be that the latter, unlike 
the former, is indifferent to all moral considerations, so that when 
he fails to conform to a moral requirement we put him beyond the 
moral pale.
But these restrictions are not as destructive of the distinction 
as they may appear to be ; they rather bring to light the differences 
between the various fields. ’Sensible’ and ’foolish’, unlike ’careful*, 
’cautious’ or ’reckless’, are not necessarily what Mr. Griffiths would
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calx ’stylè-predicatôa*, i#e$ predicates which describe modes of doing 
what one does rather than the kind of action it is; they do not refer 
solely, as the latter do, to abilities. Thus though a saint may some­
times act with care or caution, he cannot, almost by definition, pursue 
his own interest, and considerations of self-interest are inapplicable 
to him by virtue of the meaning- of ’saint*; he would cease to be a 
saint if he acted otherwise. A wider implication which may be drawn is 
that the notion of a-rational being - for surely saints are rational - 
does not guarantee the applicability of the predicates of prudence to 
beings one can correctly call rational.
There is often a tendency to assume that in calling a person 
amoral we necessarily exclude him from the community of moral agents.
J3ut I suggest that this can be so only when a person is constituted in 
such a way (or has come to be such) that we can say, not only that he 
is indifferent to moral considerations, but further that he is incapable 
of caring about morality. Morality is not, however, some faculty we 
may lose as a result of injury, or be congenitally without, as some 
people are born colour-blind. Therefore - though this is a subject 
which requires investigation is detail - the psychiatrist’s concept 
of the psychopath is bound to raise conceptual difficulties.
Generally however when someone is described as amoral all that 
is meant is that he does not care about morality. Now when our conduct 
is judged our own beliefs, and what we accept and what we don’t, are
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often relevant; nevertheless, we cannot be released from our duties 
just beoause we are indifferent towards them; we often say ’He ought 
to have cared’.
It is clear that if we recognise morality to be, like self-interest 
or religion, a field, then it follows that its ultimate character does 
not arise from the general applicability of its predicates; since the 
predicates of fields which are not ultimate are also of general 
application. Since we have rejected formalism, a rational mode of 
adjudicating between them becomes a genuine problem, instead of being 
simply a matter of choice# The answer I shall suggest is one which, on 
the main counts, seems to me the best, rather than one whose difficulties 
I can all.overcome. I shall argue (with some qualifications) that playing 
the game of morality implies that one follows its principles as ultimate 
principles. The rationale behind this status of morality seems to me to 
lie in the special position it holds as a field among other fields, which 
is to be explained largely in terms of the uniqueness of its predicates. 
Moral predicates are unique as field-predioates for the following reason.
To follow the standards of any field whatever implies possessing some moral 
predicates. A person could be prudent or religious only if he knew what 
it was to keep a promise or to be truthful. But, it might be argued that 
the same is true of self-interest; that is, it might be claimed that one 
could not be moral without having a use for some of the concepts of 
self-interest# If morality were by definition concerned with interests,
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then clearly it would be on a par with self-interest, for the interests 
of others and one’s own interests are correlative concepts, and no 
pre-eminence could be claimed for its predicates* But, as Kant would 
have said, morality is grounded ultimately in rationality not in 
humanity; we can, as we have seen, speak of beings (like saints and 
angels) who possess moral concepts without having a use for prudential 
concepts (at least among themselves)* We could not speak of self- 
interest unless we were rational, and rational beings must necessarily 
possess moral concepts* Thus moral concepts arise out of rationality, 
while self-interest arises only out of our humanity* We might say, 
therefore, that the moral concepts are the primary field concepts, 
because they are the most a priori* or the least contingent*
This may seem a half-hearted approach to our problem; but I 
suggest that this is because the alternatives I reject are so well- 
entrenched in ethical theory that a less clear-cut answer seems to be 
a poor answer in comparison* If formalism is rejected, the natural 
alternative seems to be to embrace a view which sees morality as the 
principles which are determined by a conception of human excellence.
But this would be to escape one horn of a false delemma only to fail
5
on the other .Human excellence is so patently wider than morality that
5* This is my main criticism of the ethical theories of writers like 
Mr. Geach and Miss Ansoombe. See also Professor Stuart Hampshire’s
Thought and Action*
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only a failure to see a third possibility can make us take it as the 
foundation of morality.
The alternative I want to suggest does not uphold so strong a 
form of the doctrine of the ultimaoy of morality as to claim that 
morality is obviously at the summit (in the manner of intuitionists 
like Prichard) ; nor do I hold so weak a form of it as to tie it up 
directly with our own individual interests, or to make it contingent 
on our wants. I shall now examine some of the mistakes associated with 
the doctrine, in order to show that a weak form of it won’t do, and 
to prepare some ground for my own view, which I propose to argue for 
quite briefly in conclusion.
3. The historical connection of the doctrine of the unconditional 
character of morality with Kant’s moral theory is responsible for a 
good deal of confusion; the problem is too often seen as concerned 
with the kinds of commands morality may be taken to consist in, when 
the real question is ’What can be meant by the claim that the commands 
of morality are unconditional?’ (and more generally ’V/hat is the status 
of moral considerations?’). For this the responsibility is not mainly 
Kant’s. His use of ’imperative’ is usually a metaphorical use, and 
what makes an imperative an imperative is for him a matter of reason.
We can see this in terms of the following distinction. We often 
employ the expression ’It is imperative that’ without referring to an 
imperative of any kind. This is a metaphorical use of ’imperative’
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which must be distinguished from its standard substantival use* Kant’s 
distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives is, in 
other words I not a distinction between two kinds of imperatives (in 
the normal substantival sense) but a distinction between two 
different ways in which an action or a class of action may be 
rationally necessary. Very roughly, and as uncontroversially as 
possible, this distinction might at this stage (and in modern 
terminology) be explained in the following way. When Kant spoke of 
hypothetical imperatives, he was concerned primarily with the 
conceptual point that when we make our choices or decisions (or when 
we exercise our ’wills’) certain consequences relating to their 
execution follow. These consequences have the urgency which commands 
have; but this is so only because we are rational beings, not because 
we have agreed to obey some mythical commands. But they are contingent 
in an important respect; they arise only because we make certain 
decisions (etc.) because we ’will’ certain results. On the other 
hand, there are certain actions which, though also necessary in a 
conceptual way, are made so directly as a consequence of the fact that 
we are rational beings. These latter are the categorical imperatives 
of morality.
Now what is the significance of the fact that the conditional 
form of sentence is often employed in the issuing of an imperative (in 
the standard sense)?* To answer this question let us see when the need 
to employ this form arises. Simple commands of the form ’Bo àuch and
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or ’Stop doing such and such’ are generally two-valued in respect of 
obedience — i.e. they can either be obeyed or disobeyed, but there is 
no third possibility# Orders like ’Open fire* or Stop laughing’
(unless they are pointless because there are no guns to fire or 
beoause no one is in fact laughing) can only be obeyed or disobeyed#
But when people are ordered to do certain actions if certain specified 
circumstances obtain it becomes necessary to employ an ’if’ clause, 
or an ersatz $ for stating these conditions (we might, in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language - games, say that two different 
games of ordering are possible; a primitive one in which there is no 
distinction between an ordered action and the conditions under which it 
is ordered to do it and a more complex one in which this distinction 
is provided). Such orders are, in terms of execution, three-valued; 
apart from the two possibilities of obedience and disobedience, there 
is now another possibility also. When the condition stated in the 
protasis does not materialise, when i.e. an order like ’If you see 
enemy tanks approaching, retreat’ is issued and no enemy tanks are 
seen to approach, then we neither say that the order has been obeyed 
nor that it was disobeyed.
We might say, if we like, that orders of the latter kind are 
hypothetical, though I am not sure that ordinary usage sanctions such 
a description. At least a sense will have been given to ’hypothetical 
command’ and, mutai is mutandis, also to ’hypothetical imperative’. But 
even in this sense, there is nothing conditional about the execution of 
a command. For it is not as if we had a choice between carrying out and
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not carrying out a command. There is here no question of a choice; 
after all the command is to do a certain action, if certain conditions 
arise » A command would be conditional in respect of execution only if, 
per impp s sib le, it were issued on the express condition that we could 
disobey it if we chose. In other words, the notion of a command whose 
execution is explicitly made subject to the addressee’s choice ié 
self-contradictory. For though both obedience and disobedience are 
necessarily voluntary and what is commanded may sometimes coincide 
with the addresses’3 choice, what a command cannot ensure is that 
whenever we choose not to do what it commands we cannot be said to 
disobey it.
ainoe the ordinary notion of a command can be used in giving a 
sense to the expression ’hypothetical command’ it might easily be 
supposed that the philosophical distinction between hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives is not in need of employing a different notion > 
of a command. But, as I say, the ordinary notion of a command does 
not permit us to call an utterance of a conditional form in whose 
protasis a condition in terms of the wants and choice of its addresses, 
of the kind I have just described, is stated, a command. Thus the 
philosophical term cannot acquire a sense just because the ordinary 
terms ’hypothetical*, ’categorical’ and ’command’ are perfectly clear; 
they have to be given a sense which is in accord with the purpose of 
the theory they are meant to state.
At one place in the Grundlegxmg Kant* writes* ’How all imperatives.
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command either hypothetical1y or o&te#orioally. The former represent 
the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to something j
else that is willed (or at least which we might possibly will). The 
categorical imperative would be that which represents an action as 
necessary without reference to another end, i.e. as objectively 
necessary.* (p.57). My interest in this passage, though I shall 
discuss it at some length, is purely illustrative. In view of the 
notorious difficulties of Kantian exegesis I must make it plain that 
I shall not even try to be faithful to Kant’s intentions. My chief 
excuse for this irreverence is that what I wish to say is quite 
complimentary to him.
Clearly here, as elsewhere, Kant is not using ’imperative* in _ 
its ordinary sense. In ordinary usage, an imperative (i.e. an utterance 
in the imperative mood) is not necessarily a command; it can be a 
request or an entreaty or an exhortation. In this use however, all 
imperatives, command, though in different ways.
In the above passage Kant speaks of ’something that is willed’; 
it is only because this something or other is, or might be, willed ? 
that a certain action is ’practically necessary*. In another place in 
the Crundelgung (p.54) he defines the will ’as a faculty of determining^ 
oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws* •
It seems to me that whether this definition of the will makes sense or ! 
not, willing, where it does not imply doing, cannot stand for a faculty.
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or power. In exerting a power one neceasarily employs the means which 
are implied by its exercise. If I have the power to carry my heaviest 
trunk up a steep flight of stairs unaided, then whenever I exert this 
power I necessarily employ the muscles of my arms and back in a pretty 
strenuous way; and though of course if I slipped on the way I should 
have exercised my power in vain, I should still have employed the same 
means. Only in the first of these passages, therefore, is a separation 
of means and willing implied. Thus Kant needs - whether he realised it 
or not - a second sense of ’willing*, in which willing an end has 
nothing to do with power but is simply a matter of choosing or adopting
an end. It is only in this second sense of ’willing’ that what he says
about hypothetical imperatives makes snese. For in the first sense 
willing an end is already to take recourse to the means of^  its happy 
consummation and there is nothing that can become practically necessary 
when it ia exercised as a result of it.
Let us assume that there (i.e. in the first quotation) Kant does
in fact use *will’ in the second sense. Since in this sense willing 
implies deciding, to say ’I have willed X’ is to imply that I am ready 
to do what is necessary to bring X about unless for some reason I come 
in the meantine to reverse mjr decision. This is what gives point to his
6. In translating this sentence, Paton seems to prefer ’power’ to
’faculty’. (Bee his The Categorical Imperative, p*Q2, second edition; 
Clearly the distinction I am trying to draw here can be made by 
employing either of these words.
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remark that to will the end is to will the means thereto* I shall argue 
later that the use of the notion of willing, in his explanation of the 
distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, is 
preferable to the notion of wanting which is sometimes employed in 
current moral philosophy.
Vie have seen earlier that the ordinary notion of a command does 
not permit us to regard a conditional sentence as the expression of a 
command if in its protasis the action commanded is made contingent on 
the wants or choices of its addressee. In this respect there is no 
difference between oommands and requests. If I say ’Please lend me
7
sixpence’, I could not, despite Mr. Harsanyi, make the same request by 
’If you want to help me, lend me sixpence’. The request would be 
refused if you did not lend me the sixpence even when in fact you did 
not want to help me. In other words, the condition expressed in the 
protasis of the second sentence dowa not function as any kind of 
criterion for deciding whether the request has been acceded to or not,
7* Op.cit. His division of non-moral imperatives into ’advices’ and 
’demands’ and the definitions he gives to these two terms do not 
help him as far as the point I am making is concerned. He says;
’By a demand I mean an imperative suggesting a certain course of 
action as conducive to the speaker’s own ends, whether these ends 
are selfish or unselfish. By and advice I mean an imperative 
suggesting a certain course of action as conducive to the addressee’s 
ends, again irrespective of whether these ends are selfish or 
unselfish’.(p.506). He is of course free to define his own terms, 
but he is actually defining two terms in his own way which are 
explicitly taken to cover between them all non-moral imperatives; 
he is thus redefining the constituent members of a class while 
leaving the original class as it was* By showing that some non- 
moral imperatives are not like what he calls demands or advices 
we can prove his characterisation of non-moral imperatives to be 
mistaken. The fallaciousness of his view becomes quite patent when 
he claims it to be applicable to moral imperatives as well.
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however important it may he in determining what the addressee actually 
does. On the other hand, the protasis in 'If it is raining tomorrow 
they will stay in and play bridge' ensures that it if does not rain 
tomorrow the prediction this sentence is used to make cannot be false.
A related and more general point in respect of the relation 
between wanting and imperatives oan be made by taking the case of 
advice. In the case of oommands and requests, though we can speak of 
justified or unjustified* reasonable or unreasonable, commands and 
requests, the specific predicates of indicative sentences - true or 
false, correct or incorrect - have little or no application# But pieces 
of advice often admit of such description# This means that though 
grammatically speaking advice ia a form of imperative as much as 
commands and requests, there is nevertheless a fundamental logical 
difference between them. The difference between them appears at its 
sharpest when the me ans-end model applies in a fairly straightforward 
sense. All that is required of the expert who advises us on, say, how 
to invest our savings is that in relation to our wants and preferences, 
his expertise is not at fault. His scruples are, in his capacity as 
investment expert, simply irrelevant to what he recommends# But we
saw that in the case of moral advice the situation is much more
8
complex. The adviser’s views on morality, however expert he might be, ' 
do not always override the addressee’s; nor, at the same time, can he 
simply advise the latter on how to apply his own moral beliefs, to
G. Supra, pp.124-126.
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given or hypothetical situations, if his advice is to count as moral 
advice. The situation is similar in the case of self-interest, for we 
do not advise a man on how to carry out what he takes to be his 
interest, but rather to do what, everything considered, we think his 
true interest to be; though clearly here sincerity does not count for 
as much as it does in morality.
Harsanyi’s treatment of moral principles as hypothetical 
imperatives would be plausible if we could assimilate all imperatives 
to the kind of advice we get from our bank manager or plumber. The 
real difficulty here seems to be this. If all advice is treated as a 
form of hypothetical imperative then the notion of autonomous fields 
cannot have any application. Take the indicative sentence ’In 
Japanese morality a man ought to commit hara-kiri when he has • 
dishonoured himself, j in its use to make the corresponding statement 
it yields the corresponding imperative ’If you want to follow 
Japanese morality, then • • • ’ • Clearly the latter can be moral advice 
only if I am prepared to endorse the principle of hara-kiri as a 
moral principle; I have, in other words, to say ’If you want to do 
your moral duty, then . . . ’. There is however an ambiguity in the 
latter sentence. It qualifies as moral advice only when I speak as 
moral agent, i.e. as one who plays the game of morality, not as one 
who merely speaks its language. For in the latter case I should
merely be saying ’If you care about morality, whether or not I
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myself do, then . ,
But commitment to a field makes the 'If you want' clause 
positively misleading. The significance of our wants here lies simply 
in the question whether or not there is any practical point in saying 
that something- is a duty.
Harsanyi’s prediliotion for formalism leads him to attribute I
r5l!
to his impartial spectator the limited function of being the expert I:
-f
on how best to apply our respective moral beliefs. This inevitably 
means the end of moral autonomy and ultimately that of the notion of
autonomous fields, for if any predicate can be a moral predicate the |
autonomy of morality, or of any field, is merely our own autonomy to 
make what we like of it.
4# The temptation to construe moral ' principles as hypothetical
I
imperatives stems in part from’an exaggerated belief in the explanatory, 
power of want-statementa. If it is generally true that our wanting to j
do an action gives it some genuine justification, then the ’If you
want* clause of these so-called imperatives cannot be idle, but 
coresponds to the implied truth that when we do what is mentioned in | 
the consequent clause as the means to the end specified in the 
antecedent there exists a justification for doing it. But if it can 
be shown that the explanatory power 'of want-statements is in fact 
poor, except in certain simple contexts this temptation is bound to
lose much of its strength.
There ia a minimal sense of 'wanting' in which no action can be
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done without the agent's wanting to do it, unless it is done from ' 
habit, absent-mindedly, or is in some other way unintentional. This 
is a quasi-vacous, and perhaps purely philosophical, sense of 'wanting' 
in which to say 'I wanted to do X' is merely to class X as an 
intentional act. It is in this sense that *1 obeyed X’ implies *I 
wanted to obey X» (where X is a command). Clearly this sense of 
wanting cannot distinguish imperatives of one kind from those of 
another. Nor can it provide any kind of reason for doing* something; 
for to say ’ I wanted to do. X'in this sense is merely to assume some 
responsibility for X, not to explain or justify why one did it.
The second sense of * wanting’ I propose to distinguish is this. 
The assumption normally implicit in requests, pieces of advice, etc. 
is not simply that if the person requested or advised were to do what 
he is requested or advised to do he would do it voluntarily. To say 
’Please lend me sixpence* to someone is to assume (unless the request 
is idle) on his part a want in a sense stronger than this quasi-vacuous 
sense of wanting; it is to assume some readiness on his part to do the
9 ,
action he is requested to do. Clearly the justificatory power of a 
want-statement, if it has any, must lie in the fact that it is being 
employed in this way. But the problem which faces a moral philosopher 
when he considers the latter kind of statement is not simply to 
distinguish the varying degrees in which they oan be justificatory,
9* Cf, Ansoombe. Intention, pp.66-68.
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but also to determine the extent of their applicability. I submit 
that they are inapplicable, or have poor justificatory power, just in 
those regions of our speech where certain moral philosophers are 
inclined to look for help from them.
Often a want-atateraent derives its justificatory power from, an 
understood conjunction with an liW statement. But not all 
statements of likes are equally justificatory. Thus the force of »I 
like coffee* is not the same as that of »I like Gauguin* (in regard, 
respectively, to the questions *Why do you drink coffee?* and *%y did 
you buy this picture?*). The person who does his duty against his 
inclination is not like someone who continues to play a garie sometimes 
from tenacity rather than because it gives him pleasure. For while 
there may be no point in persisting in a sport when one has ceased to 
enjoy it, morality is the sport (game) par excellence in this respect. 
And because duty and inclination stand in contrast it is not easy, 
despite what some moral philosophers say, to explain what *I like 
doing my duty* oan mean (while the sense of * I like playing football* 
seems obvious).
It is clear that the contrast between wants or inclinations 
and duty would cease to have the significance it has normally if 
human beings were able to do their duty not because their sense of 
duty was highly developed but because they simply liked doing what 
was morally right. For there can be no great merit in doing what one 
is naturally inclined to do.
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The reason why we say 'I like X' rather than 'I want X' 
sometimes is that thereby we put the object wanted in the class of 
objects wanted for their own sake. Nevertheless the fact that some­
thing is wanted for its own sake does not constitute any guarantee 
that the demand for further justification is therefore inappropriate. 
Even in activities (which are optional) 'I like X» ia not necessarily 
a good reason for choosing or pursuing X. Thus if we asked an average 
player of chess ’Why do you play chess?* 'Because I like it* would, 
admittedly, be a good answer; but coming from a grand master it would 
be extremely disappointing.
Roughly speaking’, we might say that the function of *I want X* 
in fields generally, and in certain activities, is to act as an 
assurance that one has one’s reasons, rather than to provide a reason 
in its own right. And since sometimes it seems plainly impertinent 
(as in * I like doing my duty*) to expect our likes or wants to 
function as justifications of any kind I want to mark off a separate 
use or sense of wanting in which * I want* or * I like* is mainly 
performatory and serves to give an undertaking or commitment. I shall 
call it the third sense of 'wanting* • The logical power of want- 
statements in this sense is the power of the reasons behind them. 
Sometimes we use 'want* in this sense from snobbery. Thus if a tourist 
in Paris says to a fellow-tourist * I want to buy a Guaguin print* he 
might do so from a desire to gain prestige in the latter*s eyes; he 
thereby seems to put himself in the world of aesthetic reasons and
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to claim oome acquaintance with it. Iht if he lacks aqrlw wculd be 
made uncomfortably aware of this by a ’Why?*, from hla companion; he
might say *1 like Gauguin* by way of retreat, admitting in effect 
that his choice was not made on aesthetic grounds (though of course 
he would still be denying that his motive was, say, to please his 
wife).
5. Another source of the temptation to take an imperativist view
of ethics lies in the failure to see that the concept of wanting is
primarily non-overall in th« sense that we normally speak of our
wants under a ceteris paribus clause (generally understood rather
than explicit). Our wants are not compelling in the sense in which
our decisions and verdicts are. Thus it is natural to say *I want
to go to London but I can’t*, whereas * I have decided to go to London
but I can’t* is absurd* Hare, whose account of imperatives Ears any!
accepts, fails to see this point. He is therefore able to say that
indicative statements entail hypothetical imperatives; that for
instance ’Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford* entails
* If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly 
10
Hughes*. But in saying this he is using ’want* in the sense in which 
Kant uses ’will* when he says ’Who wills the end . . .  wills also 
the means* (which Hare endorses). Once we recognise that Hare’s 
hypothetical imperatives are arrived at only as a result of a non­
standard use of ’wanting* (or at best a use which does not
10. Op.cit., p.35*
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distlngiilsh it from ’choosing*) the temptation to treat them ae 
genuine imperatives is very much weakened. For, as I have said,
Kant uses ’imperative» as a metaphorical way. Our wants often conflict 
and the necessity to employ the means to their fulfilment is on us 
only when we have decided between them; it is then 'imperative to' 
take the steps which our decision calls for. The superiority of Kant's 
appeal to the notion of willing, instead of to wanting, in his account 
of hypothetical imperatives thus lies in his making the conuiands of 
reason genuine, even though they are only comnands of reason, instead 
of being commands which leave to us the decision whether the 
conditions under which a want exists are such that other wants are 
to be ignored.
Hare realises that, despite the analogies he sees between
hypothetical imperatives and value judgments, the former are 'a
difficult matter' forming part of ’the wider problem, still very
11
dark, of the analysis of hypothetical sentences in general'. My 
own view has been that the ordinary notion of a command, as indeed 
of a request and in part of advice, rules out the possibility of 
genuine hypothetical imperatives in which disobedience or lack of 
compliance is not possible ~ when the addressee of the Imperative 
does not want 6r choose to do what is mentioned in the protasis.
I do not find Hare’s claim tiiat hypothetical imperatives are genuine 
imperatives acceptable i His main argument seems to be tnis. Though
11. Op.cit., p.58.
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a hypothetical imperative may be entailed by an indicative statement 
(as in the example quoted on the previous page), whereas this is 
impossible in the case of categorical imperatives, nevertheless 
hypothetical imperatives are genuine imperatives because they would 
not be intelligible to someone ’who had learnt the meaning of 
indicative verb-forms but not that of imperative verb-forms*. But I 
am surprised that Hare should treat such an argument as conclusive. 
Obviously from the fact that a certain linguistic form corresponds 
to a genuine logical type it does not follow that a form of 
expression constructed by employing this form represents a logical 
category of the same kind. (And the fact that the latter form must 
necessarily employ the former in expressing what it is normally used 
to express cannot make any difference). For the fact that, say, we 
can only express what is expressed by 'Some universal statements are 
silly' by employing 'universal' or one of its cognates does not make 
it into a universal form of utterance. Nor does it become universal 
because it can only be understood by someone who has learnt the word 
’universal*. And for exactly the same reason 'If you want to go to 
the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes' is not an 
imperative because such a construction would not be understood by 
someone who had not learnt the imperative verb-form.
Since Hare’s anti-naturalism does not exclude the possibility 
of a descriptive statement entailing a hypothetical imperative, to 
commit the naturalistic fallacy one must infer a categorical
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imperative from an indicative. But having done away with categorical
imperatives altogether, the only form of insurance against the
naturalistic fallacy Harasanyi is entitled to take is by an appeal
to the notion of a hypothetical imperative. For this reason he is
involved in the very error he is most anxious to avoid, namely the
naturalistic fallacy, as may be seen from the following argument. He
defines the rule forbidding the naturalistic fallacy thus; 'from what
12
there is it cannot be inferred what should be done'. Since for Harsanyi 
all 'should' sentences (or at least some, it does not matter here 
which) are analysable into hypothetical imperatives we can infer what 
should be done from 'what there is'. Thus it is a fact that forest 
fires are liable to take place in times of drought unless people are 
careful to put out matches before throwing them away when they are in 
a wood. This eutails 'If you do not want to start a forest fire, then. 
. .» But this may reasonably be taken to be equivalent to 'One should 
put out a match before throwing it away . . . etc.'
Harsanyi makes an important distinction between formal and 
causal imperatives. In the case of many imperatives the relation 
between the protasis and the apodosie is a causal one; the antecedent 
clause mentions an end to which the consequent clause proposes a 
certain means ('If you want to put on weight quickly eat a lot of 
starchy food*). On the other hand there are imperatives in whose case 
the means-end model ia clearly unsuitable. 'For instance; "If you 
want to climb a very high mountain" (or "If you want to climb the 
12. Op.cit., p.508.
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highest mountain in Europe • . "climb Mont Blanc"#* Here the 
protasis 'specifies certain desired criteria whereas the apodoais
15
suggests an object or a pattern of behaviour satisfying these criteria*. 
The latter kind of imperative he calls 'formal* or 'non-casual', and 
moral principles are for him also describable in this way. What he 
fails to see is that among imperatives (so-called) of the non-casual 
type two rather different kinds have to be distinguished. Of these hla 
definition only applies to one. When we say 'If you want to climb the 
highest mountain in Europe. . .' we do so in order to give information. 
It is no part of the meaning of 'the highest mountain in Europe' that 
Mont Blanc is the highest mountain in Europe; for though 'Mont Blanc* 
is a definite description which may reasonably be taken to imply 
'highest mountain in Europe* tlie converse implication seems far­
fetched. We can thus say that, in terms of Harsanyi*s definition, 
the protasis gives a criterion which is said to be fulfilled in the 
apodosis.
But when we consider'moral principles in their alleged 
imperative form this criterion does not always work. It is reasonable 
to assume that an imperative lii:e 'If you want to do your duty, commit 
hara-kiri when you have dishonoured yourself* satisfies this criterion, 
since the principle of hara-kiri is no part of the meaning of 'duty*. 
But what are we to say of a fundamental moral principle like truth- 
telling? Can we say that in 'If you want to do your duty then be
15. Op.cot.,p.305.
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truthful* the apodosis ’suggests a pattern of behaviour* satisfying 
the criterion of duty? What kind of suggestion is it?
It might here be argued that Harsanyi is entitled to speak in 
this way because, being a formalist, morality has no essential content 
for him and therefore hypothetical imperatives of this kind are not 
empty. But this argument is untenable. Since we choose our fundamental 
moral principles, there is no point in * suggesting* to someone that he 
should act on a principle which is a fundamental moral principle for 
him if he wants to do his duty;
I want now to suggest that in the sense in which the notion of 
wanting is inapplicable to morality so is the notion of choice ( and 
willing in so far as it implies choice) at least over a large part of 
its field. Thus superficially it might seem that Kant, in the passage 
quoted earlier, is being inconsistent since the notion of freedom is 
central to his moral philosophy - when he says that the categorical 
imperatives are objectively necessary without mentioning any kind of 
choice. But what he seems to have seen is the difficulty of applying 
the notion of choice (in the relevant sense) in their case.
Take for instance the principle *Be just*. If we try to state 
it in a way which makes obedience to it conditional on choice all we 
get is a pseudo-injunction like *If you aim at justice then be just*. 
The latter is not hypothetical in any significant sense. It is either 
a tautology (*Aim at what you aim at*) or a plain imperative which
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merely says 'Don't dither*.
The difficulty that I am trying to explain arises in the 
following way. The choice to be moral is necessarily involved in 
doing one's duty; but this choice determines so much that obedience 
to principles like 'One ought to be just*, 'One ought to be kind' etc. 
ia part of the very same choice. In other words, 'If you aim at being 
moral then be truthful* fares little better than * If you aim at 
justice then bo just'. Both are bogus in claiming to be conditional 
when in fact they present no possibility of an alternative*
6. I shall now suggest my own view on the subject. First of all it 
must be pointed out that the problem arises in a serious form only as 
a result of rejecting formalism. When morality is deprived of any 
essential content, the question why certain principles are ultimate 
turns into the question 'Why do we choose the principles that we do 
choose as our ultimate principles?* and to this there can be no 
general answer. Furthermore, not only does the question whether or not 
morality is ultimate disappears (for it is so by definition); the 
question v/hether religion, which presents many intractable problems 
in relation to morality, or any other field, can sometimes override 
morality cannot now arise.
One reason why Harsanyi*s imperativism was of special interest 
to us in this chapter was that it purported to question the most 
influential form of the doctrine of the ultimacy of morality. It ia
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clear hov/eve/' that his position need not be taken as a rejection as 
such of the doctrine. For though all normative principles are to be 
construed as hypothetical imperatives, there can still be an order of 
priority between them; and his formalism ensures that moral 
imperatives are given top priority.
In introducing the notion of competing fields I pointed out 
that ordinary speech has no clear verdict to give on the lines of 
demarcation between them. A related uncertainty is to be found in 
respect of the extent and manner in which moral considerations override 
non-moral considerations. No single answer to this question seems to 
be available, but whatever answer is given one point has to be 
accepted. Moral considerations override other considerations over a 
large area of their application as a matter of logic. This may be 
explained in terms of my distinction between merely speaking the 
language of a game and playing a game. When a principle is held as 
a principle belonging to the field of morality, and not merely taken 
as one belonging to it, tlien one acts on it in tlie manner in which 
playing the game of morality requires it. One can play the game of 
morality only when one is prepared to let it win against its rivals 
most of the time. Thus the question is not whether morality can 
override other fields"as a matter of logic, but rather whether it 
does 80 always. But even when this question is settled there still 
remains the more fundamental question 'What is the rationale behind
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this logical situation?* The answer to the latter question that I want 
to give will be offered in the absence of a systematic study of field 
concepts, and points which may seem matters of detail may upset any 
general thesis one may venture to put forward. The present enquiry 
has thus been in the nature of a prolegomenon; any systematic 
enquiry into these concepts is likely to lead to further prolegomena 
which may in their turn suggest further work in the nature of logical 
cartography.
But the two questions distinguished in the previous paragraph 
are by no means unrelated. An answer to the latter question is bound 
to be of help in providing a more precise answer to the former, 
though I am inclined to think that dependence in a similar measure 
in the opposite direction is not likely to be found.
The hesitation which exists in choosing between possible 
answers to the former question may be explained by distinguishing 
between two incompatible uses of 'moral*, both non-formal, which seem 
to be sanctioned by our speech (and in respect of neither of which we 
are able to claim that it is logically prior to the other).
Sometimes 'moral* (or 'morality*) is used in such a way that 
though a man may be said to have a morality he could nevertheless 
think it right to do an action which conflicted with a moral duty.
I shall call it the competitive use of 'moral' or 'morality*. It 
seems to be clearly a non-standard, and somewhat artificial, use when 
it occurs in the expression of the literary idea of a person who
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behaves in ways which, though immoral, are nonetheless capable of a 
perfectly adequate defence. But this is so because it is used in 
literature to state a paradox - a species of shock tactics, attacking 
the accepted morality on a large scale - to bring home a point which 
may equally be expressed, albeit less effectively, in straight­
forward language. It occurs in a less extreme form in the clash which 
is sometimes visualised between religion and morality in which the 
former can win without breaking any logical requirement. Theologians 
take up different positions on this problem. On one extreme is a
position like Kant's which views religion as in no way able to
override the requirements of practical reason; the other extreme 
being represented by a view like Kierkegaard's, which sees morality 
as ranking lower than religion. But I shall leave aside this question 
as one on which I am not qualified to speak, and as one which, 
moreover, calls for detailed investigation of certain areas of 
religious discourse, as well as of a number of field concepts.
This ambiguity in the relationship between morality and 
religion, and perhaps to a lesser extent between the former and a 
field like honour, is likely to look less irksome if we bear in 
mind the following. Paradoxes are known to arise not only in logical 
and mathematical systems but even in ordinary speech. Wittgenstein*s 
comment on the liar-paradox is here pertinent. 'Is there harm in the
contradiction that arises when someone says: "I am lying. - So I am
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not lying. - So I am lying. - etc.”? I mean: does it make our 
language less usable if in this case, according to the ordinary rules, 
a proposition yields its contradictory, and vice versa? - the 
proposition itself is unusable, and these inferences equally; but why
should they not be made? - It is a profitless performance I - It is a
14
language-game with some similarity to the game of thumb^catchlng. *
The analogy between the situation we are confronted with and that 
described by Wittgenstein does not hold mainly in the following 
respect. In the type of conflict we are dealing with it just does not 
do to say that the 'proposition* is unusable. The paradox which 
Abraham's 'sacrifice' poses for us calls for resolution, were it only 
by the toss of a coin, for the simple reason that one cannot get out 
of a field as one can get out of the situations from which the latter 
kind of paradox arises. There is, furthermore, the fact that, unlike 
mathematical and logical systems, morality is not substitutable. It 
is not as if we could make our decisions in terms of an alternative
morality when the one we happen to be using breaks down. But even so,
I am inclined to think that morality must remain essentially 
(logically) ultimate. If we are inclined sometimes to think otherwise 
this is perhaps because we tend to confuse the inadequacy of the moral 
principles with which someone might operate with the fact that we do
not necessarily employ a logically ultimate sense of 'moral*. The
kind of breakdown of our moral concepts which is illustrated in
14. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, p.51*
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literature is after all only an ideal situation intended to bring 
home the necessity for a radical revision or improvement, not to 
justify a wholesale surrender to the concepts of another field.
Philosophically the more interesting question is whether the 
borders of morality are necessarily such that paradoxes must arise, 
or whether a systematic study of the areas of conflict is likely to 
reveal an actually operative mode of settling disputes which makes 
morality as the necessary victor. But this is a question I must leave 
open.
The second non-formal use of 'moral* is the use which gives to 
morality, in whatever form it happens to be, the palm of victory as a 
matter of logic. The justification for it lies in certain recurrent 
types of rational religion ('Religion within the bounds of reason*, as 
Kant put it) which have Influenced our moral and religious talk. Being 
a non-formal use it cannot be accused of flying in the face of the 
fundamental category of competing fields which lies at the heart of 
our conceptual scheme. But it must in some measure lead to an 
impoverishment of religious speech.
The answer to our second question was already determined by the 
discussion of the previous chapter. For if morality is not practical 
in any sense which at all resembles the ordinary notion of what is 
practical the rationale behind the logical ultimacy of moral 
principles can only be explained, if at all, by the place which moral
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concepts occupy in our conceptual scheme. And this ia indeed the kind 
of explanation I wish to give. Moral principles are ultimate in virtue 
of the primacy of their concepts as field concepts. The concepts of 
morality are presupposed in the operation of other field concepts. 
There could be no religion without the existence of moral concepts;
i.e. unless a community possessed some of the main concepts of 
morality it could have no religion. Could there be the pursuit of 
self-interest unless some moral concepts were also possessed? It seems 
to me, and I have already argued, that there could not. For the 
question is not whether a rational or human being innocent of moral 
concepts (is such a being conceivable?) could pursue self-interest 
among beings who were not, but if we can conceive of a society of 
such beings who have no moral concepts whatever. The answer to the 
latter question is, again, I must admit, in the negative. The notion 
of intercourse among such beings implies the concepts of the due and 
the fair, the truthful and the false - if of nothing else. Where the 
predicates of morality gain precedence over those of self-interest is, 
however, not in respect of our humanity but of our rationality. We 
have seen already that the predicates of self interest do not apply 
to saints. It might also be argued with good justification that they 
do not apply to angels.
But even if some moral concepts are, it might be argued, 
primary in this way, what we are to say of the other moral concepts?
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To this, and the related question how concepts contested between 
competing fields may he distributed among them, I can suggest only 
the general form of an answer. Though I have rejected the view that 
moral principles are the principles of human excellence I cannot say 
that they are the principles which belong essentially to the field 
of morality rather than to any other field without obvious circularity. 
Nevertheless the primacy of certain moral predicates establishes the 
primacy of the whole field of morality over other fields, even though 
the question why certain predicates which belong to our humanity 
rather than to our rationality are moral predicates and not the 
predicates of some other field still remains to answer. A clue to 
this question is provided by the fact that certain non-moral field 
concepts seem to presuppose analogous concepts in the moral field.
Thus tact (in the field of etiquette) seems to presuppose the notion 
of considerateness, which ia undoubtedly a moral concept. Similarly 
we might say that the concept of Christian charity is logically 
posterior to the non-religious concept of charity. Concepts of this 
kind - generosity and kindness are other examples - give us a second 
line of moral concepts which are a precondition of a great deal of 
what we value in human existence, which is not distinctively moral.
It is inconceivable that there should be culture or taste (i.e. such 
things as art and literature) without these concepts. This opens a 
large area of investigation and we can thus account for the claims
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of many other concepts to be treated as moral concepts. The main things 
here is that the concepts which are non-moral receive their full 
flowering only when the corresponding moral concepts exist, but that 
there is no corresponding necessity in the opposite direction. We 
shall often face the danger of going too far in pressing the claims 
of our own particular moral beliefs and in stressing or minimising 
unduly the relevant factors; but this is a matter of judgment, not of 
infallible rules. There will, in the very nature of the situation we 
are dealing with, be checks to extravagant claims, provided by the 
counter-claims of other fields. ;had in the end there is no better 
advice to give than that one must keep ones eyes open all the time.
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CONCLÎJD i m  RÏÏLUHKS
The systematic part of this enquiry has now come to an end, and 
in retrospect moral principles can he seen to have proved a topic of 
no small philosophical importance. Not only did we find a network of 
specific problems to be considered, but often we found ourselves 
obliged to conduct our discussion at deeper levels; and we could not 
escape involvement in some of the central questions of ethics - e.g. 
the question of the logical status of ethical utterance, and the 
problem of justification. At a still more fundamental level it appeared 
that the nature of rules (as this notion has recently been employed to 
cover general requirements of various kinds) has been discussed without 
sufficient regard for the problems ethical speech forces on us in this 
area of the theory of meaning. The specific conclusions I have come to 
about the nature of moral principles (that, for instance, they 
essentially involve the language of considerations) hardly need 
recapitulation. But some further observations on the more fundamental 
questions I liave discussed, or more or less briefly commented on, may 
now appropriately be made with a view to gaining a clearer perspective 
of tlie nature and results of this investigation.
I have claimed that the current discussion of the question 
whether ethical terms are evaluative or descriptive has reached an 
impasse, and suggested that the problem might be examined afresh in 
terms of my distinction between merely speaking the language of a game
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and playing it. The futility of carrying on the controversy in the
present form lies in the assumption on which the protagonists of both
the sides of it proceed; they seem to assume that if moral terms are
mainly evaluative or mainly descriptive this must be so because of the
1
strength or weakness of their connection with actual conduct. In
discussing the 'practical* character of moral principles we saw that
2
Nowell-Smith places morality on the wrong kind of scale; it is not 
because we practise our beliefs - because, for instance, the scientist 
applies his hypotheses in his experimental work - that they are 
practical. What can make them practical must depend upon the nature of 
the field to which they belong, via. morality. The point of my . 
distinction is that there is no contradiction in saying *X is just, 
but I won*t do it * ; and this does not presuppose any distinction 
between a primary and an *inverted-commas* use of *just*. But this 
does not mean that the logical status of *X is just* is the same as that 
of *X' is batting on a good wicket*. We have found two (there may be 
others) reasons why such a simple assimilation cannot be made. First, 
we saw how moral advice differs from advice in most non-moral contexts 
in the role which sincerity plays in it. And, second, we found that 
moral knowledge is not knowledge in any straightforward sense; that, 
at least, the success of instruction in morality is judged in terms 
of actual performance and not in terms of an ability. This means \ %
1. For instance, the two articles in Analysis by Geach and Hare, 
referred to earlier, share this assumption.
2. Supra# Chapter IV section 1.
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that when one refuses to play the game of morality, i.e. when one is 
not prepared to speak as a moral agent, one is not entitled to make 
as full a use of moral language as when one is a participant in it.
If we decide to call moral terms evaluative on such grounds the 
justification for our decision will depend on the strength of this 
difference.
My firm rejection of formalism is not intended as a denial of 
all value to revisionary ethics (e.g. of the possibility of 
reformulating Utilitarianism in the tenable form) but is rather a plea 
that they are likely to be fruitful only after we have achieved an 
understanding of the structure of moral concepts (which was once 
possessed in a fair measure, perhaps, in the Middle Ages). Nor do I 
wish to recommend a ban on the study of general words like 'good*,
* right *, * ought *, 'praiseworthy* or 'blameworthy*. It does seem to me 
however, that they are terms of wider generality than what I have 
called moral predicates. And whether or not we assign to them the 
importance they have so far been given in ethical theory, there is 
one point which a clear distinction between the two classes of words 
does establish. Instead of selecting two or three of them and isolating 
them for intensive study, it would be more fruitful to study them, so 
far as possible together. In this kind of work there is a place for the 
informal methods of linguistic philosophy as well as for the rigorous 
techniques of symbolic logic.
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Lastly it ia clear that the view that ethics is a subsidiary 
field of philosophical enquiry whose results are largely conditioned 
by the conclusions reached in other branches of philosophy, such 
as philosophy of mind and the general theory of meaning and truth, 
is mistaken, and that in fact moral theory may sometimes be in the 
position of being an important contributor to a problem, 
traditionally assigned elsewhere. We found this at least in one 
instance.
My distinction between rules and principles has provided 
some indioatidn of the inadequacy of the Wittgensteinian view that 
a rule is a 'form of life* or 'practice*. A systematic investigation 
of the interrelations of the major kinds of regularity which our 
conceptual scheme requires to be distinguished seems to be necessary 
before the somewhat vague characterisation in this form can be 
replaced by a more satisfactory account. To this ethics has an 
important contribution to make.
C O N T E N T S
Chapter I# Rules and Principles.
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1. Moral philosphers have generally used words 1
like 'rules', 'principles' and 'laws* without
adequate regard to the distinctions which these 
words exhibit in ordinary speech. They have nade 
their choice between them, not in terms of a 
theoretically neutral distinction, but on the 
basis of their own philosophical predilections.
2. A distinction between 'rules' and 9
'principles' may be made which does not suffer
from this defect, and which is rich in application.
Professor D, J. O'Connor's somewhat similar 
distinction between 'constitutive rules* and 
'standards* rejected as unsuitable for our purpose 
because it makes the possibility of calling a set 
of rules 'constitutive rules' contingent on the 
ability to remedy conflicts between them, and 
thereby gives too narrow a class. In my use of 
'rules' conflicts between two rules belonging to 
a body of rules must be infrequent and be 
considered a defect in their formulation, whether 
or not such conflicts can always be eliminated in 
practice.
3. There are, on the other hand, certain 18 
requirements of a general nature belonging to a
given field which conflict with one another in a 
systematic way in virtue of their subject-matter 
and their place in that field, and therefore with­
out indicating a defect in their formulation (e.g.
'Play with a straight bat* and 'Always try to 
demoralise the bowler when he has got a 
psychological upper hand over the batsmen* in 
cricket). These I propose to call principles.
The importance of the concept of principles 
as thus defined may be illustrated negatively at 
this stage by considering the expression 'rule of 
thumb', which makes a dissociation between what is 
possible in the subject-matter and what is 
actually available or conveniently to hand.
4. Wittgenstein's view of rules as 'forms of 25 
life* fails to cover the category of principles.
The criteria of 'sameness' for rules are not of
ii
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the same logical kind as for principles# G.B.Moore's 
acoount of Wittgenstein's lectures in 1950-33 seems 
to indicate that he thought principles represented 
a category redundant to aesthetics and morals.
Chapter II. The Formalistic Fallacy.
1. The preoccupation with the naturalistic 55 
fallacy has resulted in a fallacy of an opposite
kind, which is named here the formalistic fallacy.
It is marked by an assumption that ethical utterance 
is demarcated from other kinds of utterance by its 
form and status rather than by its content. But in 
one form it may be defined precisely by considering 
the question of the criteria or distinguishing 
characteristics of moral principles.
2. Two varieties of the formalist position with 57 
respect to this question may be distinguished, namely
a weaker and a stronger thesis. The weaker thesis 
merely claims that any principle in the universal 
form is capable of being a moral principle. The 
question when a potential moral principle becomes an 
actual moral principle is however inescapable, and 
this variety faces serious difficulties in providing 
an answer to it.
3* The strong form of formalism attempts to give 40
the criteria of actual moral principles, not merely 
of potential ones. The additional requirement 
postulated by it is in terms of a mistaken view of 
ultimacy. An analogy drawn between ultimacy or over­
ridingness and the primitiveneas of certain 
propositions in a deductive system by commenting on 
Mr. P. P. Strawson's account of logical form in his 
An Introduction to Logical Theory"; but this is done 
primarily for the limited purpose of this enquiry 
and without recommending any view as the most 
plausible from the general point of logical theory.
4. Certain views of îlr. Hare on the nature of 55
justification are criticised, with a view to
showing the extreme formalism of his position.
5, The difficulties of making the transition 60
from potential to actual moral principles in which
the weak form is involved are brought out by 
considering Mr. Jonathan Harrison's version of it.
ill
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His appeal to the notion of an impartial observer 
makes such a transition possible, but only by 
resort to an odd way of distinguishing between 
correct and incorrect moral principles.
6. The question whether formalism can survive 63
at a more fundamental level of conceptual revision
must be left unexamined in this enquiry.
7. A radically anti-formalist view of moral 65
principles is sketched largely in the shape of a
few rapid steps leading to the definition of a 
moral principle. The starting-point of this 
definition ia provided by certain remarks of Mrs.
P. R. Foot's on the importance of moral concepts 
in understanding another person's views 'on 
matters of right and wrong' in the paper 
contributed by her to an Aristotelian Society 
Symposium on 'When is a principle a moral 
principle?'.
My definition stipulates, firstly, that a 
moral principle must contain a moral concept in 
its statement as constitutive of its scope and, 
secondly, that it must do so in its own right; on 
this definition we can have a moral principle only 
when a distinctive moral concept is involved. It 
is adopted largely on philosophical grounds and 
without any intention of claiming tiiat it is 
faithful to the actual usage of 'moral principles*.
The relevance of the distinction between 
what may be called a requirement of morality and 
what mny become a duty on moral grounds to the 
understanding of the nature of moral concepts is 
stresaed.
Chapter III. Moral Concepts and Moral i-rinciples I
1. Without an account of moral concepts my 77
definition of a moral principle is incomplete in
all but form. In this and the next chapter an
attempt is made to explain the nature of moral
concepts. Here two related theories of the nature
of valuo-terms are considered, which employ a form
of insurance against the naturalistic fallacy which
implies a mistaken view of moral concepts.
Hare takes 'good*, * ought * and 'right* to be 
'typical value-words* and in his view words which 
can be used pejoratively without implying irony are
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not 'fully evaluative*• But on this criterion 
even 'kind' and 'generous* cannot be fully 
evaluative.
This view stems from his formalism. He 
does not want to give fully evaluative terms any 
definite content and his imperativism leads him 
to over-emphasise the importance of what I call 
verdict-giving terms. Terms like 'right* and 
'avoidable inconvenience* are verdict-giving 
because we cannot say that a man ought not to do 
what is right; or to do that which causes 
'avoidable inconvenience'. But terms like 'truth­
ful' and 'just' belong to a class of value-words 
which do not have this characteristic.
2. Professor Urmson's distinction between 91 
'professional' and 'specialised' grading-labels
has parallels with Hare's distinction between 
fully-evaluative and only partially evaluative 
terms. 'First-rate', 'good' and 'excellent' 
belong to the first category; whereas most 
virtue-words which Aristotle discusses in the 
Niohomachean Ethics are taken to form a sub­
class of the second. This view is questioned by 
considering the word 'brave'.
A distinction is introduced between 
refusing to speak the language of a game and 
refusing to play a game with a view to throwing 
some light on the question whether moral terms 
are evaluative or descriptive.
3. A solution of the problem of conflicts of 105
duty is suggested in terms of my view that moral 
principles adduce considerations. A conflict of
duties is decided by appealing to a third principle 
whose concept mediates between their respective 
concepts.
Chapter IV. L.oral Concepts and Moral Principles. II
Are Moral principles practical principles?
1. The view that moral principles are practical 112
principles is responsible for a good deal of
confusion. In this chapter an attempt is made to ’
isolate what is clearly false in it from what may
bear serious examination. A number of senses of
'practical' are distinguished, some of them purely
technical, with this purpose, and a major division
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is made among them between those which indicate 
the nature of. thé relation between a locution and 
something taken to be practical and those that 
pertain to the nature of the field or activity 
claimed to be practical - between the internal 
and the external senses of the term.
2. Four different senses in which an utterance 118 
may be taken to be practical distinguished as 
illustrating, each in some respect differently, the 
contingency or necessity of the connection an
utterance may have with actions belonging to a field 
or activity already assumed to be practical.
Arguments are put forward to show that no moral 
principle can be practical in the first of these 
senses. In this connection an important difference 
between moral advice and most other kinds of advice 
is mentioned# The inapplicability of any of these 
senses to all moral principles shows the futility of 
blanket theories in this area of ethics.
3. A miscellany of uses of 'practical', of no I30 
great intrinsic importance for the purposes of this 
chapter, which are likely to throw light on the 
approval-charged application of 'practical* to
morality in recent ethical theory are distinguished.
4# Some of the senses of 'practical' in which 1)2
morality may be characterised, though not always 
legitimately, from the outside are considered. As a 
preliminary however, my earlier distinction between 
refusing to play a game and refusing to speak its 
language is recalled and further amplified. In this 
connection it is found useful to'introduce the 
parallel notion of function, and a number of senses 
of this term are distinguished and the question 
whether they are applicable to morality is discussed.
Mr, Stephen Toulmin's view that there may be 
beings with 'wholly unalterable» feelings, or beings 
'whose dispositions were always of the best', so 
that they had no 'use' for ethical reasoning, is 
criticised, and it is argued that moral concepts must 
be employed by all rational beings#
Chapter V. The Ultimacy of Moral Principles#
1. Though the dictum that morality is 'ultimate* 145
or 'categorical* or 'unconditional' has recently 
been questioned by one writer (by Mr# Harsanyi in 
an article in Mind)» the aim of this chapter is not 
to defend or to reject a celebrated thesis but
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rather to analyse or explicate in some measure 
an obscure but fundamental concept in moral 
philosophy. I\îy difficulties are made acute as a 
result of my simultaneous opposition to two views, 
namely formalism and the claim that the category 
of rules applies in morals in such a way as to 
make the category of principles redundant.
2. The terms 'activity* and 'field' are given 149
precise senses. As I propose to 'activity* in
this chapter an activity is always voluntary so
that one may or may not participate in it, its
standards in the latter case being simply
inapplicable to one's actions. A field on the
other hand, though voluntary in that one may or
may not pay heed to its standards, is not
voluntary in such a way that its standards can
ever become irrelevant to one's conduct.
Üinoe not only are moral principles 
applicable to our conduct regardless of what we 
choose to do, but so also are those of other 
fields, the ultimate character of morality cannot 
be explained in terms of the general applicability 
of its predicates alone.
3«- The historical connection of the doctrine 154
of the unconditional character of morality with
Kant's ethical theory is responsible for a good
deal of confusion. The problem is soon too often
as one of the kinds of commands morality may be
taken to consist in, whereas the real question is
what can be meant by the statement that the
commands of morality are unconditional. But for
this the responsibility is not mainly Kant's; his
use of 'imperative* is usually a metaphorical one.
What is the significance of the fact that 
the conditional form of sentence is often employed 
in the issuing of an imperative or command? It is 
possible that orders are three-valued in respect 
of obedience when the antecedent clause in such a 
form states certain conditions, but not when these 
conditions are made such that if the addressee 
chooses or wants not to do what the consequent 
clause mentions then he cannot be said to disobey 
the command (for then we no longer have a genuine 
order). Harsanyi's attempt to treat moral 




4* The temptation to construe moral principles I63
as hypothetical imperatives stems in part from an 
exaggerated belief in the justificatory power of 
want-statements. It is suggested that the 
explanatory-power of such statements is in fact 
generally poor, except in certain simple contexts.
5* Another source of the temptation to take an I67
impsrativist view of moral principles (and of
ethics generally) lies in the failure to see that
the concept of wanting is primarily non-overall in
the sense that we normally speak of our wants under
a ce te ria-paribus clause (generally understood
rather than explicit); our wants are not compelling
in the sense in which our decisions and verdicts
are. This shows the superiority of Kant*s appeal to
the notion of willing, instead of wanting, in his
account of hypothetical imperatives.
6. Lastly my own view on the problem is very 175
briefly argued. Morality being one of the fields 
the question arises in what relationships it stands 
to other fields. Whether or not morality is 
necessarily overriding in character, it seems to me 
that moral considerations override other consider­
ations over a large area of their application as a 
matter of logic.
But what is the rationale behind this logical 
situation? It is suggested that the ultimacy of 
moral principles can be explained by the place which 
our moral concepts occupy in our conceptual scheme.
The concepts of morality are presupposed in the 
operation of the concepts of other fields in a way 
which gives them primacy over the latter. Thus there 
may be rational beings who possess no concept of 
self-interest; and it is not at all difficult to 
imagine rational beings without religious concepts.
But some of the fundamental concepts of morality are 
necessarily implied by the notion of a rational 
being in intercourse with other rational beings.
But even if some moral concepts are primary 
in this way, what are we to say of the other 
concepts? An answer to this question may be 
attempted by considering a second line of concepts - 
for instance, generosity and kindness - which are 
a precondition of a great deal of what we value in
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human existence which is not distinctively moral.
The main thing here is that the concepts which 
are non-moral receive their full flowering only 
when the corresponding moral concepts exist, but 
that there is no corresponding necessity in the 
opposite direction.
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 182
